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ABSTRACT
The spate of civil wars in sub-Sahatan Afica has not only consumed people and
resources, it has raised issues regarding theù latent and patent causes, their impact on
dobal security and on the regime of laws on the use of force. This thesis is a
contribution to the discourse on those anxieties from a nuanced perspective using the
Liberian civil war as a case study. This approach has its obvious limitations, least of
which is the danger of illicit generalizations inherent in using one instance as
representative of all. Liberia's emergence as a state and its polity, however, has
parallels in other Afkican states.
These states emerged fiom European colonization and exploitation of Afnca,
which phenornenon was packaged as a proselytizing mission to "save the heathen
savages" o f that continent. The temtories in Afiica, which subsequently emerged as
states in the Euroçentric model, had little or no semblance to the pre-existing polities.
African states therefore owe their contemporary genesis and existence to global
morality and international law. It thus follows that those global changes in security,
econornics and politics would reverberate in them, sornetimes with deadly
consequences. While the European (re)partitioning of Afnca created socio-political
contradictions potentially inimical to a stable polity, a huge portion of the blarne for
the ubiquitous and chronic civil conflicts in that continent should be placed at the doorsteps of Afncan states themselves.
By decades of c o m p t and inept m i s d e , and systemic abuse of human rights,
these states denied themselves of interna1 legitirnacy capable of withstanding extemal
pressures. Such is the case with Liberia. It was created and sustained by a peculiar
American mix of racism and its messianic ardour to Save its fieed slaves fiom a selfcreated racial oppression. The interna1 contradictions in the new state were not so
obvious because of global pre-occupation with the politics of anti-colonialism and
intrigues o f the Cold War. This did not however stop the massive flow of military aid
and arms to that country and to the continent. With the end of the Cold War, the
seething discontent rose to the surface and the anns came handy.
The discontent in Liberia, which found expression in a violent rebellion, was
soon fanned across the sub-region by the inconsistencies of the Berlin boudaries in
Afnca. Faced with a defective global machinery for the resolution of a m e d conflicts,
what should the neighbouring States do? The West Afi-ican states found an answer to
that conundnun by forcefully intewening on the grounds of a collective security
interest in Liberia. In an age of widening conception of collective security, the West
AfFican states have urged as legal justifications, the invitation by the incumbent
President of Liberia, collective self-defence and an ex post facto ratification by the
Security Council. The last justification in itself presents additional problems and
worries regarding the citeria for such ex postficto ratification and dangers of abuse.
Would it become a hollow ritual to sanctiQ unilateralism in the use of force? What
should be the advisable role of regional bodies in i d e n t i w g and removing threats to
collective security when the Security Council seems paralysed?
This thesis attempts to tease out and examine the various ramifications of some
of these issues and concludes that the threads of legitimate govemance, state stability
and coherence in the world order are interwoven and integral to a holistic concept of
collective security.
C
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CHAPTER ONE
COLLECTIVE SECLlRITY AND THE LEGALITY O F THE ECOWAS
INTERVENTION IN TJ3E LIBERIAN C I V U WAR

On the eve of Christmas 1989, Charles Taylor, a Liberian fugitive, led a band of

armed dissidents allegedly trained in Libya and Burkina Faso, and attacked Northern
Liberia fiom Cote d'Ivoire. It marked the beginning of a militarized rebellion against the
authoritarian government of Samuel Kanyon Doe. Within six months of the crisis, half of
Liberia's population of 2 million had been intemally and extemally displaced and over
200.000 lay dead as direct victims of the rebellion. As the crisis raged, the United

Nations, short of its platitudes on peace, focused its attention on the Middle-East where
the events in KuwaitlIraq were unfolding. The detennined efforts of the Liberian

Representative at the United Nations failed to elicit serious response from the Security
Council. The persona1 and political interests of some West Afincan leaders in the crisis
and the cross-border ethnicity of West Afiïcan countries added fuel to the raging human
tragedy. Soon the rebellion acquired an ethnic character and colouration and became

more fiactious and deadly.
It was under those circurnstances that Presidents Babangida of Nigeria and
Rawlings of Ghana, acting under the aegis of the Economic Community of West AWcan
States (ECOWAS) spearheaded a regional campaigo to bring the crisis to an end. After
fniitless attempts at achieveing a negotiated settlement, the ECOWAS decided to
despatch a peacekeeping force. It was a decision taken in the face of opposition from
several fronts. On the opposing side were mainly the Francophone states of Cote d'Ivoire.

Burkina Faso and Togo. On the othe other side were the Anglophone states of Nigeria,
Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. On the battlefrelds, the decision to intervene was
bitterly opposed by the leading rebel faction, the National Patriotic Front of Libera

O.lfPFL). However, other factions such as the independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (INPFL)and the nunp of the Liberian -y,

the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL),

supported the ECOWAS decision. In addition, the embattled President Doe of Liberia
wrote ECOWAS asking for its intervention in the crisis.
The intervention by a majority of ECOWAS member states (later ratified by al1
rnembers) spanned a period of seven years and culminated in the holding of elections and
the inauguration of a democratically elected government in Liberia. While the dust of

conflict in Liberia may have settled, severaf issues arising fiom the causes ofthe conflicts
and the unprecedented intervention by a regional organization in what ostensibly was a

domestic matter of a sovereign state are stili extant. An inquiry into some of those issues
forms the subject of this thesis.
The Liberian state in its structure, polity and organization raises questions with

regard to the cnsis of statehood in Afnca and the urgent need for a redefinition of the
parameters of legitimate govemance in that continent. Further, the causes of the Liberian
conflict evoke interesting issues conceming the impact of global events and phenornena
on the stability and security of most Afkican states. The intervention is significant
because it marked the first active collaboration in peacekeeping by a regional
organization with the United Nations. This unprecedented development presents a fecund
area for exploring the fiontiers of international law.
This thesis explores some of the aspects relating to the United Nations Charter

regime on the use of force. In this broader context, some observations are pertinent. First,
the intervention impacts seriously on the contemporary regime on the use of force by
regional bodies, especialiy, when undertaken without the prior authorization of the
United Nations Security Council. Second, the intervention raises the question of whether
a regional organization can use force to maintain peace within its area of relevance, given
the paralysis of the Security Council and the increasing marginalization of Afnca as an

actor or subject of Security Council's states interest. With chronic UN indifference or
ha1f-hearted responses to militaristic conflicts in Sudan, Zaire, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Somalia, Burundi, and other
flashpoints in Africa, the temptation for relatively powerfbl neighbouring states to seize
the initiative and intervene cannot lightly be discounted. Moreso, when the chords of
ethnic affiliations have s w i v e d the European knife of division of Afnca at the 1883
Berlin Conference. One can only refer to the Watutsi (Tutsi) crisis in CentraEast Afnca
which has found expression in the infamous Rwandan genocide, Zairean war, and several
other ethnic motivated crisis in that part of the continent. Consequently, the dangers of
abuse inherent in the ECOWAS precedent may be worse than the Security Council's
notorious indi fference. The question then becomes how to improve the relationship
between the Security Council and regional organizations in the maintenance and
enforcement of peace.
Notwithstanding the diversity of the issues raised in the Liberian conflict and the
consequent miiitary intervention by ECOWAS, this thesis is limited in its scope of
inquiry. lt is pnmarily focused on a nuanced exploration of the conception and practice of
collective security and the inter-dependence of global peace and legitimate governance at

the municipal level. Towards achieving this objective, the historical, contemporary, legal
and social factors which trigered off the rebellion in Liberia occupy a substantial space in

this thesis. This aspect of the discussion hm been particularly difficult. This is so because
the injustice and brutality in Liberian political and constitutional history,' as in most
Afncan States, could have been avoided, or at least, substantially reduced.
In examining this situation, this thesis locates the seeds of the conflict, not only in
Liberia's (and by parity of reasoning, other Afncan states') historical foundations but
within the international statist h e w o r k . In determining the quotient of culpabi li ty
attributable to those Afncan countries, the objective is to suggest international legal
mechanisms by which the municipal factors of disturbance may be curbed. It also seeks
to address the means by which the regime may be rendered more accountable to the

required political order and to the international comrnunity to ensure collective security.
Further, the relevant doctrines on the enforcernent of peace are scmtinized in the
context of contemporary state practice. This naturally raises the question of whether we
are at the threshold of an era when regional organizations assume primary responsibility
for the maintenance of global peace on their own t e m s without substantive reference to

the United Nations Security Council. This implicitly questions the role and responsibility
of members of the Secwity Council, especially the permanent members. 1s theeir primary
responsibility owed to al1 states? Or is it a hostage of their respective national interests?
When China, Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States sit at the Security

Council, is it in the interest of humanity as a whole as they purport or is it prirnarily for
the protection and propagation of the limited Chinese, British, Russian, French or
I

Cassel Abayomi, Liberia: Hisros) of the First Afir'cun Republic (New York: Fountainhcad Publishers hc:

New York, 1970) at ii.
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Amencan agenda? If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, it may then be
asked whether that is a cue for the contemporary epidemic use of force by regional
bodies?
In other words, is there an emerging pattern of the United Nations "Franchising"

out its obligations to regional bodies? ït may weIt be argued that in some cases, there has
not been a wilful or deliberate "fianchise*' to regional bodies by the UN. Rather, the
responsibility has been wrested tiom the Security Council (in the face of its inaction) by
unilateral actions masked as multi-Iateralism. When this happens, the Security Council at
best, rnerely assumes the role of a helpless legitimizer. At worst, its aggrieved members
purport to decry the situation by rnaking ineffective and belated calls for compliance with
the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter.
There is a gap in a body of rules and principles to guide regional bodies and or
multi-lateral organizations deciding to act on behalf of the United Nations in securing
peace. There is hardly a clear modus operandi at international law goveming the
emergency relationship created between the United Nations and such regional
bodies/multi-lateral organizations when the latter take steps ostensibly calculated to
secure or restore peace or remove threats to international peace. With this ad-hoc and
emergency relationship quietly assurning the character of a rule (as evidenced by regional
initiatives in Bosnia and Kosovo by NATO, the OAS in Haiti, the ECOWAS in Liberia
and the ongoing SADC intervention in Zaire), practical and theoretical problems arise-

The problems arising fiom this r e c h g practice are examined in this thesis. Especially,
as such interventions stretch the traditional concepts of aggression, non-intervention, state

sovereignty, enforcement actions, and invitation of foreign intervention by effective

governments.
Furthemore, in identifyrng the Liberian crisis as a product of the end of the Cold
War and consequent active globalization of human rights, marked by a carnpaign for a
redefinition of the parameters of legitimacy of govemments,Lthis thesis argues that
international law has not remained irnpervious to these changes. It has moved almost in
tandem with the times and is in tum responding to and influencing the emerging practice.
In the context of the Liberian cnsis, this thesis explores how the emerging regime
impacts on the notions of collective security.

In the context of these emerging trends and issues, this thesis evaluates the
arguments on collective security as canvassed by the ECOWAS interveners in Liberia. It
approaches and concludes its analysis in three progressive and complementary parts. The
first approach is an examination of the causes of intemal violent conflicts in Afnca and
concludes with a set of preventative measures. This phase has both domestic and
international aspects. The second phase is on the adequacy of contemporary international
law regime on the use of force by regional organizations and concludes with arguments

on the probabie grounds for the legitimacy of ECOWAS intervention. The third phase is
on the impact of nsing regional assertiveness in the management of interna1 conflicts of
international character on the UN Charter. It concludes with a set of proposals for
containing and managing the growing assertiveness of regional security organizations in
their ready willingness to use force without the pnor authorization of the Security
Council.

In executing this three-phased approach to the Liberia. crisis, this thesis is

Reginald Ezetah, "Are We in a Grotian Moment" (1997) 13 International Insights, at 'll .mereinafter,
Ezetah]

divided into six chapters. The present chapter is merely introductoty and offen an
overview of the discourse in the entire thesis. However, chapter two of this thesis is

divided into five sections. The overall aim of this chapter is to situate the Liberian crisis
in its historicaVregiona1 context. It examines the Liberian crisis as symptomatic of the
phenornenon of troubled statehood in Africa and its impact on the political stability of
neighbounng states having identical or closely retated ethnic groups. It will demonstrate
that the notion that the Liberian civil war was a domestic problern of Liberia downplays
historical and contemporary factors such as boundary problems caused by colonial
intrusion in Afnca.
The "internal confiict" argument, which has been advanced by international Law
scholars to question the legality of the intervention, poses a formidable barrier and
challenge in appreciating the role of that factor in f i c a n regional security. Explicitly, it
contradicts the "regional security" argument made by the West African states as
justification for the intervention. Chapter one contends that in coming to a decision on the
legality or otherwise of the intervention, it is usehl to adequately situate the crisis in its
proper historical and geographic context. In deconstructing the "internal conflict"
argument, section one of chapter two introduces the subject while section two engages in
an historical examination of Liberia and argues that its emergence as a state was not

necessarily as a result of its capacity to be a state but largely a result of changes in
international politics. This pattern of creation of states in AEca, reaching its bizarre
height with the Berlin Partitionhg of Afiica in 1884, threw up a host of peopled
temtories of diverse ethnicity internationally recognized as states but lacking the
institutional structures necessary to sustain a modem state.

Further, the contemporary absence of a general idea or consensus of statehood
within those territories is shown as rooted in the manner in which these states came into
being and the poverty of vision and lack of transparent leadership endemic to the

continent. In the Liberian case, the intemal contradictions and fnistration of its hopes of
becoming a beacon in M c a was largely self-inflicted. The practice of black-upon-black
discrimination in Liberia Erom its origins is identified as the fundamental cause of this
lack of societal cohesion. This section argues that the internat political dynamics of
Liberia, which resulted in tragedy, were largely sustained by the myopia of the
international community. Those inherent weaknesses as exemplified by ethnic
discrimination, aristocratic opportunisrn and intimidation of the populace paved the way
for the eventual collapse of Liberia.
A situation where a group of people constituting less than five per cent of the

populace had absolute political control for over 125 years was bound to unravei
sometime. In s ~ m ,section one exposes the democracy in Liberia, an aristocratic
dictatorship, as a travesty. It argues that this sharn created a fragile polity and its fkagility
was demonstrated by the ease of the emergence of the dictatonhip of Staff-Sergeant

Samuel Doe which forms the general discussion in section three.
Section three of chapter two examines the emergent regime of Samuel Doe as a
final precursor to the rebellion. It explores the origins of the tyranny and the intimations
of its appetite for excessive bloodshed, cruelty and chicanery which distinguished it fkom
the previous regimes. This section equally examines the feeble attempts by some West

African states to deny the Doe coup d'etat the legitimacy it needed to sustain itself. It is
nearly impossible to escape the conclusion that Doe's tyranny was largely the result of

the prevailing Westphalian regime of non-intervention in the intemal affairs of sovereign
states and of Cold War politics. However, the seeds of Doe's eventual downfall, largely
sown at the inception of the regime were to bloom as soon as the Cold War ended.
Section four of chapter two analyzes the emergence of the militaristic rebellion in

Liberia, its character and motives. It explores the roles of various states in West Afnca in
the conflict, its ethnic dimensions, probable destabilizing influence in the sub-region and
its relationship to the Iegal parameters of the State of Liberia. In this context, the veracity

of the allegations of sabotage and subversion levelled against some West Afncan

countries (Heads of States) by Doe is scrutinized. The real motives behind the ECOWAS
intervention are also explored.
Section five of chapter two examines in detail the interna1 and external causes of
instability in West M c a and indeed AîÏica as a whole. Liberia is used as a case study.
An attempt is made in this section to underscore the destabilizing tendencies of colonial

boundaries in Afnca vis-a-vis the sanctity attached to them by heads of African states.
This section explores the threat to regional security posed by the many breaches of
humanitarian law by the Doe regime and the consequent crisis.
Within the global order, section five of chapter two also contends that the
legitimated tyranny of Doe lasted so long, not because he was invincible but as a result of
changes in global politics. The international complicity in legitimizing these breaches of
human nghts by the incoherent and self-serving application of the doctrines of nonintervention to Liberia is examinecl. While ostensibly keeping to the letter of that
doctrine, Doe's regime was the largest beneficiary in Sub-Saharan Afnca of American
economic and military aid until the end of the Cold War. Once the Cold War ended, Doe

lest his relevance and shortly thereafier, the interna1 violence erupted. In sum, chapter
two relates the Liberian tragedy to history, the perversion of the Liberian municipal polity

and to template shifis in global morality and security realignment.
The issue of collective security dominates discussion in chapter three. It has three
sections. Section one of chapter three is merely introductory of the subjects forming the
substance of the entire chapter. Section two examines the origins, constitutional structure
and jundical nature of the ECOWAS. Close attention is also paid to the regional politics
in and post-colonial influence on ECOWAS; especially the Anglophone versus
Francophone divide, and its impact on the capability of the organization to £Ûnction as a
regional mechanism for integration and economic growth. It also traces the evolution of
the ECOWAS as a regional securïty organization and its ingenious provisions regarding

collective security in the sub-region. Similarly, the dominant role of Nigeria and Cote
d'Ivoire in the regional organization is examined in the context of their impact on the
intervention by ECOWAS. The justifications by ECOWAS for its intervention in Liberia
are noted for subsequent anaiysis. The rebuttals by critics of the intervention are equally
noted in this section. However, as this thesis is pnmarily aimed at addressing the practice
of collective security in the nuanced contexts of kgitimacy of govemance in multi-ethnic

juridical states, the primary focus is on those justifications and opposing views which
bear directly upon the question of collective security.

Section three of chapter three extends the debate fürther by examining the origins
and practice of collective security, its evolution fiom a narrow concept to one which now
includes legitimate concems for economic development, protection of the environment,
democratization, population explosion and mass migration. This section also explores the

hijacking of the concept of collective security by regional and other foms of multilateral
security arrangements short of a unified and effective global collective security system. It
also relates this trend to the historical pretensions of the Holy Alliance. The question here
is whether ECOWAS had a legitimate collective security interest in the tragedy in Liberia

when it intervened. Chapter three is therefore concemed with the doctrine and practice of
collective security in the context of the West Afican region and its peculiarities.
Chapter four is devoted to analysis of the doctrine and practice of collective self
defence as an important aspect of collective security. The objective is to ascertain
whether the legal defence of collective self defence avails ECOWAS. The arguments
here are decidedly nuanced and located within the security peculiarities of the sub-region.
Towards a better appreciation of the arguments made in this part of the thesis, chapter

four is divided into five sections. Section one is introductory and periscopes subsequent

discussion contained in that chapter. Section two examines whether Doe could in the
circumstamces of the rebellion invite ECOWAS intervention and the capacity of the
ECOWAS to act on such invitation. Even if Doe could not invite extemal intervention,

the question still remauis whether ECOWAS,acting under the principles of its Protocol
on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) and the traditional principles of the nght of
CO llective

self defence, was entitled to intervene.

Section four examines the impact, if any, of the UN Charter on the traditional
elements of the doctrine. Attention is also paid to its doctrinal modification and
adaptation in the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD). The
characteristics of the PMAD, which in addition to the traditional concems for extemal
aggression, has provisions relating to mutual assistance on extenially supported intemal

rebellion are dissected in the context of the Liberian crisis. This prepares the ground for
subsequent discussion in section five.
Section five explores such questions as whether the PMAD provisions afford
legal justification for ECOWAS intemention in Liberia, the impact of PMAD on the
general notions on collective security vis-à-vis the question of what constitutes intemal or
domestic matter in an increasingly shrinking globe. Further the suitability of such
agreements as the PMAD for developing states like Libena caught in the grips of a
dictatonhip is closely analysed. Would such interventions not sustain the heavy hands of
tyrants in that part of the globe? How would the UN secunty system cope with the
growing regional assertiveness in the enforcement of peace? While this section and the
entirety of chapter four does not pretend to have definitive answers to these and many
questions, it explores the nuances of the issues raised and concludes that the ECOWAS
action in Liberia is defensible under the doctrine of collective self defence.
Chapter five has three sections of which section one is rnerely introductory.
Section two chronicles the expanding meaning of the phrase, "threat to international
peace" in its role as the trigger mechanisrn for the provisions of chapter 7 of the UN
Charter. It details the response of the UN to the tragedies in Haiti, Somalia and Sierra

Leone. The objective is to demonstrate that in recent times intemal crisis and tragedies
are increasingly being construed as threats to international peace. However, this section

argues that recent state practice shows an untidy and incoherent cornpliance with the
relevant Charter provisions. In most cases like that of Liberia, the relationship between

regional bodies and the Security Council in the application of chapter 7 of the UN
Charter is accidental and leaves much to be desired. This regrettable aspect appears to

present the Security Council with the need to rati@ whatever presumptous o r
unathourized measures that have been adopted by rnuiti-lateral security organizations
without the pnor authorization of the Council. The cases of Liberia and Kosovo are in
point.
Section three thus examines the juridical nature of UN Security Council
resolutions and traces its process of ratification of the ECOWAS action in Liberia. In this
section, attention is also paid to the probable reasons why the Security CounciI readily
ratified the ECOWAS action. I
's value as a precedent also forrns an aspect of the
discussion in section three. Section three and indeed the whole of chapter five concluCe
with the observation that in view of the Security Council's ratification, the ECOWAS

action, notwithstanding some of its obvious defects was lawful at international law.
Chapter six is the concluding chapter. Like the entire thesis, its contents are
divided into three parts. The f k t identifies the causative factors responsible for the
Liberian crisis and posits certain preventative measures. The second part examines the
adequacy or otherwise of contemporay n o m s regulating intra-state conflicts. The third
and final part evatuates the impact of the growing cases of regional enforcement actions
on the Charter regime. How can the international order utilize the advantages of regional
bodies without sacrificing a global mechanism for the maintenance and enforcement o f
peace? The common theme of the conclusion is that individual liberty, state stability,
regional security and systemic coherence are inter-linked. These are some o f the lessons
immanent in the Liberian crisis.

CHAPTER TWO
2.0: LIBERIA-A DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY AND THE SEEDS OF TRAGEDY

The civilized Liberian, to maintain his standing as a light and a
mler of the country, must live in some way aloof fiom the people he
govems. This is the custom in America and it is far more necessary in
~fnca.'
2.: LNTRODUCTION

Liberia is AErica's oldest republic and was founded by freed slaves fiom the
United States of Amenca. tt once was perceived as a fÎee and democratic society. Its e1ite
largely made up of the fkeed slaves fiom the United States held absolute sway over the
country and the pre-existing indigenous peoples of the country. The fkeed slaves, barely
constituting five per cent of the entire Liberian population, ruled for over 125 years,
warding off the political turbulence in neighbouring countries and lording themselves

over the majority number of members of the native ethnic groups. As the wave of coup
d'etats swept over Africa in the mid-sixties and seventies, Liberia appeared immune to
that phenomenon. This apparent immunity was not to last forever. In April 1980, a

handful of semi-literate soldiers of indigenous extraction, led by Samuel Doe stmck a
fatal blow to that regime. The injustice of the old order was replaced with a more terrible
one, culminating in human and matenal disaster for Liberia and its neighbours.
This chapter oulines and examines the history of Liberia and the phenomenon of
black-upon-black discrimination and section 2.2 argues that Liberia's emergence as a
state was not necessarily a result of its capacity to be one but largely a function of
3

Charles C.Boone, Liberia As I ffiuw Ir (Connecticut: Negro Univmities Press, 1970) at 8 1. The
"civilized"Liberian at the material tirne refened to the settlers from the United States. See also, Roger
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international morality which papered over its intemal problems and inadequacies.
Further, like most Afican countries, the inability of its elite to create an inclusive idea or
consensus of its statehood exacerbated the intemal contradictions in that country and
paved the way for the emergence of military dictatorship.
Section 2.3 examines the military tyranny of Samuel Doe in Libena, and its
appetite for excessive bloodshed, cruelty and chicanery. It spawned the eventual
rebellion. Similarly, it examines the feeble attempts at legitimacy of governance by some
West Afncan states. It argues that the length and success of Doe's t y r m y owed largely
to the prevailing Westphafian regime of non-intervention in the interna1 affairs of
sovereign states and to Cold War politics.
Section 2.4 analyzes the emergence of the militaristic rebellion in Liberia, its
character and motives. It explores the roles of various states in West Afnca in the
conflict, its ethnic dimensions and probable destabilizing influence in the sub-region.
Section five examines the international aspects of the Liberian conflict and impact of
extemal forces on Libena and other Afncan countries. The destabilizing tendencies of
colonial boundaries in &ca

vis-avis the sanctity attached to them by heads of African

States is also underscored. This section also explores the threat to regional security posed
by the humanitarian aspects of the Liberian conflict. In surn, chapter two situates the

Liberian tragedy in its history, the perversion of its municipal polity and in the

contemporary template shi£ts4 in global law, morality and security.

Jeffrey Roy, "The Emerging Ncxus of Transnational Govemanace and Subnational States: Shifting
Templates of International Thcory" (1997) 13 International Insighrs 17 1.

2.2: LIBERIAN STATEHOOD: HISTORY AM) CONTEXT

Liberia was conceived by political expediency in response to the paroxysm of
white racisrn in the United States of America. It was bom out of the fear by the white
Americans who could not contemplate CO-existencewith their freed black slaves? The
institiitionalized ensiavement, exploitation and denigration of the bIack race in the United
States is an embarrassing proof of humanity's amazing capacity for cruelty6

In the course of the journey of the estimated 40 million blacks to the Amencas,
the West Indies and different parts of the world for subsequent sale and exploitation, at
least two and a half million of their skeletons today lie buried at the bottom of the
~tlantic.' The magnitude of the evil of slavery and the suffering endured by the slaves
raised the question, "where was God at that time?" The propagation of the practice of
slavery by a people who fled fiom tyranny is a riddle. As one writer observed, "it is
stranger than fiction, yet it is tme that the very same people who fled from British
oppression to America to be Eree, as soon as they inhaled the first breath of fieedorn, they
tumed boldly and enslaved others."'
The economic impact of this diabolical trade is no less profound. The productive

value of slave labour in the United States prior to independence is said to be 02bil1ion.~

For Afnca, it was an unmitigated disaster so much so that the world's second largest
continent was set back for almost a thousand years and is still in relative economic coma.
5
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~ o w e v e r there
,
were still people in America who questioned the humanity and justice of
slavery as they believed it constituted "a monument of reproach...to principles of civil
liberty."'* Perhaps, this different attitude was not so much a moral conversion as it was a

calculated reaction to the economic and political dynamics of the institution of slavery

''

First, the rapid increase in the Negro population was already a matter of grave
concem in the United States of Arnenca as the industrial age was undermining the
By 1820 there were at
econornic raison d 'etre of slavery - cheap labour for agri~ulture.'~
l e s t a quarter of a million fieed slaves in the United States and there was the question of

what to do with them. This question merged with the fear by the slavers of the Iooming
prospect of equality at law with fieed slaves. Thus, the legislature of Virginia had in 1800
requested its members in the United States' Congress to "correspond with the President
on the subject of purchasing land without the limits of this state whither Dersons
obnoxious to the law or daneerous to the Deace of societv mav be removed."13 What was
to be done with the fieed slaves? It was at this historical juncture that the Amencan
Colonization Society was born. Itts objective was to "rescue" free people of colour and
to colonize them outside the United States "where they might enjoy the blessings of

Second, the season of unease and fear was fûrther fbeled by the Negro revolt Ied
by Nat Turner in August 1831.15 He organized an insurrection against slave-owners and

in the process more than 60 slave-owners were killed. As a fearful precedent, this act of
violent defiance struck terror into the hearts of several members of the establishment and
thus strengthened the case for colonization. The Society persuaded the fieed Negroes to
emigrate to Afnca and those who bought the argument reasoned thus: "1 am an Afncan
Ibid.
Roger Clark, supra note 3 at 14.
E. Dunn and S. Holsoc, "Hisrot-ïcdDictionary of Liberia" (London: Scarccrow Press, 1985) at 5 . Save
for Cuba and Brazil, the institution of slavery was no longer economical in othcr places.
'' Wilson Charles,Liberia (New York: William Sloan Associates., 1947) at 8. (cmphasis addcd)
" Ibid, at 13.
" ~ u ~note
r a 3 at 34.
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and in this country, however rneritorious my conduct and respectable my character. I
cannot receive the credit due to either. 1 wish to go to a country where 1 shall be
It was to West Afnca that they
estimated by my merits and not by my c~rn~lexion."'~
would eventually go.
In 1816, Paul Cuffee, a half-Negro fiom Massachusetts perfonned the first
expenment on emigration to West Afkica when with pomp and merriment he set sail with
38 fieed slaves. Soon Alexander Hamilton, James Monroe, President lames Madison,

Bushrod Washington (brother of George Washington), Daniel Webster and Henry Clay
were persuaded of the "peculiar moral fitness in restonng the Negroes to the land of their
fatilers.'"

'

However, a large majority of the Negroes kicked against the objectives and
activities of the Society dismissing them as "unrnerited stigma attempted to be cast upon
the reputation of the f?ee people of colour."'* ï h e Society succeeded in gathenng
information about the M c a n Coast nom the British home office and slavery abolitionist
groups. At this juncture, the United States' Congress passed the "Slave Trade Act of
1819" empowering the United States President to "make such regulations and

arrangements as he may deem expedient to safeguard, support and remove Atncans
stranded in the United

ta tes."'^ This legislation afforded the legal basis for the dispatch

by the govenunent in 1820 to Afnca of the vesse1 "The Elizabeth" with 300 Afncans
rescued fiom slave carrying ships.
On April25, 1822 the immigrants landed on the West Coast of Aûica at a place
called Montserrado and t w k possession of the ceded Providence Island. The seeds of
Liberia had been sown. By 1837 the idea of a colony on the West Coast of Afica for

fieed slaves fiom the United States became an unfolding reality. The little band of
16
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colonists at Montserrado (later renarned Monrovia in honour of President James Monroe,
the fifth U.S President) organized and expanded their original temtory by purchasing

land fiom the natives. To convince the majority of the Negro population who remained in
the United States to emigrate to Monrovia, the reports by the Society spoke glonously of
a people who now "enjoyed the liberty once denied them and know nothing of that

debasing inferiority stamped on us [them] in ~ m e r i c a . " ~ ~
The new colony was threatened fiom diverse quarters and its status denied. The

British and the French encroached upon and significantly decreased the original extent of
the colony but the United States declined to intervene and in desperation, the young

colony on July 26, 1847 declared itself a republic. It chose the name "Liberia" fiom the
Latin for freedom-liber and the ''ria" for euphony.21~ecognition
of the new republic was
quick in coming from the least expected quarters. Great Bntain, Denmark, Belgium and
France were quick in granting recognition to the young republic. Ironically, it took the
United States 15 years to recognize Liberia because the American South resisted the idea
of receiving a black envoy in ~ a s h i n ~ t oY
net
.,
~ the
~ mode of govemance in the young
republic was tailored d e r that of the United States of Arnerica. Its Declaration of

Independence read like the American Declaration of Independence. And like the
American original, no native Liberian was signatory to the all-important document. It's
Constitution defined "Liberians" as "onginally the inhabitants of the United States of
~ r n e r i c a *Its
' ~ motto
~
read " the love of liberty brought u s here." in effect, the natives
who were not "former inhabitants of the United States" were not deemed to be
"Liberians." The politics of exclusion had begun.
Liberia was thus founded upon and sustained on the supposed superiority of the
Americo-Libenans over the natives. As Liebenow larnented,
20
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[Tlhe experiment in colonization was not the 'in-gathenng o f
Afnca's Iost children. These were Americans, and their views of Afiica
and the Africans were essentially those of nineteenth-century whites in the
United States. The bonds of culture were stronger than the bonds of race,
and the settlers cIung tenaciously to the subtle differences that set them
apart Eom the tribal 'savages' in their midst. It was not then (nor is it
today) unusual to hear tribal people refer to the Arnerico-Liberian as
'white'
In living out their American fantasies, they became more Amencan than their

former masters in the United ~ t a t e s , ~ ~ r n a ak ifetish
n ~ of their exposure to the west.16 As
they regarded the natives as the country's greatest problem27astate policy of political and
economic exclusion of the natives was created and thus subverting the very logic behind
their colonization in Afnca. A country founded for Afiicans long tom fiom their roots

and with the fond hope that they would feel at home in A f i c a amidst their kin was
detennined to distance itself culturally and spiritually tiom its roots. It looked up to
America and desired everything Amencan. A people rejected by America was bending
over backwards to love America Yet, the love was hardly reciprocated.

According to Merran Fraenkel, whose incisive and monumental work on Liberia
remains a classic,
[Tlhey identified themselves closely with the way of Iife of the
New World, despite their repudiation of the role in which they had been
cast in it.. .They were expatriates rather than repatriated: they were not
buoyed up-as were the Jews in Israel for example-by the idea that they
were returning to their ancestral continent. Indeed, the entire Declaration
contains no mention whatsoever of Afnca as the land of their forefathers,
despite the fact that, for some of thern, Afnca may have been only one or
two generations back.. .Afica was a strange and barbarous continent; their

'' Liebenow, supra note 22 at 15.
Merran Fraenkel, Tribe and C h s in Monrovia (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) at 14.
[Hereinafter, Fraenkel] To the consternation of the natives, the Americo-Libcrians wore three piece suits in
tropical heat; had large houses and kcpt their Christian faith and Anglo-saxon narnes. It was only in the
early 1970's that the Liberian leaders deigned to Wear any clothes indicative of thcir African pedigree. For
over 150 years, the official attire in Liberia and which was sbictly enforced was a suit.
16 Ibid.
"~ndersonEarle, Liberia-America S Afican Friend (North Carolina: Chape1 Hill, 1964) at 8.
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'native land' was America.
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This rejection of their Afncan heritage was also reflected in the country's foreign
policy and in their attitude to the struggle for independence by colonial Africa. The

prevailing emotion exhibited by the ruling class in Liberia to the emergent wind of
freedom m d end to colonialisrn in Afnca was sheer apprehension. According to the then
Liberian Secretary of Defence in his Annual Report for 1960,
[Wjith the attainment of independence of Our sister Afiican
brothers contiguous to our borderline, problems which we never thought
of are arising and have to be grappled with every degree of eficiency and
alertness. Not only are the problems of the crossing into our temtories of
citizens of other States involved but also the question of national
ideologies, some of which are divergent to ours and destined to threaten
and uproot the very foundation upon which our democratic institution was
f~unded.~~
It also denounced the pan-~f?ican30rhetoric of Marcus Garvey on "Afnca for
AfXcans" and at the San Francisco debates on the proposed United Nations, the Liberian

Legation reminded the pan-Afncanists that Liberia was there "to represent a nation not a
race."3' In the pertinent remarks of Fraenkel, "their self-identification as 'inhabitants' of
North America', and their apparent lack of any feelings of sentiment towards Africa,

were of vital importance in determinhg the manner in which the new settlement
d e v e ~ o ~ e dIt. "was
~ ~ also to set the stage for the tyranny of Samuel Doe-a native Liberian.

The first Amenco-Libenan settlers also had pretensions of superiority over some
of their very class. Thus, the mulatto affected superiority over their contemporaries of
darker pigmentation and for some time monopolized politics and commerce on that

b a ~ i s The
. ~ ~Negroid West Xndian statesman, Edward Wilmot Blyden who emigrated to
Liberia in 1855 was politically fiustrated by the mulatto on the basis of colour and broke
- -
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-
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-
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ranks with the mling Republican Party in 1867 in opposition to the "mulatto
oppression."3J in the fullness of tirne, the mulatto oligarchy naturally withered away and
metamorphosed into an oligarchy of the very dark pigmented Arnerico-Liberians. In al1
these ebb and tide of class power in Liberia, the lot of the natives' stagnated. Worse still.
the Americo-Liberians were in political control even in the remote hinterlands. One may
then opine that the clear stratification of the Liberian society at inceptjon was a tool and
at once, a consequence of intra-racial economic exploitation and political exclusion.

Strictly speaking, it was a black-upon-block apartheid regime lacking normative
legitimacy.
In addition to this testy relationship with the natives who themselves had d i f i s e
geographic boundaries, the encroachrnent on the young republic's temtory by the
European powers continued and3%etween 1847 and 1910 Liberia had Iost 44% of its
original temtory. By its Treaty of 1885 with Great Britain, it had been forced to pan with
a sizable portion of its coastline to British S i e m Leone. This phenornenon attracted the

anger, if not the action of the United States which in the Tafi Commission Report of 1909
Iamented that Liberia

"as an independmi power may speedily disappear fiom the

map."36
For 125 years, the Arnerico-Liberians, who constituted less than 5% of the

Liberian population, excluded the natives fiom the government of Liberia and
monopolized al1 political, economic and social positions of erninen~e.~'It was only in
1963 that an attempt was made to uni@ the laws of the land and integrate the disparate

native groups.38 If democracy is to be understood as the spread of potential political
34
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power tô wider groups in s o ~ i e t ~there
, ) ~ was no democracy in Liberia. The rule of the

T N ~Whig Party (TWP) was a g o v e r n e n t of the few by the few and for the few, a
classic exemplar of aristocratie dictatorship. in spite o f the occasional political
differences amongst the settler elite, there was one body against whom they fôund unity-the natives. Prior to the arriva1 of the settlers fiom the United States, the political

structure of the disparate native groups varied from one ethnic group to the ~ther.''~
The
stabi lized and sophisticated groups existed alongside the amorphous and di ffûsely spread
groups. As Liebenow observed, the amorphous ethnic structure and spread of the native

groups in Liberia did not help mattersa' Most Liberian native groups lacked the political
sophistication and solidity of 42contemporary States or of the famed empires and
kingdoms of pre-colonial West Afnca such as the Mali Empire, the Songhai Empire, the
Benin Kingdom or the Oyo ~ r n ~ i r e . ~ ~
The political structure of the native groups was pnrnarily based on kinship

cemented by religious, cultural and social ties. The diffise nature of political authority
built as it were on lingual, cultural and religious pecuIiarities was alien to the settlers.
Commenting on the fluidity and flux nature of pre-colonial boudaries and societies
amongst Liberian ethnic groups, Liebenow m e r observes that "there has always been a

certain amount of fluctuations of tribal boundaries. The constant search for new
agricultural lands or the flight from a r b i t r q rulers have constantly driven people into
previously uninhabited and uncharted sections of ~ i b e r i a . 'For
~ some of the ethnic
groups, membership in a group was by a mere sense or consciousness of b e l ~ n ~ i n ~ . ' ~
39
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Thus, the political boundaries between the native groups was so difhse that it
had meaning only in the context of culture and language. Liebenow thus concludes that

"apaxt fiom the Mandingo-dominated kingdom of Kondo at Bopolu, Liberia had nothing
resembling the complex trading kingdoms found elsewhere in West ~ f n c a . " There
~
are
sixteen major native groups in Liberia and only two, the Bassa and the Kpelle constitute
more than ten percent of the total population.47The rest of the ethnic groups respectively
constitute five percent of the entire Liberian population. The eventual controi and
domination of the natives by the settlers was by a gradua1 process of expansion by
conquest aided by supenor firepower and deeds of cession of landed temtory to the
immigrants.
The relative ignorance and poverty of the natives was a tool with which the
settlers perpetuated their hegemony. For instance, franchise was dependent upon proof of
literacy in English language and property rights.48 Perhaps not surpnsingly, while the
natives lived in the hinterlands, the schools where literacy in EngIish language could be
acquired were located in the distant coastal areas inhabited by the settlers. The eariiest
natives who acquired the franchise were those who served and waited on their settler
masters. To further reduce the native nwnber in this enchanted circle of enfianchised
citizens, the government opened its doors to fkeed slaves fiom the West Indies. This
ingenious plan failed largely as a result of the emancipation of slaves in the United States
and tales fiom Liberia in the United States of the numerous confiicts between the settlers

and the natives.49
in futile rejection of this intemal colonialism, the Krus, a seafaring native group
revolted in 1915 and the Golas also engaged the settler govenunent in a bloody war in
46
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1918. These were military efforts by the natives to put off the yoke of the settlers. These

rebellions were viciously put d o m with arms and soldiers of the United States' =y.
The outcome of these conflicts, to bonow the words of Maugham, was that the "natives
were broken" and "no more troubles were experiencedWM
fiom them. The hegemony of
the settlers was further sustained by the instrumentality of a monolithic party machinery

built around the True Whig party.'' Membership and ascendancy in the TWP was a direct
fiinction of rnembership in the Masonic Order which in itself refùsed admission to the
nativess2This ubiquitous and powerhl organization founded in 1867s31iterallycontrolled
Liberian politics and economy. What was good for the members of the Masonic Order
was good enough for the party and, in turn, the country.

The emergence of William Tubman in 1944 with his promise of enhanced native
participation in the govemance of Liberia wilted as the ruling elite once again preferred
to inject "new blood" of t h e i own "race.""

This was a revival of the policy of

encouraging the emigration of Negroes From West Indies. As this project failed to stem
the tide of native agitation for equal access to power, the elite resorted to terror. Thus,
when Didhwo Twe, a native and leader of the opposing Refonnation Party opposed

Tubman's re-election bid for the presidency in 195 1 elections, he was speedily charged
with treason on very spurious evidence. He fled the country and of course, Tubman won
the ele~tion.~'
Later Tubman sought to integrate the natives but a large number of the

elite were opposed to the idea
The position of Tubman was a response to the climate in Afnca at the prevailing
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penod. -The other natives in colonial Africa were agitating for self-nile. Politically
inspired riots were already widespread in countries like Sierra-Leone, Guinea, Ghana,
Nigeria and the other West African countries. Liberia, thus operated a form of intemal
.~~
colonialism, a subtler form of apartheid which the natives could not ~ n d e r s t a n dGiven
that al1 the other countries in Afnca were labouring under "white" colonial rule, it was
natural to reduce coloniaIism to a "white against black" paradigm. To be coionized and
suppressed by their own race was beyond their comprehension and unlike their kith and
kin in colonial Afnca who were eagerly looking forward to seeing the backs of the
European colonizers, the Liberian natives were stuck with the Arnerico-Libenans.
It is under these prevailing circumstances that Tubman's resolve to quickly
integrate the natives in the politics and govexnance of Liberia should be seen as a
mastentroke to Save the status

Tubman quickly liberalized Liberian citizenship

rights to gant citizenship to al1 the native Liberians. The franchise was also apparently
liberalized. As a master politician, he contrived a system of cosmetic integration of the
natives but which essentially sustained the settler domination of Liberia. Thus, in 1946
although the natives constituted ninety seven percent of the population, they had only
twenty percent of the seats at the Lower House. Worse still, the native seats were held by

Tubman's lackeys and c h ~ n i s - s i n ~ e rFor
s . ~ instance,
~
in 1955, this Iegislature, acting on
the Tubman view that opposition parties were "dangerous, unpatriotic, illegal...and

unconstitutional'*~9~~tlawed
al1 major opposition parties.
The elections, especially the presidential election, were a total sham. For instance,
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Supra note 52 at 113. The nomination by the T.W.P ensurcd that native "troublemakers" could not fmd
their way to the Congrcss.
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in the 1959 elections Tubman scored 530,474 votes as against 55 votes recorded for his

opPoneni.* In faimess to Tubman, similar feats had been recorded by past Liberian
Presidents. For instance, in the 1923 elections in which 6000 voters had been registered,
President King had miraculously retumeu 45,000 votes to clinch the pesidency!" The
educated native elite were not spared by the Americo-Liberians. In 1968, Edward
FahnbuIlah, a Liberian diplomat of native extraction, was charged with treason and in
spite of the scanty and dubious evidence presented, convicted and his property
confiscated. The trial fiuther polarized the settler elite and the natives.62Three years afier
the spectacle of the Fahnbullah trial, President Tubman died and was succeeded by his

deputy, William f o l b e d 3 in spite of Tolbert's liberal posture, "the upper levels of
governent and the economy were still controlled by about a dozen interrelated
Arnerico-Liberian f a m i ~ i e s . ' ~
The declining economic fortunes of the country M e r worsened the situation.
Opposition against the regime gained strength and courage. The heart of this newly
strengthened attitude lay in the student body especially inside the University of Liberia.

The Togba Tipoteh led Movement for Justice in Afnca (MOJA) was the most prominent
of these groups and was aIso supported by extemai bodies of opposition such as the
United States based Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL) led by Bacchus
~abriel.~~T
h e soon metamorphosed into a political party -The People's Progressive
PAL

Party (PPP) and declared its readiness to oppose Tolbert in the elections6%ut the Tolbert
regime refused to register the PPP.~'
Following a controversial subsidy placed on the price of nce (Liberia's staple

*1 fbid.
O

Supra note 52 at 1 14.
6'fbid.
b3 Supra note 12 at 53. Tolben med to heal the wounds of the Fahnbullah trial by releasing the diplomat
from prison and rehabilitatiug him.
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food) the MOJA issued a 'General Declaration of Rice and Rights" enjoining the
populace to march in protest against the rice subsidies? According to Amadu Sesay, "the
rice riots of April 1979 marked a tuming point in the history of ~ibena.'"~
The issue here
was that the government insisted on subsidizing imported rice and refused to extend a

similar policy to locally cultivated rice which was even cheaper than the imported one.

The Americo-Liberians dominated the rice import business in Liberia. While the landing

cost of the imported rice was $30, the govemment was willing to pay the difference of $8
per bag to stabilize it at its standard prize of $22 per bag. Meanwhile it could have paid
the local farxners $3 per bag of rice to reduce the cost of locally grown rice fiom $25 to
$22 per bag of n ~ e . ~Therefore,
'
the proposed subsidy was generally perceived as a
means to further enrich the dominant class who monopolized the nce imporation

business. The PAL preference for stoppage of rice imports and encouragement of local
nce farmers was rejected by the governemnt.
Consequently, PAL called for a public demonstration but on the proposed date,
just as it was proposing to cal1 off the strike and defuse tension, govemment forces acting

precipitously,7'descended on the hapless demonstrators. in the process over 200 people
were feared dead. Harsh prison sentences were imposed on the alleged perpetrators of the
no t. The PPP ieadership was charged with capital

off en ce^.^^

Apparently, the Tolbert

govemment was running short of ideas on rational govemance of Liberia. In his last
tirade, the embattled President vowed to deal with the opposition in such a way " that
they will never nse again.""

-
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2.3: THE DAWN O F DICTATORSHIP AND THE SOUND O F REBELLION
Had we been candid about the standards of govemment in Libena it would
have been very darnaging to US interests.. .Great powers don? reject their
partnen just because they smell." Chester Crocker, Former US Assistant
Secretary of State for Anican Affairs (1981-88), 4 February 1993.
We had the Liberian Executive Mansion pretty well wired. So we knew
what was going on in the Mansion. Womanising until 3 am? Chester
Crocker.

Perhaps 1 made a wrong career choice if it was people like that 1 was
going to meet. Doe was unintelligible? George Schultz, U S Secretary of
State 1980-1988.

On the night of 1lthday o f Apnl 1980, a group of seventeen semi-illiterate junior soldiers
of native background led by a scmfQ 28 year old Master-sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe
stmck a fatal blow to the 133 years old rninority rule of Libena. In that night of the long

knives, President Tolbert and 27 o f his guards were butchered. Like al1 coup d'etats. it
was a secretive plot which upstaged the prevailing political order.'?

in his maiden

broadcast to the nation, the miiitary j u t a read out a litany of evils allegedly committed
by the defunct oligarchy. It imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, closed all Liberian borders

and set up a Military Tribunal to try the members of the defûnct regime for alleged
corruption, treason and vioiation o f human rights.
This body of seventcen was composed of seven sergeants, eight corporals and two
privates. None had gone beyond high school. Their modest ranks were soon to be
74
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David Steven, Third World Coups d 'etat and International Securis, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987) at 7. In a ratha belated substantive analysis of the causes of the Doe coup, Mr.
H e m Cohen, the then United States' Assistant Secretaxy of State for Afncan Affairs, in his testimony
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United States accorded the rninority govcfnment legitimacy and never for once used its good offices to
raise the issue.
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dropped for more glorious epaulettes. The junta called itself the "Peoples Redemption
Council" (PRC). The first few days of the coup was marked by excesses in vendetta on

and widespread looting of the assets of the vanquished elite which were punished with
extra judicial l ~ i l l i n ~ s . ~ ~

This penchant for bloodshed was to characterize the regime. Apart fiom declarïng
martial law, it disrnissed the top echelon of the Liberian civil service, assumed legislative
and executive powen,79suspendedthe Constitution of Liberia and disbanded the Supreme
Court. Assets and property of the top mernbers of the True Whig Party were summarily

confiscated and bold promises to right the wrongs of the past were announced. While the
coup d'etat was welcomed by a large majonty of Liberians as it dispensed with the hated
oligarchy of the Tme Whig Party, its excesses were condemned by some Afncan
countries for at least, three reasons.
First, the assassinated President Tolbert was at the material time, the Chairman of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and was widely respected by his colleagues

with whom he had developed some deep personal relationships. One of Tolbert's sons
was rnanied to a daughter of the Ivorian Head of State, Felix Hougheout ~ o i g n ~His
.'~

murder by Doe's forces at the premises of the French embassy where he had sought
refuge was to play a significant part in Boigny's subsequent support for the rebellion
against Doe.
Second, although a considerable number of Afncan rulers came to power via the
instnimentality of coup d 'etats, Doe's coup was by al1 comparative standards excessively
bloody. No less than 200 pesons were killed in the first three days of the putsch. This
bloodletting continued with the brutal execution of the 13 top members of the Tolbert

regime. The procedure adopted in their hasty trial and execution did not have any
redeeming qualities. They had been summarily tried without any legal representation and
78
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in spite-of weak and brief global protests, were executed in a gross and sadistic manner:
tied to stakes and without blindfolds, they were machine-gumed to death before a gleetûl

crowd. The International Commission of Jurists issued a statement on Apnl 23, 1980
describing both the trial and execution as violations of accepted international

No

sanctions or other serious normative measures were adopted or pursued by the
international conununity against the Doe regime. Third, Doe's coup came at a time when
Afnca was coming to terms with the tragedy of the tyranny in ugandas2 and Bokassa's
excesses in the Central Afncan Republic.
For these and other reasons, Liberia's delegation to the contemporaneous special
session of the OAU Council of Ministers was refùsed admission to the conference venue
in Lagos, Nigeria. Similarly, the Liberian delegation led by Doe himself was refused
participation at the Economic Cornrnunity for West Afkican States (ECOWAS) Summit
convened in Lome, T O ~ O . ' ~Cornmendable as these measures were, hindsight shows that
the international community should have completely refùsed to accord the Doe regime
any legitimacy at all. Doe's response to these measures betrayed his rashness. He recalled

the Liberian ambassadors in Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra ~eone"and on June 14,
1980 Liberian troops invaded the French embassy and arrested Adolphus Tolbert, the

brother of the slain President Tolbert. Similarly, in February 1883 when a Sierra Leonean
newspaper allegedly libeled him, President Doe unilaterally closed the borders between
Liberia and Sierra Leone and threatened to keep it closed until the Sierra Leonean
goveniment shut down the offending n e w ~ ~ a ~This
e r .rashness
~~
and contempt for the
due process of law portended the greater evil, bloodshed and severe regional dislocations

which Doe would precipitate.

'' Supra note 66 at 30406
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R. Welch, "The OAU and International Recognition: Lessons From Uganda" in Yassim El-Ayoutry.
ed., The OAU After Ten Years (New York: Praeger, 1975) at 103-1 17.
Ibid.
West Afiica Magazine, 7 March 1983 at 598. Note that Sierra Leone rcfiised the dcrnand and theu
international borders were for that reason closed for over 8 rnonths
85 Ibid.

-The new helmsmen lacked the sobriety required of their new station in life.
Barely a fortnight after taking power, they announced rapid promotions for themselves

ranging fiom the comrnissioned officer ranks of Major to five-star General. Doe leapt
fiom the lowly rank of Master-sergeant to the dizzying height of a five star General of the

Liberian Armyg6and increased the salaries of the military by 150 percent. It is equally

siginificant that of the 27 cabinet members constituted by the PRC, ten were fiom the
Krahn-speaking part of Liberia- the same ethnic background as Doe; 5 members were
fiom the

Kru speaking part; 7 from the GioMano speaking region and 4 fiom the mixed

Lofa speaking parts of Liberia. in effect, the soldiers had learnt the politics of ethnicity
and exclusion fiom the old order." This was soon to becorne a factor in the ultimate
cnsis.
Within the caucus of the PRC, cracks soon appeared. It was becoming clearer that
Doe's rabble-rousing rhetoric on "African socialism" and diatribes against the
"corruption of capitalism" was a cover for his quest for ultimate persona1 control of
Liberia. For instance, some members of the PRC preferred a leaning towards the
communist Soviet U-Uon. This attitude appeared not to go down weil with Doe and his
then deputy, Bng-Gen Quiwonkpa who preferred to sustain the Liberian connection with
the United statesg8 Doe's camp prevaiied and the pro-socialist camp led by MajorGeneral Weh Syen was marked for destruction. Both camps disagreed openiy. The proAmerican camp ordered the Soviet embassy to reduce its embassy staff by half for acts
described as "unbecoming attitude."89 The Libyan Legation, called "the Peoples
~ureau,**~w
asked
a s to shut down and leave Liberia within two months. This antagonism
with Libya was to become a critical factor in the subsequent crisis as the rebels were
86
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alleged to have Libyan support.
Three months after this split, 13 lower ranking officers sympathetic to the Weh
Syen camp were implicated in an alleged coup plot against Doe and executed for treason.
Three months after the executions, Weh Syen himself and four members of his camp
were allegedly implicated in another coup plot and also executed for treason. Doe
constantly changed his cabinet and created a personality cuk9' As at December 1991,
only two of the original 17 members of the PRC were alive." The only potentiai threat to
Doe's persona1 rule of Liberia was his charismatic deputy, General Quiworikpa, a
GioMano of the Nimba County of northem Liberia. The Gio/Mano ehtnic group
straddles Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. Doe's prompt demotion of Quiwonkpa was rejected
by the latter.
Quiwonkpa was consequently dismissed fkom the Liberian A m y and expelled
from the PRC.~)One rnonth later, he was implicated in a 'plot' to overthrow Doe

allegedly sponsored by the defimct Soviet Union and

ha na.^^

In spite of their

protestations of innocence, the ambassadors of both countries in Liberia were
General Quiwonkpa fled to Cote
respectively asked to leave w i h foriy-eight ho~rs.~'
d'Ivoire through Nimba but Doe quickly rounded up those suspected to be sympathetic to
Quiwonkpa and had them tried for treason. Doe's crackdown on the perceived opposition

-

and rivals was not restricted to his primary constituency the military or the traditional

political class. It extended to the student body in Liberia.
The students had expressed shock and disapproval of his brutal execution of the
13 members of the Tolbert cabinet and were agitating for refonns. Doe banned by decree
91
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the hol-ng of parties in the higher institutions o f Liberia on the grounds that they were a

In 1984, a civil
subterfuge for inciting the youths against his "revoluti~n."~~
demonstration was brutally quelled by Doe's security forces and at least 40 people were
killed in the process.97 It is equally significant that Doe's regime was rnired in fraud and
~om~tion.~*
The clamour for a speedy return to civil nile did not affect Doe's intention to

succeed himself as the President of Liberia. A cornmittee headed by Amos Sawyer was
set up to draft a new constitution for ~ x b e r i a ' Doe
~
forrned the National Democratic

Party of Liberia (NDPL) and named himself as the party's presidential candidate. Other
political parties such as the United People's P w (UPP) led by Gabriel Bacchus
Mathews, the Liberian People's Party (LPP) led by Amos Sawyer, the Liberian Action
Party(LAP) led by Tuan Wreh, and the Unity Paity(UP) led by Edward Kessely were
floated. As the new Liberian constitution pegged the qualifjmg age for the presidency at

35 yean, Doe's true birth date of May 6, 1952 disqualified him fiom m i n g but by
diverse means, his age was "corrected" to show that he was bom in 1 9 5 0 . ' ~To make

assurance doubly sure, he rescheduled the e!ection tirnetable and fixed the presidential
elections for 8h October 1985.101He resorted to a systematic and vicious crackdown on
the opposition. On August 19, 1985, he "uncovered" a plot by Professor Amos Sawyer,
the leader of the LPP to overthrow hùn. Sawyer was arrested alongside three othen and

irnrnediately charged with treasodo2In an official statement, Sawyer's plot consisted of
a campaign '20 create confusion, fear, distxust and division among the people" and thus
secure the "resignation" of President Doe. "'~urther allegations were that Sawyer and his
-
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supporters intended to blow up important public buildings and set fire to the capital city
of ~ o n r o v i a . ' ~ ' ~ nagain,
ce
the students demonstrated agaiwt Doe's increasing tyranny
and in response, Doe's presidential guards opened fire on thern.'05

Bolstered by the huge aid and finances pumped into Liberia by the United States,
Doe had ample resources for his unprecedented repression of the Liberian people.
Between 1980 and 1985, Doe received over USDSOO million in aid and military wares
from the United States. While this aid was supposedly meant to bolster Liberia's defense
from the forays of Libya's Ghaddafi, "it is unlikely that President Doe would have been
able to entrench himself in power without this unconditional support.r r 1 0 6 Doe dissolved
the PRC and constituted an Interirn National Assembly with h h s e l f as the head.Io7 It is
significant to note that it was under the regime of Doe that his ethnic group, the Krahnspeaking part of Liberia and the Mandingoes, gained relative political ascendancy over
other ethnic groups in terms of domination of political appointments in ~iberia.'~'
As the election date drew near, President Doe banned the popular Liberian
People's Party led by the embattled Amos Sawyer on the ground that it advocated
"foreign i d e o l ~ ~ i e s "and
' ~ ~had thus innùiged the elec%ral laws. In addition, some
opposition figures were mested for "spreading lies, nimours and misinf~rmation""~and
charged with treason.' '' It was under this situation that the presidential election was held
on the 151h of October 1985. The electoral commission had as its vice chaiman Mr.
David Gbala, an NDPL P o e ' s political party) activist.
Despite credible allegations of electoral irregularities, on October 29, 1985, Doe
was

announced the wimer of the elections with 50.9 per cent of valid votes cast.'I2 The
--

-

Ibid.
los Ibid.
106
Supra note 52 at t 35.
107
Keesing S Contemporary Archives (1985) (London: Longman Publication, 1 985) at 33 322.
'O8 Supra at 33323.
109
Keesing
's ContemporaryArchives ( 1 986) (London: Longman Publication, London, 1986) 34 146.
l IoIbid.
" Ibid.
Ibid.
lm

' ''

opposition parties protested and contended that Jackson Doe (no relation to President
Doe) of the Liberian Action Party ( L M )had "won" the election with 63 per cent of the
total votes cast- The other results showed that Doe's NDPL had "won" 22 of the 26
Senate seats and 5 1 of the 64 Lower House seats.

The opposition parties refused to take their seats in the congress descnbing the
elections as "a mockery of the law and of the people of ~iberia"'" Amidst this confusion.
General Quiwonkpa, who had fled Liberia to Cote d'Ivoire on allegations of treason,"'
launched a dramatic but tragic coup attempt on the 12* of November 1985. Dunng his
exile in Cote d'Ivoire and in the United States, Quiwonkpa had made public his resolve to
retum to Liberia and stage a coup against Doe.ltSThe coup attempt lasted three days and
unofficial accounts put the death toll at more than 1,000.~'~
Opposition politicians were
placed in "protective custody"' 17byDoe.
According to some independent sources, "Quiwonkpa was captured, tortured,
castrated, dismembered and parts of his body publicly eaten by Doe's victonous troops in
di fferent areas of the city.r r l l 8 Doe recalled the Liberian ambassador in Sierra Leone for

aIleged Sierra Leonean cornplicity in the coup attempt. Nationals of cther West Afncan
countries such as Ghana, Guinea and Cote d' Ivoire were allegedly involved in the coup
attempt."9 The Gio/Mano people of Nimba County, Quiwonkpa's ethnic group, were
routinely victimized for their alleged support for the coup attempt. ' 20
Ibid.
Ibid. See also, Huband supra note 74 at 37-4 1.
' Ibid.
' l6 Ibid.
Ibid.
' Huband, supra at 40. Note that Charles Taylor equally allcgcd that Quiwonkpa's body was eaten by
Doe's men. See Amadou Sesay, supra note 69 at 52
119
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As the economic situation worsened,"'~ibena's political isolation increased."'

In

spite of his transformation to a civilian president, Doe 's heavy hand still rested on the
~ ~ ~ o s i t i o n l ~ ~ dae sUnited
~ i t e States' Congress non-binding resolution urging the
administration to suspend aid to L.iberia.12' Some opposition memben such as Mrs.
Johnson-Sirleaf went into exile for fear of their 1 i ~ e s . l ~ ~
e dhead again on 4" September
The opposition h m the Nimba ~ o u n t ~ " ~ r e a rits
1987 giving rise to a Liberian Treaty of Non-Aggression and Security Co-operation with

Sierra Leone and ~uinea.'" However, on March 22. 1988, the Doe govemment
announced the uncovering of a plot to assassinate ~ o e . ' ~Six
' months later, another coup
Doe's
a n derstwhile deputy, Nicholas
attempt, was launched fkom the Nimba ~ o u n t ~ ' ~ ~
Podier was officially implicated and died in the alleged putsch.'30 Although the alleged

coup plotters of March 1989 received stiff penalties for their alleged treason,I3'the fatal
December
on
24, 1989.'~'
threat to the regime was to ~ t a r t ' ~ ~

lZ1 Ibid. World demand for Likria's major produce of iron ore. rubber and tirnber was falling rapidl]. Note
also that the resources of Liberia was deploycd by Doe to wage his politics of persona1 swivai. See
Huband, ibid at 43.
Ibid. Only nine diplomats attended Doe's swearing-in-ceremony.
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2.4: A BRUTAL AND FRACTIOUS REBELLION

Real power you take. It's not given to you.
Charles Taylor in conversation with his fellow dissident,
Tonia King, Abidjan, 1987"'
On the fateful night of Chritmas eve 1989, 24 amed men of different West
Afncan nationa~ities'~~
crossed over into Nimba County of ~ i b e r i a " ~from the
neighbouring Cote d 'Ivoire and attacked a border customs post killing an army oficer

and replacing the Liberian flag with an "unknown flag."13' The hitherto exiled Charles
~ a ~ l o r ' ~ ~ c l a ithat
r n e ad group led by him, the National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL)
was responsible for the rebellion. Within the first weeks of the rebellion, a massive

refbgee crisis had developed and the conflict had uprooted "60 per cent of Liberia's
estimated population of ~,soo,oOO.""~
As the rebels increased in number and acquired more ~ e a ~ o n s ' ~ *ethnic
its

tendencies"'began to emerge. The Mandingoes and Doe's Krahn ethnic groups who were
alleged to be the backbone of Doe's regime started receiving the butt of the excesses of
the rebellion. Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian aligned himself to the Gio/Mano of

the Nimba County who had borne the brunt of Doe's excesses. They now seemed to be

taking retribution over the series of ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o n ' ~ ~ r nout
e t eto
d them by Doe's
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communications system allowing the tracking of shipping and submarine movements in
the Atlantic, a powerful Voice of America radio transrnitter situated near Monrovia, a

communications and information-gathering centre at the embassy for contact with U.S
embassies throughout Africa and refueling facilities at the Robertsfield international

airport for the US Air F ~ r c e . ' ~The
'
Marines were only ordered to "evacuate the
rernaining U.S citizens and protect the U.S e r n b a ~ s ~ . ' ~ ~
There was an impasse as the various factions would not let Taylor seize the whole
of Monrovia. The deadlock over the capture of Monrovia by the NPFL is attributabie to
the breaking away from the NPFL of its advance group comrnanded by Yomie Johnson
who formed the iNPFL. Thus, at the moment when ultimate victory was within the grasp

of NPFL, Yormie Johnson's founding of his W F L (Independent National Patriotic Front
of Liberia) did not only hstrate Taylor's bid for control of the capital but set the stage

for further factionalization of the rebel lion against the Doe regime.
The Economic Comrnunity of West AErican States (ECOWAS) emerged as the
solitary initiator for a settlement of the conflict as the United Nations and the
Organization of Afncan Unity, Save for scattered homilies on the wisdom of peacefbl
settlement of crises did nothing to resolve the crisis. The ECOWAS approach was
primarily aimed at a peacefûl and negotiated end to the cnsis. However, Taylor's NPFL
faction, in the hope of wresting control of the capital city and the presidential mansion
from the other contending factions, boycotted al1 peace talks."'

Taylor's conduct and

attitude is probably explicable on two geo-political and juridical grounds.
First, although the NPFL had effective control over a substantial part of Liberia,
its frustration and fixation with capturing the capital city largely lay in the fact that the

breakaway M F L which controlled the Monrovia seaport and the major land access to
Ibid.
Supra note 133 at 37645.
Is3 S q m at 37602. ~creinafier,ECOWAS] The ongin, structure and legal charactcr of the ECOWAS will
be exarnined in the ncxt chapter.
l

ls2

the capital city, Monrovia, although very determined, did not have Taylor's superior

firepower. Taylor reckoned that sooner than later, the iNPFL would yield to his superior
men and firepower. In addition, the rump of the Libenan army, which had an unassailable
controI over the presidential mansion and its immediate environs, showed itself as
undisciplined and rapacious.
The military and political significance of this situation is that in Afncan political
experience, control over the capital-city and contenders for state power generally regard
the presidential mansion as the ultimate syrnbol of effective political control in the
state.'" It matters little that the force(s) in control of the capital and presidential mansion
has no control or c m o t extend similar control over the hinterlands of the country in

question. Politically, effective control of other temtories in an Afkican country, no matter
how extensive, is not the sarne as effective control over the capital city. The power which
controls the capital city and the presidential mansion is the President and the forces in
control of other parts of the country remain rebels until they have oveMn the capital city
and installed one of theirs in the presidential mansion. Thus, control over the capital city

differentiates the "rebel" fiom the officia1 "governrnent." Proof for this proposition may
be found in the cases of the cluonic "rebellions" in Angola, Zaire, Uganda, Mozambique,

and in other countries. Taylor therefore believed that given more time and in view of his
considerable control over large Liberian temtory, the other factions would weaken or
self-destnict, thus enabling him to achieve his dream of ultimate control over LibenaTaylor simply could not afford letting go of Monrovia.
On the other hand, this conception of power partly explains Doe's tenacious grip

on the presidential mansion and Yoxmie's Johnson stranglehold on the main access to the
capital city, Monrovia. In Taylor's calculation, the ECOWAS peace proposa1 would rob
him of the momentum he had gained and would give his opponents a much needed
154
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respite and time to search for more arms and troops. It is therefore understandable why

Doe and Johnson's INPFL welcomed the ECOWAS interference and Taylor opposed it.
Taylor's rnisgivings were fùrther fueled by the closeness between Nigeria's General
Babangida and Doe. What has baffled scholars is why President Babangida of Nigeria
played such an active role in the Liberian crisis. spending well over US$ 8 billion in a
conflict which posed only a remote threat to Nigerian security and for which there was
"little solid gain for ~ i ~ e r i a . " lIn
* ~a continent with weak institutional structures for

modern govemance and for the formulation of foreign p o ~ i c i e s , ' ~is~ iperhaps
t
useful to

go beyond the national interest paradigrn in understanding the reasons for Nigerian
leadership in the ECOWAS intervention in Libena.

Both dictators were speculated to share sympathies and mutual business interests
which possibly translated into military support for the beleaguered Doe. Is7 This aspect of
the peace process and its overall impact in complicating the intervention will be
addressed in the next section but suffice it to note that as a result of this relationship
betweeen Doe and Babangida, Taylor deeply distmsted the Nigerian-inspired ECOWAS
peace plan for Libena. By July 20, 1990 Doe had grudgingty (after realizing that the

ECOWAS was determined to do away with his presidency) accepted an ECOWAS peace
proposal. This provided for a cease-fire, deployment of a peacekeeping force in Libena
and the formation of a government of national unity.

In a move, which was to characterize the conflict, the NPFL rejected the peace
proposals.158Doe's final isolation was to occur on July 21, 1990 when al1 his ministers

signed a public statement urging him to resign "in order to Save Liberia fiom fbrther
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destruction of lives and properties, and also to ensure his personal safety. 99159 The solitary

efforts of ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ c o at
n titsi 13"
n i iSummit
e d of Heads of States in Banjul, The
Garnbia on May 28-30 where it resolved to send a peacekeeping force to ~ i b e n a . ' " l e
objective of the peacekeepers was to oversee the cease-fire agreement and bring the civil
war to an end?" Johnson's iNPFL (with it's secure access to the capital city) welcomed

the ECOWAS initiative. However, Doe's personal end was drawing near. In a meeting
arranged by the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with the Johnson
led INPFL on September 11, 1990 President Doe was fatally shot and his corpse seized

by the INPFL rebels?
The circumstances under which Doe died, till date, remains controversial and
radically altered the role, perception and stance of the ECOMOG in the confiict.
Although Johnson and his INPFL forces killed Doe, the incident took place in ECOWAS
controlled premises. Second, it has remained a mystery how Johnson and his armed
escorts, in spite of the presence of ECOMOG security operatives, were allowed to bear

arms and attend a meeting uninvited. Moreso, when Doe's military guards had already
been disamed. Third, speculations surround how Johnson, without invitation to the
meeting between ECOMOG and Doe got intelligence reports indicating the time and
venue of that fatal meeting.lU The sequence of sloppiness, fuuiness, improbable
coincidences and unanswered questions on the exact roles of the parties in the fatal
-
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shooting of Doe, largely fuelled the impression of ECOMOG's complicity in Doe's
death. This in turn affected the credibilty of the ECOMOG as an impartial arbiter in the

Liberian crisis.
However, contrary to general assumptions that the departure of Doe-dead or alivewould bring peace to beleaguered Liberia, the factions persisted in their fighting,
massacring Liberians and foreigners caught in the ~onflict.'~'While the ECOWAS

insisted on a democratic transition, some of the factions, believing that they could win
power by force or use their respective degrees of control over Liberian temtory as
bargaining chips, insisted on prolonging the ~ o n f l i c t .Thus,
' ~ ~ the ULIMO-I and the AFN
(Armed Forces of Liberia) having secured access to the presidential mansion believed
itself to be in possession of the symbol of power in Liberia. On his part, Charles Taylor
of the NPFL, being in effective control of more than eighty per cent of Liberian temtory
the ECOWAS organized a conference of al1
laid clairns to the ~residenc~.'~'~eanwhile,
leading Liberian politicians during which Amos Sawyer was appointed the Intenm
President of ~ i b e r i 168
a Simultaneously, the NPFL forces restarted its bombardment and
~ l t under these circurnstances that the
shooting of ECOMOG troops in ~ o n r o v i a . ' ~was
ECOWAS peacekeepers acting on an enhanced mandate to use "al1 necessary
99

rneans

170

to bring the conflict to an end practically joined the fray as combatants by the

deployment and use of military force1" against the w h g factions."2
By October 1990, the ECOMOG had taken Monrovia fiom the rebels and
established a buffer zone of 20 kilometres around its perimeter, creating safe havens for
Weller, supra notc 5 at 89.
Supra, at 88.
167
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168
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the mounting number of refugees fleeing the hottest areas of the conflict."'

Fmstrated

from seizing the capital, Taylor declared himself President of Liberia, moved into the

Liberian hinterlands and established his operational headquarters at Gbamga, 150
kilometres northeast of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. One of the foreign factors in the
conflict betrayed itself when the NPFL insisted to no avail that Libyan troops be added to
the ECOMOG contingent. This request was rejected by the Nigerian led ECOMOG as the

Libyans had been fingered as one of the major financiers of the NPFL.'" However,
Taylor's intransigence mellowed aîter a delegation Eiom Nigeria persuaded Libya's
Ghaddafi on November 21,1990 to reconsider its support for Taylor.
Similarly, the government of Burkina Faso which had despatched 400 soldiers to
heIp Taylor's NPFL rebelIion, was advised by the United States to desist fiom aiding the

NPFL rebels. According to Herman Cohen, "we informeci the President of Burkina Faso
that we disapproved of his sending amis to the NPFL in transit Eiom Libya.'175This
cleared the way for m e r negotiations leading to the Bamako Accord of 28 November
1990 which provided for a cease-fire agreement.'76 However, Taylor's NPFL disagreed

with the ECOWAS on the proper .;tatus of the Amos Sawyer led interim govement.
This necessitated fùrther talks at Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire between al1 the relevant
parties leading to the signing of another peace accord in October, 1991. While the ceasefire agreement held, the disaming aspect failed as the NPFL accused the ECOMOG of
supporting the interim government at Monrovia headed by Amos ~aw~er."'
New factional groups with clearly ethnic agendas soon emerged and one of such,
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the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy ( U L I M O ) ' ~with
~ its base in

Sierra Leone launched armed attacks against the NPFL from the northwestern part of
Liberia bordering Sierra ~ e 0 n e . I ' The
~ Yamoussoukro Accord finally CO llapsed when the

NPFL executed six Senegalese soldiers of the ECOMOG contingent and cornmitted other
atr~cities.''~One of the most shocking acts by the NPFL was the murder of five
American nuns in late October 1993.18'
As the crisis degenerated, the Permanent Representative of Cote d'Ivoire at the
United Nations addressed a letter dated 15 January t 99t to the President of the Security
~ o u n c i l ~ ~ ~ r e ~ uthat
e s body
t i n ~ to consider the Liberian crisis in its deliberations and to
support the appeal for humanitarian aid to Liberia. The confïict was M e r spreading to
neighbouring countries. On the

loU of April

1991, Sierra Leone wrote to the Secunty

Council detailing the attack on its temtory on 23 March 1991 by NPFL
Sierra Leone w m e d that "because of the seriousness of and persistence of the attacks she
reserved the right to use al1 necessary means, including assistance fkom friendly
countries, to protect the lives of its people and defend itç territorial integrity. ,9184
With al1 these echoes of tragedy and-probable prospects of an exacerbated
regional crisis, the United Nations only accepted the ECOWAS i n v i t a t i ~ n ~participate
~~to
in and oversee the proposed Yamoussoukro taks on peaceful settlement of the conflict.Ig6

But the ink on the Yamoussoukro Accord had hardly dried when the rebeIs took up their

178

Ibid. The U L M 0 split along etbnic Iines with ULIMO-K led by Alhaji Korornah supporting and
defending Likrian Mandigoes. It was allegcd to have strong backing fiom other Mandingoes in Guinea.
The ULiMO-J was a prcdominantly Krahn anny and was alleged to be operating fiom Sierra Leone.
179 Ibid.
18
mis issue is addressed in chapter two.
181
Amnesty /nternational Reporz 1993 (Amnesty Intemational Publications, London 1993) 191- 192.
I s 2 Supra note 156 at 133. See also "Letter fiom tbc Charge d'Affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of Cote
d'Ivoire to the United Nations Addrcssed to the Prcsident of the Security Council, 15 January 199 1"
Reproduced in Weller, supra note 5 at 127.
183
Ibid. See also, Weller, supra note 5 at 142.
Ibid.
l a s Ibid.
Weller, supra note 5 at 15 1.

arrns again.'" Thus, another peace accord concluded in Geneva under the auspices of the

UN and ECOWAS was signed in Cotonou, Benin Republic and replaced the
Yamoussoukro Accord. It provided for another interim government, reduction of the
Nigenan contingent in the ECOMOG and disarmament of the warring factions. Once

again, Taylor refused to permit the disarmament of the NPFL troops on the grounds that
the Nigerian quota in the ECOMOG had not been reduced.
To reduce the suspicion by the NPFL of the alleged partiality of the ECOMOG in
the disarmament process, the ECOWAS, by letter dated 29 July 1992, invited the United

The UNOMIL was also
Nations to set up an Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).188
to CO-operatewith the ECOWAS and the OAU in supervising the transitional process and
overseeing the elections proposed under the Cotonou ~ c c o r d . 'Renewed
~~
hostilities
occurred as another anned faction called Liberia Peace Council (LPC) headed by Dr.
George Boley emerged, thus further complicating an already bioody and fiactious
battlefield. This group was Iike the ULIMO-J, made up of Krahn speaking Liberians and
soon engaged the W F L in bloody battles in alleged protest against atrocities committed

by the NPFL. l W Another rebel group, the Lofa Defence Fcrce (LDF) also emerged to
pursue an ethnic agenda. The Cotonou Peace Accord was partly implemented as an
Interim govemment headed by David ~ ~ o r n a k ~ o r ' ~ 'constituted
was
and troops fkom
Uganda and Tanzania joined the ECOMOG force to reduce the Nigenan contingent in
ECOMOG.

By this stage there were six different groups fighting each other in Liberia: the
NPFL, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, LPC, LDF and the AFL (the rernnants of the Liberian
A m y ) . ' 9 2 Further fighting continued and al1 the factions were committing atrocities
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against the civilian pop~lation.'~~
Amidst this chaos, some of the rebel groups such as the
NPFL suffered hirther intemal crises of l e a d e r ~ h i p . ' ~ ~ ~ n opeace
t h e r ageement initiated
by President Rawlings of Ghana was signed by the leaders of the NPFL, the AïL and the

ULIMO-K at Akosombo, Ghana. The unwillingness of the warring factions to comply
with these series of peace agreements wore thin the patience of the UN, the OAU and

ECOWAS. Thus, the govemments of Ghana and ~i~eria'~'declared
their readiness to
reconsider their participation in the peace process if the rebels persisted in the war. These
threats were made good when Ghana and Nigeria ostensibly started to pull out their
soldiers fiom the ECOMOG force and the UNOMIL followed suit by reducing its
numencai presence. lg6
The brutalized Liberian civil population rose up to "cal1 on the ECOMOG Peace
Keepers to be decisive in enforcing cornpliance of the factions in heeding cease-fire
regulations so as to Save the Libenan Peace Process to which they have committed so
' rebels then showed a
much in human and material tems fkom ~ o l l a ~ s e . " ' ~The
discernible attempt to keep within the terms of the Akosombo ~ c c o r d . However.
'~~
reports of hrther fighting and atrocities continued as the NPFL troops were reported on
September 8 1994 to have seized 43 members of the UN observer mission.'99 The last
al1hthe
en
attempt at finding a peaceful settlement to the crisis was in Abuja, ~ i ~ e r i a ~ ~ w
warring factions agreed to a comprehensive peace plan; but by this time, over 200,000

Liberians had penshed in the fiatricida1 c ~ n f l i c t . ~ ~ '
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Pursuant to the Abuja Accord, a transitional Councii of State was inaugurated on
September 1, 1995 and the ECOMOG troops were widely distributed in Liberia to
ovenee the r e m of Liberians to their war-tom country.20zThe nurnber of Liberian
refbgees returning fiom Guinea was put at 410,000, Cote d'ivoire 305,000 and Ghana
15,000. ECOMOG started disanning the estimated 60,000 troops loyal to the various
w arring groups203asthe m e d factions were now tram fonning themselves into po litical

parties to contest the elections slated as part of the peace process. The NPFL transformed
into the National Patriotic Party (NPP) and the ULIMO-K transformed into the Al1
Liberian Coalition Party (ALCP).

The peace process gained impetus as the francophone countries in the sub-region
now sent 2,300 soldiers to build up the ECOMOG contingent to 13,000. Similarly, the

United States and Great Britain sent rnilitary aircraft for the airlie of troops fiom the
francophone couatries. And as the return to political activities heated up 13 candidates
emerged to contest the Liberian presidency. With his stronger organization and finances,
Charles Taylor, in spite of allegations of rigging and electoral malpractice, including
intimidation of voters, realized his ambition of becoming Liberia's president. He was
swom into office in August 1997 and the Liberian Constitution of 1985 was rein~tated.'~'
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THE LEGITIMACY OF EFFECTMTY AM) THE NEW EFFECTIVITY O F
LEGITIMACY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

2.5:

I want my name to be littered over the pages of history as being the man
who started out the way it should be started. If 1 had some chances, 1
would really start some trouble in this region.'05 Charles Taylor, Gborplay.
May 1990.

The first Liberians to be enlisted by Taylor were a 40-strong group
assembled by Cooper Miller, a former soldier who had gradually brought
his followers into the Ivory Coast.. .They were taken to Danane ...from
there they took the bus to Ougadougou (Burkina Faso) and were installed
at a military base outside the city. From there they were transported by
plane to ~ i b ~Mark
a . Huband.
~ ~
While in Libya we did military training at Tarjura base s u p e ~ s e dby
Prince Johnson and Paul B. Harris...then we did commando training,
jumping fiom multi-story buildings and barbed wire training at the seaside
base ...Taylor wanted to recruit Chadians to fight with them against Doe
and some of them did go with Taylor back to Liberia Samuel Lartor, ex
NPFL rebel
1, Prince Johnson, the commander of the special forces, have decided to
give an order to have al1 foreign nationals arrested on the ground and kept

in my camp. British, Indian, American-1 will arrest you al1 and cause a big
regional conflict, Then the worId will intemene. We will start with US
citizens ...they will be held hostage ...1 want the UN to send a
peacekeeping force right away. 208 Prince Yormie Johnson, Leader of the
NF'FL.
Although the Liberian conflict has been characterized as a pureiy intemal conflict
by some observers, it has been obsewed "every intemal war creates a demand for foreign

i n t e r ~ e n t i o n . " ~For
~ ~ diverse reasons, this is certainly the case with Liberia. In
appreciating the regional dimensions of the Liberian conflict, regard should be had to the
interlocking nature of West African states.*1° In addition, reference should be made to the
'O5
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questionable roles of some countries in the sub-region in organizing, encouraging and
fueling the conflict. Furthetmore, the global factors which catalyzed the u ~ a v e l l i n gof
some Afican countries; especially Liberia, Zaire and Somalia and the impact of this on
regional stability and secwity ought to receive sorne consideration. A consideration of the
Liberian conflict fiom these perspectives raises doubt as to the extent of the interna1
character of the Liberian rebellion. This would probably enable an empathetic
examination of the rationale for the intervention. In addition, this approach irnplicitly
questions our contemporary appreciation of the notions of the law on non-intervention in
the domestic affairs of states. That is to Say, while states purport to keep faithfiilly with
the letter of the law on non-intervention, there is a disturbing impression that state
practice, whether by deliberate omission or subtle commission, may in fact be violative
of the spirit of the n o m s on non-intervention.

Prior to the emergence of the Doe military regime, Liberia enjoyed a relatively
peaceful CO-existencewith its imrnediate neighbours. This state of affairs predated the
colonial era. As a matter of fact, the colonial delineation of AFica at the Berlin
Conference of 1844 wittingly or othewise carved out and dispersed homogenized ethnic
groups into disparate states.'"

In effect, "almost al1 Liberian tribes are also found in

neighbouring countries. 9,212 The same goes for vimially al1 Afiican countries. This is one
major potential and actual cause of dispute in Afnca Burkina Faso and Mali have fought
three bitter wars in a penod of 10 years over disputed colonial boundaries and there are
over 103 examples of borders that divide ethnic groups across different Afncan
~ountnes.~"
The Berlin Conference of 1884 was motivated by the European concerns for
convenient colonization and economic exploitation of Afnca. Little regard was paid to
York: AMS Press., 1969) atl. [Hereinaftcr, Kelly & Miller]
Liebenow, supra note 22 at 45.
Fraenkel, supra notc 25 at 27.
'"Copson, supra note 95 at 56. See aIso, Stedman on Conflicts, in Brown, ed., supra notc 223 at 236.
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the convenience of cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the affected African peoples.
While ethnic homogeneity may not be necessary for the creation and sustenance of states,
the experiential reality is that it has largely become a controversial instrument for the
acquisition and maintenance of power in Afkica. This will be explained in due course.
This trend has apparently become more pronounced since the eclipse of the ideological
divide between the East and the West and the growing sense of ethno-nationalism and
geo-political irredentism.
For Liberia and West Afnca, the table beiow illustrates the population spread and
division of some of the native ethnic groups in and around ~ i b e n a . ~ ' ~

Liberia

1 Mende

Mali

Guinea

S/Leone

CfIvoire

1

According to Liebenow, "the majority of the sixteen Liberian ethnic groups
straddle the borders between Liberia and the neighbouring states of Sierra Leone, Guinea,
and the Ivory Coast. in some cases such as the Mende, the major portion of the tribe

"'Ethnologue, o d i n e : < h t t p l l . s i l . o r g ! e t b n o l o g u d c o u n û i . last modificd on 1 February
1999.This phenornenon gives rise to irredcntism and accusations of subversion. Kwame Nknunah of Ghana
to issuing threats to the effect that Ghana would invade Togo so as to unite the Ewes in both
countries. Togo accuscd Ghana of complicity in the assassination of Togolese President, Sylvanius
Olympio. See, Copson Supra note 95 at 100. Cote d'Ivoire constantly accused Guinea and Ghana of
supporting Camille Adam's inedentist movemmt in Cote d'Ivoire.
was given

raides across the border.. .Even today the majority of Liberians identify much more with
~ close sîudy of the
their ethnic group than they do with the modem state of ~ i b e r i a " " A
table above partly explains why the ULIMO-K (predominantly Mandigo), i n the Libenan
civil war had considerable support l5om Mandingoes in neighbouring Guinea Similarly,
the Dan/Gio (mainly in the Nimba County) were alleged to have considerable support

from their kith and kin in neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea. This tendency also

helps to explain the relative ease of the cross border refùgee movement in times of
humanitarian crisis. Indeed, an outbreak of humanitarian disaster is not necessary to

triggger off massive hwnan migration in that part of the world. As Liebenow presciently
noted, "artificial and largely unregulated international boundaries have provided no
obstacle to Mende, Gola, Kissi, and Vai, who move back and forth to renew old ties with
kinsmen in Sierra Leone; to Grebo, Kru,and Krahn who visit their relatives in the Ivory
Coast; to Loma, Kpelle, Mandingo, Mano, and Gio who have maintained their econornic
and social links with kinsmen in Guinea.,1216

This phenomenon of "nations without states" repeats itself across Africa. For
instance, the Ibibio nation with its political and spiritual capital in Calabar o f present day
Nigeria (which had as early as 1472 estabhshed formai trading and diplomatic relations
with the Portuguese), has 5,200,000 of it's people on the Nigerian side and nearly
900,000 in neighbouring ~ a m e r o o n . ~ Similarly,
"
the Karembu of the famed Kanem-

Bornu empire has 4 million of their people in present day Nigeria and over 3.7 million in
the adjacent states of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Yet, the colonial boundaries made by
Britain, France and Germany have not diminished the fervour and passion for their strong
cultural links reinforced by traditional festivities such as the ~ u r b a r . " * This duality
creates a delicate mix of tension and ease and when the former takes precedence
215
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Minahan James, Nations Without States4 HLFtorical Dictionam of Contemporas, National Movemenrî
(London: Greenwood Press, 1996) at 99.jHcrcinafter, Minahan]
""finahan.
supra at 273.This is a colurfiil horsc riding ccrcmony of the Bomo people.

especiaMy in times of crisis. A serious strain on the bilateral and rnulti-lateral relations of
the West Afncan states is thus imposed on several occasions by these factors. The tension

is heightened by ethnic politics of African leaders who are the most vocal supporters for
maintaining inherited colonial boundaries regardless of their inherent problems and

contradiction^.^'^ In fact. absolute respect for the integrity of the colonial boundaries is a
findamental n o m of the OAU Charter and state practice in ~fkica.'~'It is remarkable
that of the 53 Afncan countries, only Eritrea has successfully overturned the integrity of a
colonial boundary and attained recognition as a sovereign state by breaking away fiom
~ t h i o ~ i a . 'Interestingly,
~'
many Aficans especially the border citizens with kith and kin
separated by the Berlin designed borders do not share the same enthusiasm for the
juridical

tat te.^^^ A combination of some of these factors have led schoiar~~~'to
conclude

that they generate intemal c o n f l i ~ t s ~ ~ ~also
a n d encourage the intemationalization of

Some of those factors need M e r elaboration.

intemal conflicts in

First, apart fkom the problems associated with the Berlin demarcated boundaries,
the nascent Afncan states were hardly ready for the demands of statehood. In most

kifrican countries, the departing colonialists barely created or sustained those institutions
necessary to support a modem state as constmed under the dominant Eurocentric
paradigm.226This is largely attibutable to the clamour for independence and self-

p~

Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, Intematio~lRelations and the Third Word (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press., 1990) at 22. [Hereinaficr, Jackson, Quai-States]. See also, Clapham, Afican
Politics of Survival. supra note 154 at 4.
"O OAU Charter, Addis Ababa, May 25, 1963.479 U.N.T.S. 39. See Article 3 (3) and (5).
"' Christopha Clapham, 'The Foreign Policies of Ethiopia and Eriaca" in Stephen Wright. e d . Afiican
Foreign Policies (Westview Press., Boulder Colorado, 1999) at 84. Sunilar campaigns labelled as
"separatist", "secessionist" and"inedentist" in Su&m,Nigtria/Biafra,CongoKatanga, Ghana/Ewe/Togo and
SomaliKenya have not bcen succcssful,
Asiwaju Anthony, "Borders and Borderlands As Linchpins For Regional Integration In Afica -Lessons
of The European Experience." In Schofield Clive, ed., World Boundaries Vol. 1 (London: 1994) at 57.
23
Michael Brown, cd., The International Dimensions of Interna1 Conflicr (Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1996) at Ur. I)iereinafter, Michael Brown]
"'Rhoda Howard "Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Afnca: Intcnially Generated Causes" (1995)
Inremarional Journal at 27.
Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Afiica" insupra note 223 at 235.
E 6 Jackson, Quasi-States. supra note 219 at 21-34.
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detemination of peoples which reached its peak after the defeat of Nazi Germany and
caught the colonial powers in Africa and Asia ~ n p r e ~ a r e d Instead
. ~ ~ ' of the proposed
centuries of col~nization,~~~~uro~ean
colonists were compelled by international rnorality
to hand over power in the colonies. The mantle fell on the few native elites who in the

absence of strong governmental institutions, with its checks and balances, largely
appropriated the inhented power for t h e r n s e l v e ~ In
. ~ some
~ ~ cases such as Belgian Congo

and French Guinea, the departing colonies deliberately looted and impoverished the
colonies in contempt of the way local agitators for political independence hurried and
harried them out of the country.230However, in almost al1 the cases, the Berlin designated
state boundaries with its inherent weaknesses were scrupulously mantained.
Second, the nascent states or "quasi-states", in their ostensible bid to quickly gain
the kingdom of economic well-being long denied them by European colonization and
exploitation, emphasized the state as the leading engine for economic growth and
insisting on national unity at the expense of sub-national ethnic and political

In the attempt to enforce state unity at al1 costs among ethnic groups with
identitie~."~~'
"vastly diffezent political values and instituti~ns,'*~'~the
state became the greatest

institution of patronage. The minority elite maintained power and sustained it on that
basis. According to Stedman, "the lack of domestic economic capital ensured that states
would be important sources of resources and would becorne the subjects of intense
distributional c~nflicts.'"~' in addition, some newly independent African states went on
the populist but ill-advised nationalization of foreign

industrie^.^'^ This merely provided

more avenues for the opportunistic power holders to dispense patronage to a few cronies
227
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and ethnic jingoists. As Stedman M e r observes, "office holders appropriated state

resources to consolidate their power bases and reward their network of clients. National
interests were subordinated to the interests of politicians and their supporters, who
viewed public office as private property."2'5
Third, power in West Afkica was and to a large extent still is, maintained by a
convenient play of the "ethnic ~ a r d . " This
~ ' ~ is a system of mobilizing ethnic sentiments
to colour important issues and deprive them of objectivity. For instance, a cal1 for a
constitutional reform may be poriayed by govemment propagandist machinery as a cal1
by the proponent's ethnic group for dismemberment of the state and thus give political

advantage to another group. These perversions weakened the interna1 legitimacy of the
Afncan States, rendering them excessively vulnerable to extemai forces.

in effect, instead of the state becoming an effective mechanism for the articulation
of the means and framework in which life, liberty and happiness may be pursued by the
citizens, it becarne engaged in a war with the people. Accordingly, Doe constmed
criticisms against his govemment as attempts by other ethnic groups to unseat his own
ethnic group fiom powe:.

He became the champion and Goliath of the Krahn ethnic

group and was so perceived by members of the other ethnic groups. To sustain himself in

power, it therefore became convenient to mobilize his ethnic group by giving them
preference over other groups. The loss of power by a leader like Doe, was thus
drarnatized as a calamitous loss to his ethnic group. To avert this tragedy, he made his
ethnic group, the Krahn, believe that they would face retribution or possible annihilation
from and by the other ethnic

To M e r compound this dreaded scenario, he, like most other African dictators
of his ilk, maintained his power by divide-and-nile tactics pitting his Krahn and the
lbid. See also,Clapham on Afican Politics of SuMvaZ, supra note t 54 at 187.
Donald Rothschild,"Ethnic Bargainhg and Stace Brcakdown in Afnca" (1995) 5 Nationalhm and
Ethnic Politics at 54-72.
"'Amnesty /nfernational Annual Report 1992 (Amnesty International Publications,London, 1992) at 173.
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Mandingoes against the other ethnic groups. In the course of the subsequent crisis, the
factions naturally split along ethnic lines, which of course, ran deep into the territories of
other neighbouring states. Where coercion and coaxion failed, recourse was had to brute
force. In effect, the unity of several West Afiican states like Liberia has been sustained

on a peculiar mixture of force, coaxion, ethnic patronage, respect for colonial boundaries,
and the prevailing international morality on the notions of sovereignty. The consent of the
governed has been o f little relevance. These inequities and iniquities in the Afncan states
largely went ignored for at least three reasons.
First, the new Afkican states were creatwes of a world order fashioned on the
Westphalian paradigm with its excessive deference to the canons of non-intervention in
intemal affairs of other states. Second, the notion of statehood being largely jundical,
especially for post-colonial Afiica, threw up empty shells like Chad and Niger as states.
These sparsely populated temtories with little or no institutional structure of govemance
or reasonable degree of effectiveness over their arïd and expansive temtones, by virtue of
~ . ~ ~ prior
~
the prevailing order, have attained recognition as states, at least j ~ r i d i c a l l Third,
to the end of the Cold War, the notion of collective security did not encompass "the
development of human dignity and basic ~ i ~ h t s . "Although,
~'~
it was embedded in the
United Nations Charter, of which later, peace and collective security were
interchangeable with the absence of war. The Cold WarlWestphalian notions of state
sovereignty ensured that whatever went on within the borders of such countries was not
the legitimate subject for external c ~ n c e r n . * ~ ~
For AfÎican rulers who had effective control over their temtories, it was a license
to pillage the state and oppress their peoples as Cold War imperatives afforded ample
shield and extemal distraction. It was a triunph of legitimacy of effectivity instead of the
-

3 8

-

-

James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press., 1979) at 230.
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effectivity of legitimacy. In effect, most of those juridical states, regardless of their
absence or poverty of intemal legitimacy in governance, survived at the sufferance of the
prevailing worId order and morality. The Westphalian doctrine of "cuius regio, eius
religzo" was in Afiica, read to mean that the prince (change President) was fkee to do as

he liked within the boundaries of the juridical state. Most Afiican states thus became
synonymous with the persona of those who mled them; hence Nkrumah's Ghana,
Kenyatta's Kenya, Banda's Malawi, Eyadema's Togo, Boigny's Cote d'Ivoire, Mobutu's
Zaire, Mengistu's/Selassie's Ethiopia, Keita's Mali, Kerekou's Benin, Sekuo Toure's
Guinea, Nyerere's Tamania, Kaunda's Zarnbia. The juridical state in Africa was merged
and synonymous with its d e r .
The crisis of legitimacy in govemance was occasionaly resisted by boiling
popular discontent, riots, strikes and popular demonstrations but violent f o m s of
discontent, ethno-nationalism, self-determination and warlordism remained largely
subdued. This state of affairs spanning almost three decades survived because of the bipolarization of global politics and the prevailing regime of strict juridical statehood and
sovereignty. In addition, that global regime enabkd some African states to assert some
geo-plotical relevance, get funding from the superpowers and Western dominated
international financial institutions without questions on political and econornic
accountability. Thus, mlers of states like Liberia, Zaire and Somalia (among others),
being of strategic geo-political importance to the United States and the defûnct Soviet
Union, s w i v e d on American or Soviet patronage and protection. It is here that the global
community is ùidicted for its complicity in the reign of terror and bastardization of
govemance inflicted on the people of Afnca and indeed on ail deveioping nations.
Under the old regime, effective controllers over the capital cities of the Afican
countries and possessors of the keys to the presidential villas were feted, feasted and
hugged in the Kremlin, Bonn, the White House, the Elysee palace and other centres of
global power and legitimation. According to Clapham, this was the regime of "letter-box

s o ~ e r e i ~ n t ~Whoever
. " ~ ~ ' happened to be the occupant of the presidential mansion was
entitled to regard himself as the Head of State of that country. it helped a lot if that
occupant of the presidential mansion served an economic or geo-political purpose
ageeable to any of the contending superpowers. Their means of occupation of the

respective presidential mansions and sustenance of that occupation were intemal matters
which their oppressed peoples should sort out by themselves. It was the classical age of
the politics of patrimony in Afnca.

Thus, by an adroit mixture of coercion and corruption of the domestic order and
deft manipulation of the international security paradigm, a host of Afican mlers held
sway in their respective presidential mansions for

de cade^.^" The notion of collective

security excluded an activist, progressive and cosmopolitan perception of justice and
respect for human rights in the plenihide of its contemporary expanding ramifications. In
this withered conception of collective security and preoccupation with the nuances of the
Cold War, Mobutu of Zaire who fionted as a bulwark against communism, with the
support of the United States, ruled and ruined his country with an iron fist for 32 years.2"
The great powers always despatched foreign troops to Save Mcbutu each time an attempt
was made to forcefully w e a t

However, Mobutu's political relevance to the U.S,

France and Belgium expired with the end of the Cold War and he shortly fell fiom power,
died in exile in Morocco and left his country ernbroiled in a chronic civil wa.. His

persona1 fortune in European banks was estimated in 1982 at about $5 billion, the
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Rothschild, eds., Afnca in rhe World Politics (Colorado: Westvicw, 199 1) at 56.
'43 Zaire Fac t Book. Onlinc>http://www/afncanews.no/Cong~Zaire/btml.
Last modified on 10 March
1999. Another pathetic case is that of the Central Afncan Republic under the regïmc of Marcias Nguema.
According to an observer for the htcmational Commission of Jurists, "the h d s of the state had become
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equivalent of Zaire's external debt.24s Bernard Kouchnev. the French Minister for
Humanitarian Affairs scornfùlly described Mobutu as a "waking bank account in a
Leopard skin hat. ,9236 Yet, he was most welcome at the Elysee Palace.
Similarly, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia sided
with Socialism's political agenda and received Soviet military and economic support

which allowed them to tyrannize their countries for 17 and 22 years respectively."'
According to Kofi Quashigah, "in their (the superpower) relationships with the Afncan
nations other determinants, such as morality and justice oflen played very minimal roles.
The human rights implications of their policies in Aûica were not often of prime

consideration in the policies of the developed nations. ~ 2 4 8As contemporary events such

as the Liberian cnsis indicate, this regime underrnined and stultified the emergence in
Afnca of a legitimate systern of govemance which probably would have avoided its
internecine conflicts threatening collective security o f the entire continent.
Another aspect of the Cold War nvalry in f i c a which irnpacted heavily on
global collective security was "the massive export of weapons to Afnca which the
archetypal authoritarh regimes used to prop themselves up. ,9249 To maintan the balance

of terror al1 over the world, govemments in AErica, irrespective of their degrees of
illegitimacy were substantially bolstered with arms by the superpowers in preparation for
any eventual global showdown. Liberia alone received well over $500 million in military

aid. For a country that has never engaged in an inter-state conflict and had reasonably
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good refationships with its irnmediate neighbours, those guns and bombs were used on
Liberians.

This point has been corroborated by Congressman Ted Weiss in his speech

on the Liberian cnsis in the US ~ o n ~ r e s sAccording
.~'~
to the Congressman,

[Tlhe United States certainly did not cause the current crisis in
Liberia; this is a conflict between Liberian people over Liberian
grievances. But as a result of the Administration's long silence, the United
States must share some of the responsibility. Our Govemment failed to
publicly demonstrate a cornmitment to protect human rights in Liberia.
More importantly, we tumed a blind eye to the aspirations of the Liberian
people themselves, who should have been able to depend on the United
States to speak out in defense of democracy and human ~ i ~ h t s ; ~ '
However, the regime of interna1 illegitimacy and external legitimacy was not to
last forever. The end of the Cold ~ d ~ ~ i n s ~ai movement
red
towards political and
economic accountability in Africa. This movement which has been hailed in some
quarters as the d a m of a Grotian ~ o m e n t , ~ " juridical
a
revol~tion,~"isstill unfolding

and its impact on the collective security and stability of West Afiican states deserve some
close consideration.
Orphaned by the end of the Cold War, these types of govermnents whose geopolitical relevance had just expired, were confkonted with the imperatives of legitimizing
themselves with their people. It was a demand and necessity strange to them. Sorne of
them who had used the universal preoccupation with the Cold War as a shield to cover
atrocities perpetrated against their own peopleLISwere faced with the 'pay b a c k
-
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syndrome. The people hitherto oppressed did not only seek economic/ political liberation
but craved vengeance. The demand for this historical indebtedness, in the form of
warlordism and other fonns of militaristic dissent, came at a critical time. The Soviet
Union's Perestroika and Glasnost and the United States' domestic probiems did not
warrant superpower concern in Afiica's perennial conflict. Accordingly most of the
Afican governments had few resources available to douse the flarnes of di~content.'~~
Support at the international fora and the flow of military and economic aid were
no longer to be taken for granted merely because the affected regime espoused capitalist

or cornmunist doctrines or served a geo-political purpose. Aid came with conditionalities
of economic policies or political changes. in the latter case, explicit demands for a higher
degree of interna1 legitimacy from the aspiring recipients of aid have become the rule.

This new attitude, christened "La Boulle ~ o c t r i n e , " ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~gave
a r e nvent
t l ~ to diverse
forces within the polity of many Atncan countries and is cause for the ubiquity of
democractic changes in A k a . Hence, Doe contrived a democratic election in 1986.
Similar events took place in Kenya, Benin Republic, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Cote
d'Ivoire, to mention a iew.2SgThe one-party states yielded to multi-party politics.
A considerable number of these democratizations were fake and hence activist

revolts against the old order. in some cases, this took the form of militaristic rebellion

and warlordism. In this context Liberia presents a paradigm. It is also in the recognition
of the consequences of the Berlin borders that that the anxiety of Liberia's neighbouring

states may be appreciated.259The era of overbeaing illegitimate governments sustained
by fictional respect for juridical statehood stood in grave danger. Although the challenge
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was not welcomed by the old ~rder,'~'it was irresistible. On the other hand. the growing

marginality of Afkica in the emerging d i ~ ~ e n s a t i o n ~ ~created
~ h a d a vacuum which
ostensibly sought to fil1 in those
stronger states like ~ i ~ e r i a , ~ ~ Africa,
~ ~ o uZimbabwe
th
crises which ostensibly threatened regional security. As this template shifl unravelled
some African c o ~ n t r i e s , ~ ~consequences
~its
became more pronounced for two reasons.
The first relates to that continent's chronic political instabilitJM and the second is a
function of the Berlin partitionhg of Afiica and the complications of cross-border ethnonati~naiisrn.'~~
Accordingly, the success of a militaristic challenge to the old order is not limited
to the particular municipal forum where its success has been recorded but extends to
neighbouring states sharing sarne ethnic identity. Secondly, it affords a strong precedent
for similar ideas and sentiments in neighbouring states. As the saying in West Africa
goes, "when Ghana sneezes, Nigeria catches cold." Hence, President Iawara of Gambia
larnented ( t h e months before he was removed by a coup d état), "if Charles Taylor with
the support of what 1 may cal1 mercenaries fkom other countries of the sub-region were to
corne into power, one can imzgine the implications it would have for regional
~ t a b i l i t ~ During
. " ~ ~ ~the B i a h secession bid in Nigeria, the leaders of the Ewe nation
(straddling Ghana and Togo) indicated their readhess to declare their statehood if the
Biafkans succeeded or if the B i a h were supporteci by the Ghanaian goveniment.267
Anne Shepherd, "The Economics of Democracy" Afrcan Report, March-April, 1992 at 29.
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The combination of these factors in the Liberian crisis became an explosive mix capable
of d e s t a b i l i ~ i n ~ ~ ~ ~govemments
other
in the s ~ b - r e ~ i o Itn .is~ in
~ ~this context that the

argument by the West Africans states that the Liberian crisis posed a danger to their
territorial integrity of West Afncan states rings politically true.
It is now important to comment on the questionable roles of some West Afncan

states in encouraging and fbelling the rebellion by Charles Taylor. Inasmuch as the
Liberian conflict has been depictsd as a Liberian affair, there is some evidence to support
the opinion that fiom the conception of the rebellion and it's execution, it was more than

that. For various reasons, the neighbouring states were hardly disinterested observers.
First. the original batch of 24 NPFL rebels had some sprinkling of Gambian, Ghanaian
and Sierra Leonean

national^."^ It is remarkable that among them was Foday Sankoh, the

head of the contemporary rebel movement in Sierra ~eone."'
The pertinent question is why these people of disparate nationalities should band
together. While some sit-tight West Afiican leaders as Dauda Jawara of the Gambia and
Mathew Kerekou of Benin, who have between them spent nearly fifty years in office,
were content to dismiss the rebels as "mercenaries, rr272-it seems that money was not the
only factor. Some of them were ideologues d i s g ~ s t e d ~ ~ ~ the
w i tpolitical
h
decadence in
West Afiica, as symbolized by the Doe regirne in Liberia. In their view, the Charles
Taylor led rebellion was a "revolution" against the old order represented by ~ o e . ~ ' ~
Secondly, it is also probable that given the regime wherein successfÙ1 rebellions has its
common language and culture and common religion. See Souadia Toural, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963) 24-25. It is remarlrable bat Siad Barre of Somali, in spite of the relative
homogeneity of the Socnalis playcd the clans against themselves in ordcr to sustain his persona1 rule over
Somalia. See Clapham, Afncan Politics of Survival. supra note 154 at 150.
"'Stedman, "On Conflict and Conciliation" supra note 225 at 248.
Amnesty InfernarionalAnnual Report 199 1 (Amnesty International Publications, London, 199 1) at 145.
'O Huband, supra note 74 at 140.
ibid.
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Supra note 136.
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Quashigah, "Protection of Human Eüghts" supra notc 239 at 93.
"'Stephen Ellis, "Libcria 1989-1994: A Sîudy of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence" (1995) 94 Afiican Afairs,
at 168.

"'

material and political rewards in Afkica, those dissidents had ample precedents to believe
that their success would translate into economicaly lucrative political offices.

However, prior to the invasion, Taylor 275 had travelled within the West African
sub-region organizing dissidents and exiles from Doe's t y r a n r ~ ~ Taylor's
.~'~
personal
charisrna and superb abilities as a fundraiser and organizer yielded results. Doe's tyranny
had created many enemies and previous attempts to unseat him by coup d'etats and
democratic elections had been ruthlessly fnistrated by him. With the notable exception of
Nigeria (President Babangida), Doe had become a pariah in regional political circles.
Liberia's relevance in the Cold War had expired and increased Doe's isolation. Thus, the
new international order, regional ostracism, Doe's appalling recora and the conviction
that only an armed invasion could rid Liberia of Doe were decisive factors favouring the
rebellion.
Although externalty funded axmed invasions of Afkican states have been recorded,
Kwesi Aning observes that the "Libenan instance represents an entirely new dimension.
For the first time neighbouring states advanced patronage to a well-orchestrated act of
insurrection with strong support among the states of the regi~n."~'~
Sirnilar observations
have been made by Emeka Nwokedi who notes that the Liberian conflict marked "the
first ïarge-scale and sustained civilian carnpaign from an extra-territorial base against a
~~
Ghana, Doe's coup of A p d 1980 and its
govemment in West ~ f r i c a - ' "Regarding

excesses had strained their relations. Repeated Liberian allegations of subversion by
The charge of corruption was dropped as part of the peace process.
Aning Kwesi 'The International Dimensions of Intemal Conflict: The Case of Liberia and West Afnca"
OnlUie>http:/lwww.c&.dWwp-97-4.Last modifiai on 5 January 1990~creinaftcr.Aning]
'77 Aning, srrpro at 7. The United States' Statc Department furtber c o ~ e Burkina
d
FasoILibyan support
for the rebels of the NPFL. "The Danger in Liberia" The Inremutional Herald Tribune, 10 November
1992.
'73 Cited in Aning. supra note 276. Ghana has always had the rcputation in African politics of being
virulently opposcd to conservativc tyranny. In the Congo crisis, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah in denouncing
Congolese leader Moise Tsombe for inviting Belgium to iatcrvene in the crisis had written: ". ..you have
assembled in your support the foremost advocates of imperialism and colonialism in Africa and the rnost
determined opponents of Afncan ficedom. How can you, an African, do this? Sec Ali Mazrui. Towarcis A
Pax Aficana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967)a t 38
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Ghana led to the mutual occasional recall of arnba~sadon."~There is no doubt that
Ghana initially extended some degree of patronage to Charles Taylor when the latter was
planning the rebellion against ~oe.'" However, it appeared that this romance did not last
long as Taylor's recruitment of rebels in Ghana became a security concem to Ghanaian

authorities and he was consequently detained t w i ~ e . Taylor
~ ~ ' had become a problem.'82
Quoting a Ghanaian intelligence officer, Aning notes that "there were a number of
Ghanaian dissidents willing to fight alongside Taylor in Liberia. r r 2 8 3
It was not only Ghana that inadvertently or otherwise contributeci to the creation

of the NPFL. Byron Tarr asserts that "in 1987, Taylor approached the embassy of
Burkina Faso in Accra and requested assistance to overthrow Doe.-.Madame Mamouna
Quattara, a client of Captain Blaise Compaore [the Burkinabe President] received

Taylor's written proposal."2w Taylor eventually gained access to the Burkinabes and
thence to Ghaddafi of Libya who had financed the Thomas SankardCompaore revolution
in Burkina ~ a s o ? Stedman is thus emphatic that "...Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and
Libya provided military assistance to Charles Taylor's forces in Liberia." It is equally
instructive that the Burkinabe govemment at the 27* Summit of the Organization of
Afncan Unity convened in Abuja, gave some assurances to the "Intenm Govemment in

Liberia that Mr. Taylor would no longer enjoy their support. 9-286
At the start of the rebellion, the goveniment of Burkina Faso despatched 400 of
it's troops to Charles Taylor and justified this as "moral support. ,9287 According to Mark
Aning, supra at 7. Doe accused Ghana of sponsoring the Quiwonkpa coup attcmpt of November 1985.
Ibid. As already indicated, this is not unusual in Africa. For instance, the Somali governent in Somalia
sought to justify ifs support for the Somali's of Kenya by arguing that "...it is completely impossible for
the Somali govenunent to abandon the work they have k e n undertaking, which is that of liberating
'79
"O

Somalians trapped in Kenya..."See Copson, supra note 95 at 145.

'
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Tarr Byron M. "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective" 49 Journal of Opinion at 6.
Ibid.
Weller, supra note 5 at 151. See also, Osisioma Nwolise, " The Iriternationabtion of the Liberian
Crisis and its Effects on West Africa" in Vogts, cd., supra note 41 at -58
$87
Candy Shiner, "Peacekeepers Caught up in Renewcd War in Liberia" Christian Science Monitor, 12
2ss

Huband,
[I]n early 1991, the Nigerians confirmed that Taylor visited the
Burkina Faso capital of Ougadougou and was developing plans to train
mercenaries at the Po military base south of the city. The force included
nationals fkom Liberia, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Guinea and was
being trained as new weapons were transported across Ivory Coast into
~iberia.~"
As for Libya, its meddling in sub8aharan e c a n affairs is n o t o r i o ~ s . ' ~A~
significant number of the first batch of the NPFL rebels were ~ u r k i n a b e 'and
~ or trained
in Burkina ~ a s o ~ ~ l in
a nLibyan
d
military

Indeed one of the reasons given by

Yormie Johnson for splitting with the NPFL to found the INPFL was that there were
improprieties in disbursing "Libyan finances.ri293 He also alleged excessive Libyan
influence over the NPFL. Sirnilady in February 1992, the Liberian Interim President,

Amos Sawyer led a delegation to the Libyan leader, Muammar Ghadafi, in an effort to
persuade him to stop supporting Taylor's NPFL. According to Amos Sawyer, "Ghadafi
told me that he made a Mstake in supporting Charles Taylor because he (Charles Taylor)
was

now a tool of French impenalism, to whom he had stopped supplying weapons in

December 1991.9,294
This welter of evidence is M e r confhned by Mr. Herman Cohen, the then US
-

-

October 1991 atl. See aiso, Weller, supra note 5 at 3 12.
Huband, supra note 74 at 2 12.
189 Ofuatey-Kodjoe W,"Regional Organizations and the Resolution of intemal Conflict: The ECOWAS
Intervention in Liberia" (1 994) hternational Peacekeeping at 272. Similady, ideologicai persuasions are
known to have motivated support for intra-state rebcllion in Africa. During the Congo crisis, Burundi was a
transit route of anns supply to the Katangese cebels but with a change of govcrnrncnt, the arms shipment
dned up. Sudan was also another notorious pipeline for the flow of a m to the Katangese rebcls. The
pertinent regimes aided the rebels on ideological groun& as the rebels had professed socialism. See
Copson, supra note 95 at 160- i 6 1.
Huband Mark, "The Power Vacuum" (1991) Afica Report [Janwry-Febmary] at 27.
Nwolise, supra note 286 at 57.
292
Yeebo Zaya, Ghana: The Smggle For Power-Rawlings, Saviour or Demagogue (London: New Beacon
Books, 1991) at 56.
293
Aning, supra note 276 at 15. As Prcsidcnt Kcrckou of Benin Republic presciently argued in 1992,
"today it is Liberia, tomomw it could be any of the corntries represented herc today. Indeed the canker we
are fighting against is aiready showing itself in Sierra Leone and in othcr parts of the subregion."
'
9
.
1 Huband, supra note 74 at 2 12. Note that French engineen wcre i
n the NPFL temtory installing a
powerful trammitter for the NFFL radio.
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Assistant Secretary of State for African A f f h . in his testimony before the U.S.
Congress, he asserted that "we do have some evidence that about 50 of those people (the
" ' ~BurkinabeKibyadCote
~
W F L ) rebels were trained in Libya and armed by ~ i b ~ a . The
d'Ivoire support for the NPFL*~%m e r evidenced by their initial strong refusal to
contribute forces to ECOMOG. In addition, they persuaded other West Afncan States not
to support the intervention. During the cnsis, ECOMOG jet-bumbers strafed the supply

lines linking the rebels to their supply bases in Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. This
support had economic, ideological, military, ethnic and personal motives.297
As CroR and Treacher notes,

Liberia was the stage for a bitter struggle for dominance within the
ECOWAS; the organization was fissured dong Anglophone and
Francophone lines. The Peace process was subsumed by the respective
regional interests and the personal ambitions of the political leaders. Each
state had a different agenda for the Liberian crisis. Above all, Nigeria saw
the war as a test of what it perceived to be its regional hegemony, for it
was determined that Liberia would not succumb to the NPFL and then join
the francophone bloc inside ECOWAS.~~'

Nigerian support for the Doe regime has never been substantially rebutted by that
country. Nigeria took over the repayment of the %50millionAfiican Deveio~mentdebt
owed by Liberia in May 1990, and it was widely alleged that the embattled President Doe

during his visit to Nigeria requested for 2,000 Nigerian troops to counter the NPFL
r e b e l l i ~ n It. ~was
~ ~ common knowledge that the Nigerian government headed by General
'95~eller,
supra note 5 at 52. Note also that the U.S in protest recallcd its ambassador to Burkina Faso.
Aning,supm note 276 at 10.
' 9 7 Ibid. The late Ivorian Prtsidcnt was also father in-law to Pmsidcnt Compaore of Burkina Faso.
Sirnilarly, because of the ideological and personal rclationship between Kwamc Nkrumah of Ghana and
Sekou Toure of Guinca, the latter occasionally thrcatcned to invade Ghana so as to re-install the former
after he had becn ovmhrown. In 1963, Sawaba ethnic dissidents had a i d d their kith and kin in Togo to
launch an assassination attempt on Presidmt Hamani Diori of Niger rcpublic. It is common kuowledge that
the radical governent of Kwame Nhurnah of Ghana harbourcd dissidents and socialist miaded rebels in
Africa who were fleeing thcir respective States. On îhis, see immanutl Wallcrstein, A m : The Politics of
Unity (New York: Random House, 1965) 101-108.
'98 Stuart Crofl& Adrian Treacher, "Aspects of Intmention in the South" in An&ew Domian & Thomas
Otte, eds., MiIitary Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy tu Humanitarian Intervention (Aldershot:
Dartmouth Publishing Company; 1995) 147.
'W Huband, supru 74 at 103- 104.
%
'

Babangida was particularly close to the Doe regime in ~ i b e r i a . ' ~ ~ nNigerian
ie
factor was
quite crucial and decisive in influencing and resolving the Liberian crisis. in addition, it
marked the height of the competition for influence between France and ~ i ~ e r i a . " '
Another international aspect of the Liberian conflict is discemible fiom the
hostage taking policies of the rebel groups.302This policy was adopted for various
motives. While the NPFL targeted Nigerians, Guineans and Ghanaians and kidnapped
and killed them for their goveniment's support for the ECOMOG, Yortnie Johnson's

INPFL justified its preference for Americans, British, Lebanese and indian civilians in
order to provoke international intervention in the

cri si^.^^^ This strategy worked in

varying degreesM"and eventually elicited some response fiom the international
comrnunity.
It is equally pertinent that the field of conflict was not limited or restncted to
Liberian temtory. Apart fiom the traditional support which rebel movements usually get
fiom some neighbouring countries/ethnic groups sympathetic to their struggle for Liberia,
the field of conflict was not restncted to Liberia a10ne.'~' For instance. the NPFL rebels

on 23 March 1991 attacked two towns in Sierra Leone killing "two senior military
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Clapham, supra note 154 at 238.
Ibrahim, 'Towards a Nigerian Perspective on the French Problematic in Africa" in H a m a Jacob
& Massoud Omar, e&., France and Nigeria: Issues in Comparative Studies (Ibadan: Credu Niger Press..
1992) at 67. Note that the recognition of Biafra by France during the civil war in Nigeria ( 1967-70) was
generally constmed by the Nigerian govemment as an attempt to b a h i z e Nigeria and reduce its influence
in West Africa. See Ferni Otubanjo & Seye Davics, "Nigeria and France: The Stniggle for Regional
Hegemony" in B. Akhyemi & F. Otubanjo, eds., Nigeria Since Independence (Ife: University of Ife Press..
1994) at 73-86.
'°1 Aning, supra note 276 at 16. There were 250,000 Guineans. 200,000 Ghanaians and 5,000 Nigerians in
Liberia shortly beforc the crisis. The rebcls werc seizing and at times executing forcigners for diverse
reasom.
303 Ibid. See also, Nwoiise, supra note 286 at 59. Somc Nigcrian joumalists werc killed by the NPFL in
cold blood.
301
Ibid. Ghana wamed on Iuly 2, 1990 that it would no longer tolerate the violence against its citizens.
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Stedrnan on "Conflict and Conciliation" supra note 225 at 252. Thus, even in the absence of state
support for the rebellion, border-citizcns scparatcd by the Berlin boundaries extend help and support for
rebels. The help may corne in diverse ways; ranging from the provision of shelter from pursuing
govenunent troops and serving as a conduit pipe for the flow of a m . In addition, cross border raids by the
rebels and government ttoops werc rampant during the Liberian crisis.
30' Jibrin

officers and eleven ~ivilians.''~~~~ccordin~
to the Sierra Leonean letîer to the United
Nations Security Council, "Sierra Leonean military were sent there and afier an intense
engagement.. .repelled the in va der^."^^'
This invasion which enab1ed the rebels secure transit for the flow of arms into
Liberia ultimately led to the downfall of the govemment of ~ o r n o h . i
' n~ addition,
~
one of
the Sierra Leoneans trained in Libya for the NPFL invasion of Liberia, Corporal Fodeh
Sankoh founded the Revolutionq United Front (RUF) which has since 1990 been
waging a htricidal war in Sierra ~eone.''~As at July 1999, the RLJFrebellion has killed
over 50,000 Sierra Leoneans, mutilated over 100,000, pushed over 500,000 into
neighbouring States as refûgess and intemally displaceci over 2 million Sierra Leoneans
(half of the population).310According to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.
Sierra Leone faces a tragedy unprecedented in its history and
horrendous even by the standards of a worid increasingly inured to the
brutalities of war. The entire population of Sierra Leone, without
exception, is at the mercy of a murderous rebel war machine which makes
no distinction between women and children on the one hand and
combatants on the other. The escalation in the amputation of Iimbs and
other bestialities, to Say nothing of the almost random mass killings of
defenceless civilians, point to a Dark Age threatening to overtake Sierra
Leone. The vaunted scorched-earth policy launched by the RUF has left
Sierra Leone's infiastnicture in mins and thousands of homes in Freetown
and elsewhere in the country burnt and razed to the ground ...in Sierra
Leone, no less than in Kosovo, the sentience of the world cornmunity
faces its sternest test."

'

The impact of the Liberian crisis on Sierra Leone indeed formed the substance of the

note 160 at 133.
Ibid.
308
The coup led by Valentine Strasser was justified on the grounds that the Momoh regime had proved
incapable of curtailing the NPFL scizure of Sierra Leonean territory and Foday Sankoh's rebellion. See
Huband supra note 74 at 206-7.
'O9 /bid. Sec also, "Commander Culpable for Invasion of Freetown, Says Khobe" Odine,
ngrguardiannews.com/featurts/ft73S9.h~
accessed on IOIOU99.
''O "Sierra Leone Peacc Deal Agreed" Online, N e w s . B B C . c o . acccssed
~
on 7/7/99. See also
"Cornrnonwea!th Secretary-General calls for Urgent international Action to Save Sierra Leone"
Commonwealth News Release 2 February 1999.
Ibtd.
306 Supra
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"'

deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly at its 86" Plenary meeting held on
the 2 1" of December 1993.)'~
The subsequent Resolution passed by that body made the
following findings,
that the spi11 over effect of the Liberian crisis had caused serious destruction and
devastation of the productive areas of the territory of Sierra Leone and of its economy

the conflict in Liberia had "devastated lives and properties in the eastern and southern
provinces of Sierra ~ e o n e , ~ ' % a u s ian'massive
~
outflows of rehgees and dispiaced

These factors imposed an astronornical cost to the governent of Sierra Leone which had
to battle to protect its temtory and people fiom the "spi11 over effect of the conflict in
Liberia.

993
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For a country that was included by the General Assembly in its Resolution

37/133 of December 17 1982 as one of the "least developed countries in the ~ o r l d , " ~ "

the tragedy was and still remains harrowing. It was not only Sierra Leone that bore the
brunt of the spreading confîict. Taylor's forces also plundered parts of ~ u i n e al )8 and the
war equally spilt over into Cote d'~voire."~

Scholars are divided on the motives for this internationalization of the Libenan
conflict, especially with respect to Sierra Leone. According to William Reno, the NPFL
invaded the diarnond mines of Sierra Leone to finance it's r e b e l l i ~ n . ~However,
*~
apart
from the econornic interpretation, political cum military meanings have been read into the
-

-

-

"'International Assistance to Sierra Leone, G.A. Res.481196, U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 171, U.N Doc.
N48149 (1993).
Paragraph 5 , ibid.
314
Paragraph 6, ibid.
"'Ibid.Note also that in addition to other Resolutioar of the General Assembly, Resolution 49 of 1994
appeakd to the world community to aid the States around Liberia contcnd with the refugce crisis. See G.A.
Res. 49126.49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) U.N.DocN49149 (1994).
'16
ibid.
3'7 Ibid.The Gencral Assembly Resolution contains a ralher pathctic cal1 for international aid and
assistance to Sierra Leone.
3'8 Stedman, on "Conflict and Conciliation" ,supra note 225 at 252.
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"Liberia's War is Said to Spill Into Ivory Coast" New York Times,5 Scptcmbcr 1993. at A2 1.
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NPFL invasion of Siem Leone, moreso as the NPFL invasion "sparked off another civil
war in Sierra ~ e o n e . " ~ ~ ' Tcivil
h e war in Sierra Leone as provoked and sustained by

Taylor's NPFL has thus been construed as Taylor's "punishment for Sierra Leone's
participation in the ECOWAS led intervention in ~ibena.'" Whatever the motives. the
reality is that since the instigation of rebellion in Sierra Leone by the NPFL rebellion in
Liberia, that country has become one of the most dangerous places in the world with a
mounting rehigee crisis threatening to "destabilize the ~ubre~ion."'~'
Similarly, some of the rebel groups in Liberia such as the United Liberation
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) were
formed in Sierra Leone and Guinea and it was for the above reasons that the United
Nations' Security Council unequivocally determined that the deteriorating situation in
Liberia constituted "a threat to international peace and security, particularly West Africa
as a whole.9,324 Another aspect which probably lends credence to the destabilizing ability

of the Liberian crisis was the ease of fiow of arms within the sub-region which has been
acknowledged as being at the root of the intractable nature of the on-going civil war in
Sierra Leone. As Stedman noted,
Afnca's wars have created a boorning cross-border trafic in small
m s . This leads to political instability in several ways. The availability of
arms and the porousness of borders will intensifi civil conflicts in several
Afncan States where dictators have fanned ethnic hatred in order to stay in
power. Counûies that are trying to manage democratic transitions find that
disgruntled groups have access to weapons and can challenge the viability
of new govemment~'~~

in an ostensible attempt to cwtail this ugly trend, the United Nations Security Council in
William Reno. "Reinvention of an Afncan Statc" (1995) 16 Third Worid Quarterly at 1 10.
note 225 at 170.
Yearbook of the United Nations f 995 (New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishcn, 1995) at 396.
324 U.N.Doc. SIResf788 (1992) [hcreinafter, Rcsolution 788 of 19921 On the formation of the U L M 0 and
LDF in Siena Leone, see Peter Da Costa, "DiversionaryTactics?" West Afiica, April29-May 5. 199 1 at
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Resolution 788 of 1992 imposed a complete arms embargo on Liberia and called on al1
"member states to exercise self-restraint in their relations with al1 parties to the Liberian
conflict and to refiain fiom taking any action that would be inimical to the peace
process."3'6 Apparently this exhortation fell on deaf ears. According to the United
Nations Report for 1995, "factions continued to acquire arms across the bordes" and this
was attributed to the "the inability of

ECOMOG to deploy troops at the major points
9-327

across the borders of Liberia in accordance with the Cotonou Accord-

The Securïty Council was thus compelled to note with concem that "in violation

of Resolution 788 of 1992, arms continue to be imported into Liberia, exacerbating the
conflict.-9328 In addition to reamnning the embargo on the supply of m s to the rebels,
the Security Council took a fûrther step by establishing an amis monitoring cornmittee of
the Council to "seek from al1 states, and in particular al1 neighbouring states action taken
by them conceming the effective impiementation of the arms embargo...And to
recornmend appropriate mesures in nspowe to violations of the embargo imposed by
Resolution 788 of 1992.9,329
Havir-g examined those intemal contradictions and weaknesses in the Liberia
polity which rendered it very vulnerable to external factors giving impetus to the
rebellion, it is now necessary to draw some conclusions. First, the absence of a resilient
institutional structure in the municipal polity and the subsequent subsumation of the state
in individuals was an enterprise fiaught with grave risks. Its view of collective security
and peace as the absence of war was short sighted. Second, illegitimacy of govemance

Iasted so long principally because the prevailing international order tolerated and in some
cases supported and sustained it. On the other hand, the redefinition of collective security
to include concepts hitheno excluded imposed a severe strain on most illegitimate

j2"
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Ibid.

regimes. Third, the West AErican states connived at and in some cases collaborated with
different factions and camps in Liberia and this impacted on the duration and spread of
the crisis. While the complicity of some West Afncab states in the Liberian cnsis may
not meet the austere standards set by the Court in the Nicaragua Case regarding state
responsibiIity for support of rebellions (of which, later), the facts at least show that they
were not innocent or disinterested by-standers.
Further, the refugee crisis created by the crisis was a threat to the collective
security of the sub-region. According to Michael Brown, "at a minimum, refiigees
impose heavy economic burdens on host states, and they pose political and security
problems as well. 99330 In the Rwandan crisis, 250,000 Rwandans fled into Tanzania in a
single daymJ3'In the Liberian crisis, over 1.7 million people out of its estimated
population of 2 million were intemally and extemally d i ~ ~ l a c e d .The
" ~ important point
here is that until recently, intemal confiicts which created high niunbers of intemally
displaced persons have been largely ignored by the international community and as such,
were not necessarily construed as threats to international peace. It is in the evaluation of
the process of this chanze and expansion of the meaning of the concept of collective

security that chapter three fmds its relevance in this thesis. Chapter three seeks to
articulate the history and contemporary featwes of the notion of collective security and
the impact of this trend on the determination by the Security Council that the Liberian

crisis was a threat to international peace and security.
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CHAPTER THREE
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: DIALECTICS AND PRACTICE
1 have made a ceaseless effort not to ridicule, not to bewail human actions,

but to try and understand them. Benedict de ~ ~ i n o z a . " ~
3.1 :INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the theory and practice of collective security as applicable

to the Liberian crisis. In theory and practice, collective security has not k e n static, rather
it has reflected the necessities, aspirations, and anxieties of the tirnes. This chapter is
divided into three sections of which section 3.1 is o d y introductory. Section 3.2
examines the origins and practice of collective security in the gobal order and the
evolution of the noms regulating its practice. This section also evaluates the changing
content of collective security fiom being merely defined as the absence of war to its
contemporary comosition of legitimate concems for the security implications of
economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation, democratization of oppressive
polities, population explosion and mass migration. The limits of legitimate concem by
neighbouring states of regrettable events in other states are considered.
Section 3.3 examines the origins, constitutional structure and juridical nature of
the ECOWAS. The sub-regional politics and vestiges of colonial influence on ECOWAS
and its constitutive instrument regarding ollective security in the sub-region are also

examined. The reasons for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and the criticisms
thereto are enumerated for subsequent analysis in chapter four. Chapter three is

concerned with collective security in the contemporary global order.
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E. Luard, ed., The Ilnrernarional Regdation of Civil W w s (NewYork: N.Y.Univ. Press, 1972) at 188.
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3.2: THE CLASSICAL NOTION O F COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Domestic interests are no longer defined as belonging to a sphere separate
from that o t international interests; rather, they are seen as existing in
rzlation to transnational, regional and global spheres. The space of
international law is becoming increasingly international, as opposed to
inter-statal, and the state is no Lon er capable of serving as the sole locus
of international law's l e @ i r n a ~ ~f . ) ~

In spite of the ubiquitous charmer of the notion of collective security and its
common currency in international law, it is in fact one of the most elusive ideasSs3'
Consider for instance, the United Nations. It is supposed to be the manifestation and
realization of the imrnensity of the doctrine of collective security yet nowhere in its
Charter does the terrn "collective security" appear. It is not only in this type of great
omission that the concept of collective security betrays it's strange familiarity; teachings
by publicists and the behaviour of states, as will be demonstrated, have not lent much

clarity to its precepts.
This state of affairs is perhaps traceable to its intrinsically fluid and organic nature
and to the confusion by its earliest proponents who were battling with political realities of
their times and thus propounded a doctrine heavily dependent on the whims of their

respective national interests. Where the political wind blew them affected their perception

and conception of the doctrine. Thus, President Woodrow Wilson, reputed to be the
father of collective security, was himself steeped in confusion on the issue. From his first
idea of a "universal government of al1 states" which is central to the concept of collective

security, he tumbled to the slippery and parochial doctrine of balance of power.336
However, in faimess to him, at the Peace Conference of 1919 convened shortly afier the
3 34
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First World War, he persuaded the Conference to accept that "collective security requires
the creation of a global apparatus capable of giving institutional expression to its basic
princip~es."337
It was not only President Wilson who engaged in conceptual somersaults on the

question of collective security. To other politicians, allegiance to the concept of collective
security was a fùnction of national self-interest. For instance, in 1936 when ltalian troops

invaded Ethiopia, exposing the impotence of the League of Nations and its dubious
relevance to global security, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King disrnissed
calls for a collective restraint of Italy. In his view, the concept of collective security was
"a hypothetical argument, bearing no relation to the actualities of the day."338 It was
probably safe for hirn to Say so since Canada was not facing any direct threat from
Mussolini's escapades in Ethiopia- Three years later when Mussolini in collaboration
with the awesome Nazi war machine was mowing down modem civilization and
knocking on Canadian doors, Prime Minister King ate his words. In a conceptual
apostasy, he lamented that "if Britain goes d o m , if France goes d o m , the whole
business of isolation will prove to have been a rn~th."'~~
With the concept of collective security hostage to swinging national interests, it

took a combination of Adolf Hitler's policies o f a Geman lebensraurn/ final solution, and
the American explosion of two nuclear devices in Japan, for the world to perceivce of
collective securty as a global issue.j4' Purporting to have learnt profound lessons fkom the
337

Otto Pick & J u l i a Critcidcy, Collective Security (London: Macmillan., 1974) at 15. mereinafter, Otto
and Cntchley] In spitc of this impressive intention to actualizt collective secwïty in its purity, President
WiIson could not seIl the idca to the Amcrican Congrcss, especially the Senate. The American Senate
refused to ratify the Covenant of the Lcaguc of Nations. The United States never joined the League. Thus,
the ideal yielded to a cruder version of the convenient. Like the Concert of Europe, the tmcation of the
concept and the half-hearted attempts to enforce it's dilutcd version soundcd its death kncll. From its
mealy-mouthed response to the Japanesc aggression in Manchuria to a half hcartcd reaction to Mussolini's
rave pretensions in Ethiopia, it stumbkd and wobblcd to death.
G m t Dexter, Canada and the Building ofPeace (Toronto: C-dùn
institute of International Affain.
1934) at 141.
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Naidu, supra note 336 at S.
3'0~upranote 209 at 125.
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disaster of the Second World War, humanity denounced aggression and embraced an
enhanced concept of collective security.""

With this new lease on life, the concept of

collective security emerged in the post war discourse as the Holy Grail to perpetual
peace. Statesmen and politicians were literally falling over themselves extolling its

virtues as the ultimate antidote to global ~uicide.'~'
The concept of collective security is prernised on the theory that "peace is

This notion, it seems, attains its greatest popularity among
universal and indivi~ible."'~~
states after the dissipation of blood and life in expensive warfare. In its classical theory, it
thrives on the practical supposition that "a world wide combination of a11 states against

al1 potential aggressors would create a global system of collective s e c ~ r i t ~ . " ~
Indeed.
"
the history of inter-state relationships confims the abiding notion that states find security

in combining with other states which on the whole share some of their values and most of

their interests.)" No state has yet admitted that peace is not a universally shared value. It
is upon this seemingly trite pnnciple that the whole edifice of global collective security
encompassing the elaborateness of the United Nations and the ubiquitous nature of its
agencies is built.
As a doctrine, collective securuty assumes that any aberrant aggression in the face
of communal devotion to peace and unanimity of strength would be unprofitable, if not
suicidai. It affïrms that human societies (here identifieci as states) are not suicide ~lubs.''~
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Otto & Cntchley, supra note 337 at 27. In spite of Soviet enthusiasm in 1934 to revive the concept of
collective security md thus contain Hitlerite cxpansionism and aggression, the League woefuily failed and
Stalin in despair, "continued to promote his country's national interest by his own means."Ibid. Save for
providing a forum for minimal multi-lateral contacts, the League was a failure as an instrument of
collective security.
'42 Supra at 16.
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R.A. Akindele, Ihe Organization and Promotion of World Peace -A Smdy of Universal-Regional
Relationships (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) at 3.
344
fbid. Among the Igbo's of Nigeria, this philosophy is Summanzed in the pithy saying that no one cari
finish a rneal prcpared by the entire comrnunity and that no matter the size of the pot and the dexterity of
the skili, no single person can gorge the entire commwiity with food for too long
34 5
Ham Kelsen. Collective Security ut International L m (Washington: United States Govt-Printing
Office., 1957) at 3. [HereinaAer, Kelsen on Collective Sec11nn~]
346
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press., 196 1) at 89.

As such, no state would in the circumstances, be inclined towards aggression knowing
that such a course of action will ultimately lead to its defeat and possible destruction.
~ e l s e n ~ ~ ~ a n a l othe
~ i zrationale
ed
for collective security to the individual experiences at
municipal law. He thus argued that as individual attempts at security in municipal law are
Futile, so are individual state attempts at international law. In his words, "security can
only be collective, security is a pleonastic

Scholars such as Otto and Critchley have asked the question which strikes at the
very root of the principle of collective security. In their view, if peace is rnanifestly
desirable, an absolute good and of universal value, why do we need collective
institutionalization and maximization of the means of coercion to secure it?349Henry
Kissinger offers a rather pragmatic answer. In his view, in spite of the touted rationality
of humanity, the practice of states in the course of history, confims that where peace is
premised upon mere gentle persuasions of its inherent goodness, humanity has always
been at the mercy of the most ruthless dictator of the international c o r n ~ n u n i t ~ . ' ~ ~
While there is rnerit in Otto and Crichley's argument, there is a danger in
assuming that collective security depends soIely on maximum unifivation of the
international means of coercion. First, collective security is not about military alliances
per se. Just as the coercive instrument in the state goes beyond the police and other

awesorne institutions of force and enforced obedience, the concept of collective security
goes beyond a global machinery for enforced cornpliance with international Law.
Collective security includes the knowledge and consciousness that acts of states which
disturb international peace are prohibited in the conduct of inter-state relations, Save
where justified at international law. It corifesses the existence of certain universal values
which states are obliged to obey, not necessarily by compulsion or force but by a
347

Kelsen on Collective Security, supra note 345 at 8.
3481bid.
349
Otto and Critchley, supra note 337 at 16.
35
%enry Kissinger. A World Restored (New Y0rk:Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) at 1 1. Collective s e c u r i ~ ~
affirms the inhercnt rationality of hwnanity but does not close its eyes to human conduct and history.

recognition of their legitimacy and rationality. It invokes legality in the behaviour of
states and rewards it accordingly. Towards this end, collective security includes the spirit
or notion of international justice and rule of law. It acknowledges that intemal stability of

states and global insecurity interact c o n t i n ~ o u s l ~ . ~ ~ '

In practice, collective security has not always been the exampiar of global
consensus and rationality. The sarne inconsistency is apparent in its post Second World
War theory. The theoretical dissonance is to be examined first. Some scholars like Hans
Kelsen argue that the concept of collective security may be compatible with devolution of
the mechanism of international coercion to regional bodies.352Others such as ~ a i d u ~ ~ ~ a n d
Inis ~ 1 a u d e ' ~ ~ a rotherwise.
~ue
Claude and Naidu prefer the more idealistic and classical
view of collective security. h their (Claude and Innis) view, universal collectivity is the
means and security is the end. That is to say, securîty of al1 states, by a11 states and for al1
states.'''

Ln this context, absolute centralization and universalization of global morality

and means of coercion are the fiindamental characteristics of collective security. Unlike
Kelsen's compromise, there are no half measures. There is either a universal and
centralized security system or nothing. In this pure theory of collective security, which
approximates to a world govemment, there is no "aggression" by states per s e as there is
a world order. Delicts by states will thus rank as illegal use of force necessitating global
police action.
The intellechiai ngour and purity posited by Claude and Naidu is a far cry kom
state practice. in spite of the clamour for the ideal, the practice of states since the end of
the Second World War until the late eighties shows a bifurcation of the world order along
the lines of the Soviet and American led race for arms supremacy. In effect, universality

'"Otto and Critchley, supra

notc 337 at 17.
Kelsen, supra note 345 at 25.
Is3 Naidu, supra notc 336 at 15.
3 54
~rofessor-[nisClaude is genccaliy regarded as having undertaken the most defuitive work on the
subject. Sec h i s Claude, Swords into Ploughhores 3d ed.(New York: Random Housc, 1964) at 32.
Hereinafler, Claude]
This may be said to bc a f o m of Lincolnian democracy o f collective sccurity.
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lost out-and the concept of collective security became a hostage of the Cold War politics.
Although the development of security alliances (fashioned along the lines of the Cold
War conflict) as the active engine room for the maintenance of international peace is
hardly ~n~recedented,~'~it's
consequences are no less w o ~ y i n ~Some
. ' ~ ~ scholars trace

the ongin and spread of the practice of regional secwity outfits in the post Second World
War era to Soviet hegemonic tendencies.)'* As the Soviet Union imposed its will in East

Europe in apparent preparation for the Marxist prophesied showdown between capitalism
and socialism, the Western world took note and responded accordingly,

However, with the proliferation and optimization of the dreadfbl capabilities of
thermonuclear devices, it probably dawned on a11359that no one, including the most
comradely cornrnunist and the supposedly rapacious capitalist, would survive a
thermonuclear holocau~t.'~~
To the con-,

the con£iict will wipe away the entire

humanity several times over. Tempered by this sobering reality but yielding to the
dubious historical imperatives of securing its problematic eastem flank, Soviet Russia
proceeded to establish satellite states. in response, the United States encouraged the
imrnediate re-arming of the Federal Republic of Gemany and the creation of the North
356

Otto & Critchley, supra note 337 at 2 1. The ancient Greek city-states who combined against aggression
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Operarion Barbarossa had al1 conspircd to persuade the Russians that it's survival depended on the security
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The argument here is that Soviet expansionism was at once traditional and ideological. The ideology in
Marxisrn of the incvitability of a conflict between socialism and capitalism persuadtd the Soviet
comrnunists to ~flêumizeit's military might and size in preparation for the eventual showdown. This
ideological motive was furîher fiieled by the vacuum crcated by the defeat of Germany in the Second
World War. Moscow could thus march deep into Europe and install "client states" which could act as plates
of shield to protect it fiom it's weak Europcan flanks.
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University Press, 1983) at 34.
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Houghton Mimin Company, 1988) at 2. Sec also Alastair Buchan, Change Wirhout War (London: Chano
& Windus. 1974) at 22.
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).'~'
In a counter-response, the Soviet Union and it's
client-states of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania
Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania formed a forma1 regional security arrangement under the

Treaty of Fnendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed at Warsaw, ~ o l a n d . ~ ~ ~
With these arrangements, the arms race between both systems/regions began. In this race,
the obvious loser was the cosmopolitan definition of collective security. Such was the
complete triumph of the truncated version of collective that for nearIy f i Q years after the
end of the Second World War, âhe globe was preoccupied with the intrigues,
'
and collective security thus became
machinations and politics of the Cold ~ a r . ' ~Peace
negatively defined and circumscribed as the absence of war.
While this tmcated concept of collective security, evidenced by the rise of
regional security arrangements and peace of the graveyard may have marked a triurnph
for politics, Quincy Wright opines that it was a loss to international

la^.'^^ He argues that

while the trend probably produced a balance of power, it failed to create a legally
restrained world community. in the harsher judgment of Naidu, the trend was "a diffüsed
and demented version of the collective security envisaged by the United Nations

In his view, regionalism runs counter to collective security as it means
361

James Golden, et al ed., NATO At F o w - Change, Continuity and Prospecrs (London: Westview Press,

1989) at 22.
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Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pacr
(Brooklyn,New York: Praegcr, 198 1) at 6-8. Both rcgional security arrangements, like the ECOWAS
P M A D embody the concept that an aggression on one member is aggression on al1 other mcrnbers.
363
Regional arrangements appear to bc the compromise. Defenders of this watercd down substitute contend
that it is a partial realization of the grander vision of the pwc concept of collective security; a peculiar state
of being "dightly prcgnant."This limited vision of collective security and its defence by Lester Pearson,
arguably cost him the job of United Nations' Secretary Generel, a job which he was otherwise eminently
quaiified for. Sec Krishna Menon, India and World Politics-Krishna Menon's View of the World (Toronto:
Oxford University Press 1968) at 107.
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On his part, Claude bemoans the situation and asserts that the "mountainous resolve" by states at the close
of the Second World War to cstablish a univcrsal collective security shradt to a "mousy commitment. See
Innis Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of Forcen ( 1961) International Conciliation at 338.
365
Naidu, supra note 336 at 3. But see Wolfgang Friedman, " Thc United States Policy and the Crisis of
International Law" 59 A.J.I.L. 857. He rnakcs the argument that since 1956, there is a prevailing regime of
"limiteduse of force" and that states talce particulas interest in justifying their actions bcfore the United
Nations. In his view, these two factors show that the doctrine of colIective security systcm is alive and well.

security for some and not for all.'"

However, such arrangements represented by the

NATO and WARSAW treaties and pacts, are distiguishable from the Protocol on Mutual
Assistance on Defence (PMAD) of the ECOWAS.~~'
The difference in both regimes is
that unlike NATO and similar organizations which are aimed at detemng inter-state
aggression, the PMAD encompasses intra-state conflicts which threaten regional security.

Be that as it may, the discussion above shows that the notion of collection security
was primarily focused on peace and the avoidance of war. In recent times, the concept of

collective security has assumed a more globalized content. It now includes legitimate
concems

for

the

security

implications of

such

diverse

issues

as

nuclear

~ea~ons,~~~environrnental
degradation, mass migration, democratization process, sea and
water pollution, ozone layer depletion, and a myriad of issues hitherto construed as being
within the exclusisve domain of state sovereignty. It is therefore important at this stage to
comment on the changing content of collective secwity vis-à-vis state sovereignty.
The Westphalian notion of state sovereignty acknowledges the boundaries of the
state as that sphere of a peopled temtory with an effective govemment within which the
institutions of govemance are not accounatable or answerable to extemal entitie~?~In
the relationship of one state with another, the idea of stateh~od,"~the
juridical rneans of

its attainment, and its overall features, a strong preference for pragmatism in ils
jurisprudence was manifest."' As earlier argued, this regime emerged from the decay and
--

-

-

'%aidu, ibid. Sec also, Kelsen on Collective Security, supra note 345 at 259.
ï67 Kelsen, ibid at 29. It scerns that the Charter of the United Nations itscIf coatcmplated the prcsent
position as Chapter 8 provides for the exercise of certain fictions which in an effective international
collective security system, would have been an absolute prerogative of the United Nations itself. This
aspect of collective security and its impact on the concept of colIective securïty wil1 be cxamined in chapter
five.
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Gene Lyons & Michacl Mastanduno, "State Sovercignty and International Intervention" in Gene Lyons
& M ichael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia?State Sovereignty and International Intervention
(Baltimore: Johns Hoplrins Univmity Press., 1995) at 250.
3 70
Crawford, supra note 238 at 11.
371
Thomas Weiss & larat Chopra, "Sovereignty Under Siegel*in Gcnc Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, eds.,
Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press., 1995) at 87.

collapse of papal authority in temporal matters and the supphnting of the church in
political matters by the state. Anxious to blunt the edges of extreme nationaIism, the
inherent inequality of states and dangers of absolute sovereignty, the nascent states at the
a policy of jundical equality of a11 states
famous Peace of ~ e s t ~ h a l i a ~ ' ~ ( 1 6evolved
48)

and qualified state sovereignty in the domestic terrain. It was this emerging order,

especially the central role of States in the new dispensation that Hugo Grotius ably
foretold and articulated in his groundbreaking work entitled De Jure Belli ac ~ a c i s . ' ~ ~
The ernergent Grotian age, as it came to be known, was marked by a system of
balance of power, settlement of disputes by mediation, growth of diplomacy and
development of international

la^.'^^

The ~ e s t ~ h a l i a n ' and
~ ' Grotian conceptions of

sovereignty hinged on equality of states and supremacy of the sovereign in the state.
Although the sovereign in most States, most often the royalty, had near-absolute
discretion in fixing the boundaries for the expression of human interests in their domain,
the state sovereignty has never been absolute but qualified. It is useful to note that the

Treaty of Onasbmck and similar international agreements provided for the hurnane
treatment of rninorities within ~ t a t e s . ~ ' ~
However, the basic unit of international discourse and interaction was the state
and the regime of collective security and the means for its securement was by restraining

inter-state aggression. Collective security meant the absence of war and whoever held the
mantle of power in the state and maintained a peace of the graveyard was the recognized
head of that country. Apparently, the carnage of the Second World War contributed to
hrther entrenchment of the view that collective security was the mere absence of war.

"'fbid.
H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1646) ( Carnegie trans. 1925) at 1 12.
Frederick Kratochwil, "Sovercignty as Dominium**in Gcne Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds.,
Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignry and International Intervention (Fhltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press., 1995) at 23-30.
The Peace of Westphalia was among the series o f international agreements reaffimiing the inviolability
and sovereignty of the emerging states.
376
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However, the UN Charter acknowledged the relationship of respect for human dignity
and the overall earth space as components of collective security but this was to remain

covered and obscured by the politics and intrigues of the Cold War. Abuses of human
rights were routinely dismissed, especially in Aftica, as rnatters within the domestic

cornpetence of the respective states which other states had no legitirnate right to address.
It was under this regime that most states with chronic legitimacy deficits3"in the

municipal forum, relied on the international order fashioned on the relative indifference
inherent in fixation with juridical statehood to ride rough on their peoples.
The Courts too were not lefi out in reflecting the values of this regime of nearabsolute state sovereignty and nmow conception of collective security. Thus, the Privy
Council in the case of Mitchell and Others v. DPP held that "the issue as to whether de
j u r e recognition was to be given to a revolutionary regime was a matter of municipal law

in the State, and not international law. ,3378 This regime continued until late into the
ei@~ties.)'~However, the concept of collective security has shown resilience and an
organic disposition as it now seems to import concems for social justice, ozone Iayer
depletion and climate change, mass migration, chronic and violent ethno-nationalism,
water pollution, soi1 and groundwater pollution, nuclear weaponry and arms race,
dernocratization, and a host of other aspects of collective s e c ~ r i t ~ . ' ~ ~ ~
changes
h e s e which
appear most manifest since the end of the Cold War have wrought changes on our

contemporary understanding of the limits of state sovereignty, environmental aspects of
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Supm note 379 at 55. Sec also. Jost Dulbmck, "Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implication
for Local Law-A European Perspective ( 1993) 1 Indiana J. of Global Legal Sl~dies9 at 36. These changes
have also found expression in several trcaties and conventioas on the clhate, ozone Iayer protection,
ecological trade and so on.

global security and cosmopolitan nature of humanitarian law and human rights

la^.^''

By

the recurrent nature of both international discourse on these issues and number of states
participating in the conferences which yield these conventions and dedarations, the
notion of an emeging holistic conception of collective security cannot be denied.
Needless, to Say, these conventions are binding on the state parties thereto but the crucial
point to note here is that, they evidence a normative shift in the conception of collective
security.
As the Court observed in the Nuclear Weapons Care, even though some of the

resohtions of the General Assernbly on these issues may not be binding, depending on
their circumstances, they do also have some normative value.382In the context of an
emerging holistic concept of collective secwity, the series of international declarations
and conferences drawing a direct link between democratization, sustainable use of the
environment, population control, refbgee problems, et cetera to collective security show
an evolving global consensus on the point.'83 The expansion of the notion of collective
security and the celebrated move towards an international s o ~ i e t ~ ~not
~ ~sor nmuch
a ~ be

an affirmation of our common humanity as it is probably a pragmatic recognition that
some supposedly state problems know no artificial b o u n d a ~ i e s They
. ~ ~ ~ simply do not
respect the boundaries between states. This emerging trend may arguably be moving
from the North of the globe to the South. Hence, it has been quened whether the

phenornenon is really a case of genuine globalization3860rin fact, a "globalization" of
38 1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1 966) 999 U.N.T.S.171. See also. David Luban,
"Just War and Human Rights" ( 1990) 9 Philosophy and Public Afain Journal, at 166-8 1
Supra note 368 at 234.
383
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1.C.J.Reporis 3 at 44. On the expanding concept of sccurity on sustainable development, see Gregory
Tzeutschler, "Growing Security: Land Rights and Agricultural Dcvclopmcnt in Northcxn Scncgal" (1999)
4 3 Journal of African Law 36.
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CYirhout Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 58.
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Hopkins University Press., 1995) at 59.
386
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Western concems, anxieties and interests.
According to Quashigah, the emerging order 'Ys definitely not due to a change in
moral or humanistic values of the Western states in their relation to the south, it is simply
change in security interests brought about by the break up of the Soviet

s ni on."'^' Be

that as it may, threats to global collective security posed by issues outside the actual
existence of warfare and answen thereto are matters which can hardly be pursued fiom a
statist viewpoint. They are global problems and accordingly, must be resolved by a global
approach. It is not completely correct to assert that the emerging holistic approach to
collective security is a pureIy recent phenomenon. To the contrary. it is also seeded in the
provisions of the United Nations ~ h a r t e r . ' ~ ~
As the "focal point"3890fstate practice at international law, the Charter, inspite of
its state-centric perception of collective security and its means of securement contains a
cluster of values of hurnan rights and seeds of an expansive concept of collective
security. The symbiotic linkage arnong democracy, hurnan rights and peace3wfinds
anchor in the Charter. Its eloquent prearnble speaks of the determination to "establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
It also reaffirms its faith in
other sources of international law can be rnainati~ined."~~'
fundamental human rights and promotion of social progress and better standards of ii fe in
larger freed~m.'~*
Its Article 1 ammis the inter-relationship of enlargeci human freedom
to global peace and collective security and Article 103 of the Charter makes the preeminence of the Charter obligations clear. While these auspicious aspects of international
law were almost subsumed in the Cold War intrigues, recent multi-lateral treaties,
conventions and declarations re-affirm a holistic conception of collective security and
387
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jas Charter of the United Nations,
389

accord it deserved priority.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at it's
Conference on The Human Dimension of Security held in Geneva in early 1991,
unanimously declared that "issues conceming national minorities, as well as compliance
with international obligations and commitrnents conceming the rights of persons
belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concem and consequently do
not constitute exclusively an intemal affair of the respective state.

'93

This confirmation

of a cosmoplitan nature of collective ~ e c u r i t y ' ~ iW
s h e r buttressed by the Santiago
Comrnitrnent to Democracy, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of

American States (OAS) in Iune 1991.'9S This Declaration re-echoes the CSCE
cornrnitment stated above. The CSCE declaration at its conference of Geneva 1991 was
further elaborated in its Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the
. ' ~ ~import of these developments, as the
Conference on Security and ~ o o ~ e r a t i o nThe
Court noted in the Libya-Malta Continental Sheff Case is that they "have an important
role to play in recording and defining niles deriving therefkom, or indeed in developing
tl~ern."'~'

Although these developments are arguably inspired hom the Western part of the
globe, their impact have been felt in e c a , a continent known for it's rigid insistence on
the near-absolute pnnciples of state sovereignty and parochial conception of collective
security. The Secretary General of the OAU, Salim A. Salim in applauding the ECOWAS

action in Liberia, rejected the claim that the ECOWAS action constituted a violation of
the OAU Charter prohibition on intervention in the intemal affairs of other countries. In
his words:
393
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mon-interference should not be taken to mean indifference.. .For
an Afican Govenunent to have the right to kill it's citizens or let it's
citizens be killed, 1 believe there is no clause in the Charter that allows
this.. .To tell the truth, the Charter was created to preserve the humanity,
dignity, and the rights of the Afiican. You cannot use a clause of the
Charter to oppress the Afncan and Say that you are irnplernenting the
OAU Charter. What has happened is that people have interpreted the
Charter as if to mean that what happens in the next house is not one's
concern. This does not accord with the reality of the ~ c r l d . ~ ~ ~
In addition, the Harare ~ e c l a r a t i o n ~ ~the
~ osituation
n
in South Africa elaborates

and a f h s tbis notion. in the fifth paragraph to its Preamble, the African States avowed

that they recognized the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can
only be achieved when the system of apartheid in South AfÎica has been liquidated and
South Afiica transfonned into a united, democratic and non-racial country. Thus, the
direct relationship between regional security, respect for human rights and legitimacy of
govemance, not only in South Afnca but for Southern a c a was affixmed.

The Harare

Declaration demonstrates that the inequities and iniquities in South Afnca was a threat to
peace in Southern Africa and not merely in South AGica alone. The Ahican states in
paragraph 9 of the Declaration affirmed their continued support, politically and rnilitarily
for a11 those fighting apartheid in South Africa.

The Liberian conflict, as already noted, caused the death of over 200,000 people
and exiled over a million to various cowitries in the sub-region. Given the inter-locking
nature of the ethnic configuration of Liberia with its neighboun and the ethnicization of
the confiict, the field of conflict rapidly spread to neighbouring states. in view of these
factors, it cannot be seriously argued that the Liberian conflict, on its face and in the
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Harare, Zimbabwe, August 2 1, 1989. See Gino Naldi, cd., Documents of the OA U (London: Mansel
Publishing Co., 1992) at 79. This Declaration was unanimously endoned by the Movement of Non-Aligned
States at it's Summit Meeting in Belgrade and fomed the basis for the "Declarationon Apartheid and it's
Destructive Consequcnce in Southern Africa" adopted by the U.N General Asscmbly on December 14,
I989.

399

overall context of the emerging holistic concept of collective security, was not a matter of
legitimate concern for neighbouring countries. Intra-state ethnic warlordisrn is
problematic, and when such a conflict occurs in a region like West Africa, where ethnic
groups traverse the fiontiers of state boundaries, such a conflict is intrinsically
international in character.
Further, given the events in Sierra Leone and ~ a i t i , ~ w h e interventions
re
were
undertaken to remove illegitimate govemments disturbing the tranquility of neighbouring
states, a change in the concept of state sovereignty and recognition of the relationship
between illegitimate govemance and collective security can hardly be denied.40' In the
circumstances, Kampelman's thesis that "there is a shifiing dividing line between interna1
affairs to be protected against intervention and the responsibility of the international
community to intervene in order to preserve peace and important huma.
v a l u e ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ r oholds
b a b true,
1 ~ especidly for M c a n countries. in sum, the question
whether the Liberian civil war constituted, prima facie, a legitimate subject of concern to
neighbouring states must be answered in the affinnative. However, that does not mean
that ipso facto, neighbouring states may join the fkay or iniervene militarily in the
character of knights errant. To the contrary, the pertinent question ought to be the scope
of action ECOWAS could lawfully take in arresting the situation in Liberia- This question
raises issues of the legality of the invitation by President Doe to ECOWAS to intervene,
the principle of collective self defence, and the legality of the Security Council

ratification of the measures taken by ECOWAS in respect of the Liberian crisis. Before
evaluating these issues, the next section will examine the constitutional structure of
ECOWAS and its juridical status. Attention will also focus on the legal arguments on

collective security made by ECOWAS and its critics.
400
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3.3: ECOWAS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

At the thirteenth ECOWAS Surnmit in Banjul, the Gambia, the (ECOWAS)

Standing Mediation ~ o m m i t t e e ~ ~ ~ d e c i d eestablish
d ~ ~ t o an ECOWAS Cease-tire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with the mandate to "keep peace, restore law and order
and ensure that a cease-fire agreed to by the warring factions in Liberia was
respected.99405This unprecedented action was anchored inter alia on the ECOWAS'
findings that
[Tlhe failure of the waming parties to cease hostilities has led to
the massive destruction of property and the massacre by al1 the parties of
thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and
children. some of whom had sought sanctuary in churches, hospitals,
diplomatic missions and under Red Cross protection, contrary to al1
civilized behaviour ...the civil war has also trapped thousands of foreign
nationals, including ECOWAS citizen5 without any means of escape or
protection...the result of ail this is a state of anarchy and the total
breakdown of law and order in Liberia. Presently, there is a government in
Liberia which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding
the entire population as hostage, depriving them of food. health facilities
and other basic necessities of life.. .these developments have traurnatized
the Liberian population and greatly shocked the people of the sub-region
and the rest of the international community. They have also led to
hundreds of thousands of Liberians being displaced and made refugees in
neighbourin countries, and the spilling of hostilities into neighbouring
countries.

d

On this broad mandate, the ECOMOG troops nurnbering 3,000 amved Liberia on
25 August 1990.~'Prior to this bold initiative, the ECOWAS had adopted a diplomatic
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approach'08in which representatives of the major rebel group, the NPFL had held
discussions on a peacefùl settlement of the conflict. These diplornatic efforts failed as
neither the Doe regime nor the rebels were willing to yield on the question of how and
when Doe should vacate his office as the President of Liberia. It is important at this stage
to examine the juridical basis and structure of ECOWAS.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional
alliance of sixteen states?09 Geographically, the West African sub-region is
conventionally delimited as the area bounâed by the Atlantic and lying south of the
Sahara and West of ~ a m e r o o n . " ~
The ~reat~~"estab1ishi.n~
the organization makes it

clear that the ECOWAS was originally designed to accelerate regional economic
development and in~e~ration.~"
This ambition was not novel. Prior to the appearance on
the global scene of the West Afncan States with the Berlin-designed boundaries, close
economic activities (and intemecine rivahies) had existed amongst the various peoples of
the region.

'

Although the formation process of the ECOWAS was long and checkered,"'its
formation has been acknowledged as the most significant West Afncan effort at
integrating. It is also ironic that the idea of an economic entity in the nature of the
ECOWAS was fust rnooted by late President Tolbert of ~ i b e n a . ~Sequel
"
to Tolbert's
Kufour, supra note 136 at 527. As earlier indicated, tbe rebels rejected the peace proposals.
Douglas Rimmer, The Economies of West Afnca (New York: St Martins Press, 1985) at 2 .pereinafter,
Rimmer]. At its formation, ECOWAS had fifieen members namcly: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire,
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone and Togo. Cape Verde, the sixteenth membcr joined in 1977.
410
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'"'

suggestion. a senes of meetings and negotiations led to the launching of the organization
by Nigeria's General Yakubu Gowon in Lome. Togo on April 1972."~The ECOWAS

Treaty was adopted by a ministenal meeting and signed by the original fifteen members
at Lagos. Nigeria on 28 May 1975.'" The creation of ECOWAS was a diplornatic feat

for states in a region notonous for inter-state rivaIry, suspicion and mutual hostility.
According to Julius Okolo, ECOWAS was created out of the teeth of "the perennial
frontier disputes between Cote d' Ivoire and Ghana and between Benin and Nigeria.. .the
irredentist movernent among Ghana's Ewes; Togo's suspicions of Ghana since the
assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963, the long standing suspicion of
Nigeria by Cote d'Ivoire.. .the rivalry between Senegal and Mali.A l 8 The recurrent
suspicion of Nigerian motives in the sub-region is as old as the history of colonialism in
that region and deserves some consideration.
Following the colonization of Afnca and its consequent balkanization at the
Berlin conference of 1844, the British Nigeria was an outstanding possession. First, the
territory called Nigeria had (and still has) a population larger than al1 other West Afnca
states combined. Its southem state of Lagos with a population of over 10 million people
(Nigeria has thirty-six states), is twice that of the Republic of Benin and greater than the
combined population of the French-speaking Republics of Togo and

en in.^'^ Similarly.

the population of Nigena's northern city of Kano (bigger than Lagos) is greater than the
combined population of the French speaking republics of Niger and Chad bordering it on
the north. Nigeria has half of the entire West Anican econornic market.420In addition. it
is the richest country in the sub-region, accounting for a sixth of the entire global supply
West flrica (ECO WAS) (Ile-He: University of Ife Press, 1982) at 53.

Olatunde Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS" (1980) 34 Infernarional Organizafion at 57 1 .
'"supra note 414 at 22. The f m t five protocols annexed to the trcaty werc signed at Lome. Togo on 5
November 1975.
' 1 8 Supra, at 25.
419
John Heilbninn, "The Flca on Nigeria's Back: ï h e Foreign Policy o f Benin" in Stephen Wright, ed.,
r i p a n Foreign Policks (Boulder. Colorado: Wcstview Press., 1999) at 43.
'"O Stephen Wright and Julius Okolo. "Nigeria: Aspirations of a Regional Power". supra note 413 at 43.
.'16

of cmde 0i1.''~'
Afthough these riches and potential have been largely squandered as a result of
chronic cornipt military rule in that country, the consciousness of its wealth and its huge
and mobile population, combine to imbue its citizenry and governrnent with what some
cornmentators aptly cal1 a sense of "manifest destiny1422in the continent of Afica. This is
the feeling that the country is destined to lead the West Afiican region, if not the entire
African continent. This attitude raises serious doubts about its real motives whenever it
dabbles into regional politics. The gross disparity in wealth and size between anglophone
West Africa led by Nigeria and the relatively less endowed French speaking countries in

the sub-region has been observed by some publicists as fueling French suspicion of
Nigeria in West Afnca. It should be noted that France has a long policy of construing its
freed colonies as cultural heirs of mainland France. Accordingly, France is always
perceived of as sabotaging British West Afncan dominance of the sub-region by its
encouragement of divisions and dissent within the E C O W A S . ~ ~ ' D U
talks
X~~
for~ the
formation of the ECOWAS (which dragged on for 15 years), President Georg Pompidou
of France counseled French West Africa to boycott the "British West Afncan led
proposal for the ECOWAS and fonn a French West AfÎican economic alliance to isolate
and weaken rival influence poles as Ghana and Nigeria.r d 2 4

This division was manifested in the nature of support by ECOWAS countries for
the various factions in the Libenan conflict and in the overall French attitude to the

Nigerian 1ed attempt to resolve the crisis. While most of the French West African
countries supported or at least were indifferent to the rebellion by Taylor, the
Anglophone countries were vocal and active in their condemnation of Taylor's rebellion

and support for the ECOMOG effort.

"'

Ibid.
Clapham on Afican Polifia of Survival, supra note 154 at 18.
'"Daniel Bach "Franco-phone Regional Organizatious and ECOWAS" in Julius Okolo cd., Wesr Afiican
Regional Cuoperation and Development (Oxford: Westview Press.,1990) at 54.
'"Ibid.. See also, Clapham on Afican Politics of Survival, supra note 1 54, at 64-89.

It is perhaps pertinent to address the question of the constitutional structure of
ECOWAS. The ECOWAS has several organs engaged in the daily ruming of the

organization. The organs established by the Charter of the organization are the Authority
of the Heads of States and Governrnent, the Council of Ministers, the Executive
Secretariat, a Tribunal and several technical and specialized Commissions. The Authority
of Heads of States and G o v e m e n t which is established by Article 5 of the ECOWAS
Treaty is the "principal governing in~titution'~~'
of the organization. It is made up of the

various leaders of the member-states. It meets at teast once a year, directs and controls al1
the executive functions of the ECOWAS and its decisions are "binding on al1

~ ~ delegate its functions to a gmup
institutions" of the West AWcan ~ o m m u n i t yIt. ~may
of members chosen fiom its fold. It did this in the Liberian case when it constituted
arnong itself a Standing Mediation Cornmittee to fashion ways of dealing with the
Liberian problem. However, the Authonty of Heads of States and Govemments acts on

the advice of the Council of Ministers of the ECOWAS. However, a carefbl reading of
the entire treaty leaves no doubt that no organ of the organization, has any powers to
intervene in matters solely within the dornestic competence of a member

tat te.'^'

The Council of Ministers consists of two representatives of each member state
and its responsibility includes the giving of directions to al1 other subordinate institutions
of the ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o nIn. ~addition.
~~
it advises the Authority of Heads of States and

Governments on matters of policy aimeci at achieving the goals of the organization. Like
the Authority of the Heads of States and Govement, its decisions are binding on the
other organs of the organization subordinate to it.429 The bureaucratie hub of the
organization is the Executive Secretariat of the organization, headquartered in Abuja, the
capital of Nigeria. This organ is charged with the actual implementation of decisions

'"Article 5 ( 1 ) of ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 41 1 , ibid.

"'Articles 5 (2) and (3). ibid.
'"Weller, supra note 5 at xx.
"'Article 6 of ECOWAS Trcaty, supra note 4 1 1.
Ibid.

reached by the Authority of Heads of State or the Council of ~inisters.'~"lthou~h
Article 1 1 of the ECOWAS Treaty provides for a judicial Tribunal which would ensure
"the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the ECOWAS
~ r e a t y , ' ~ " n such
o
organ has been put in place. In addition to the above mentioned organs
of the ECOWAS, the Treaty of ECOWAS provides for the creation of specialized

Commissions to deal with such diverse issues as trade, customs, immigrations, industry,
transport, telecommunications, et cetera. Indeed, the ECOWAS Treaty ernpowers the
Authority of Heads of States to establish other Commissions from "time to tirne,432as the
need for them arises.

In recognition of the indispensability of peace and security to the attainment of its
economic goals, ECOWAS expanded the scope of its cornpetence beyond the confines of
commerce and economic integration. The extra-economic character of the ECOWAS is
discernible fkom the organization's Protocol on Non-Aggression concluded on 22 April
1 9 7 ~ . ' ~ ~ECOWAS
~he
Non-Aggression Pact obliges al1 member states to uphold
international n o m s forbidding the resort to rnilitary settlement of disputes."34 In addition,
the Non-Aggression Pact imposes a duty on member states to desist from subverting or
allowing foreign elements to use their territories to subvert the authority of member

tat tes.^"

This is one fundamental difference between the ECOWAS Non-Aggression

Pact and other collective security pacts like that of the N A T O ' ~ ~and the defiuict

WARS AW .437
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Articles 8 and 9, ibid.
Ibid.
432 Ibid.
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n Weller, supra note 5 a t 18.
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the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). This latter Protocol, with a
contextualized view on collective security, is remarkable for its adaptive response to
conflicts of peculiarly African ~ h a r a c t e r . ' ~It~is arguable that the PMAD was ptirnarily
aimed at plugging the loopholes existing in the Non-Aggression Pact- Unlike the NonAggression Pact, the PMAD has provisions to deter and deal with "external aggression
and extemally supported domestic insurrection and revolt which constitute major threats
to stability in the c o ~ n r n u n i t ~ . " ' ~ ~

In spite of these provisions, the question has been raised whether the ECOWAS is
a regional body as conternplated by the United Nations chartersa0 Scholars such as Hans

el sen^' and ~aidu"*have proposed some tests for determining when a grouping of
states may for the purposes of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter, be construed as a
regional body. These tests must be cumulatively answered in the aflinnative. They are as
follows: (a) that their mernbership includes almost al1 the states within the region, (b) it
has a permanent and centralized authority and (c) it guarantees the security of one state

against another?'
The prearnble of the ECOWAS Treaty and the implicit language of the PMAD
show that the ECOWAS is a regional body. Its membership encompasses al1 the states in
the sub-region and as already elaborated, has a permanent and centralized authority. It
also has assurances of mutual and collecticve security. It is equally significant that
Resolution 8 13 of 1993 passed by the Security councilW and other Security Council
resolutions on the Liberian crisis were made pursuant to chapters 7 and 8 of the United
438
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Nations C h t e r . These contain provisions for regdating the relationship behveen
regional bodies and the Security Council in the maintenance of global peace. Upon the
foregoing, it follows that ECOWAS is a regional organization. Having examined the
ongins, structure and juridical statusU50f the ECOWAS, it is necessary to revisit the
reasons it gave for the intervention in Liberia. This is important because its (ECOWAS)
altniism in intervention has not only been doubtedu6but the reasons raise some
controversial points of international Iaw.
Several rationaies and justifications centred on collective security of the region
have been advanced by the ECOWAS as justification for its action in Liberia. General
Ibrahim Babangida, then President of Nigeria justified the ECOWAS action on the
ground that the Liberian conflict "had a destabilizing effect on the West Afncan subregion.'*'

In his words, "if events are such that have the potential to threaten the

stability, peace and security in this sub-region, Nigeria in collaboration with others in this
sub-region, was duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to either
avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquility and
s e c ~ r i t ~As
. " i~his
~ argument appeared unconvincing to critics of the intervention, he
queried, "should Nigeria and other responsible countries in this sub-region stand by and
watch the whole of Liberia tumed into one mass graveyard?"449
From New York, the Head of Nigerian Legation at the United Nations, Ibrahim
Gambari in a lener to the Security Council argued that the ECOWAS stepped in "to
prevent the situation in Liberia degenerating into a situation likely to constitute a real
445
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threat to international peace and securïty and that the goals of the cornmunity had
received endorsement from al1 the leaders of the West Afncan sub-region as well as fiom
the OAU.rd50 Further, the Secretary General of ECOWAS contended on behalf of
ECOWAS, that the intervention was in "collective self defence" of the sub-region.
President Babangida of Nigeria, who at the material time was the Chairman of the
ECOWAS and the moving spirit behind the intervention, offered yet another legal
justification. He argued: " we have heard of the iegality of the intervention ...people who
raise the issue of legality should promptly look at Article 52 of the Charter of the United
Nations for the appropriate and expected role of the ECOMOG and other sub-regional
organizations

world- ide."^" In

sum, the intervening members of the ECOWAS,

declared unequivocally that "the reasons for our dynamic but positive action in the
Liberian crisis are not mysterious ...they are to enswe collective security ...of Our
peop~es.M452
The justifications tendereû by ECOWAS have not blunted the edge of the
criticisms against the intervention. The criticisms have largely dwelt on the contention
that the intervention flouted n o m s of international law forbidding intervention in
domestic conflicts. It is important to summarize the case of the critics before examining
their ments in international law and as they relate to the issue of collective security in the
~ u b - r e ~ i o n . ~ ~ ~of~ nthe
t i cECOWAS
s
action invoke the customary international law
principle of non-inter~ention~~~in
the intemal affain of a sovereign state. The rule against
intervention is so sacrosanct that evm the Charter of the United ~ations"'in Article 2(7)
UN Doc.S/PV.2974. 22 January 1991, p.8.
Supra at 106.
""
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forbids -the United Nations itself fiom intervening "in matters that are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any

tat te."^'^

The principle of non-intervention is a

fundamental principle of customary international Iaw and is also affirmed and reiterated

in the United Nations Charter, intemationaI conventions and treaties. It is also evidenced
by state practice and espoused in judicial decisions and various United Nations

de~larations.'~~These
varied manifestations of international law undoubtedly reflect and
restate its fiindamental character as a basic component of state s o ~ e r e i ~ n t y As
. " ~a~
corollaxy to the prohibition on the use of force by states, which is a rute of ius cogens, its
radical character is hardly debatable and it is on this formidable pillar that the criticism
against the ECOWAS action in Liberia partly r e s d s 9
~ ~ ianchored
s
on subsidiary sources of international
The case of the c r i t i ~ s ~also
law such as the opinion of writers?'
Cà.se4" and the Co$u Channel CU#'

Similarly, decisions of the Court in the Nicaragua
on use of force by states and the doctrine of non-

intervention have been called in aid. These arguments are apparently well founded. The
Court in the Nicaragua Case reiterated that the prohibition of military intervention
without valid invitation is a necessary m d constitutive part of every state's right to
-

Ibid. It has been argued that no state can insist on this right if the right to non-intervention will cause
disproportionate injury to the community of nations. See H-Lauterpacht, Tlre FuncfionofLaw in the
International Cornmuniry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) at 286.
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sovereignty, temtorial integrity and political independence. Similarly, virtually every
multiIatera1 treaty of importance on inter-state concourse provides for the right of nonintervention. The critics conclude on this point that " the existence in the opinio jrcris of
states to the existence of the principle of non-intervention is backed by substantial and
established state practice."'u
There is hardly any doubt that international law in its primary and subsidiary
manifestations forbids the intervention by one state or a group of states in the intemal
affairs of another state rnilitarily or otherwise. For the avoidance of doubt, the "intemal
affairs" forming the subject of state sovereignty in which other states are debarred Corn
intervening are those matters which each state is permitted, by the principles of
sovereignty, to decide !?eely?'

However, is this fundamental n o m of international law

a b s o ~ u t e ? 'Critics
~~
of the intervention in Liberia have made the important distinction that
the ECOWAS action would have been lawful if the effective governrnent of Liberia had

invited ECOWAS to intervene in the ~onflict.'~' In effect, the critics concede that at
internationaI law, a state or a group of states may be excepted fiom the prohibition on
external intervention in domestic affairs of a sovereign state if the effective govemment
in the troubled state invites the intervention.468
This is a very interesting point, especially as the critics of the intervention further

464

Supra note 136 at 532.
'651mplicit in this observation as made by the Court in the Nicaragua Case is that sovereignty and nonintervention are not absolute positions or principles. As already notcd, states may not in their insistence on
sovereignty menace other states or engage in acts which constitute a direct thrcat to 0th- states even if the
acts or omissions are perpetrated within the borders of that state asserting the claims to non-intervention.
Secondly, the doctrine of non-intervention also presumcs the existence of a "state" and that the state
asserting the right is engaged in acts in which states arc permittcd by international law to "decidc fieely."
The advances in telecommunications and information have significantly affected these vaiues. As the globe
shrinks, the "domestic" concems of states especially in human rights issues now assume the toga of
international subject.
Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, "Lnternational Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of
International Society" in Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, eh., Beyond Wesrphalia?State Sovereignty
and /nfernationalIntervention (Baltimore: Johns H o p h University Press., 1995) at 9.
467
Supra note 136 at 543.
'69
Ibid. It is thus argued that the UN interventions in Congo and Cyprus in the 1960s were at the invitation
of the respective states.

opine that the ECOWAS ought to have assembled the various heads of the warring
factions to obtain their consent before intervening in Liberia. With this golden rod as it
were, the waters of (i1)legality in external interventions are parted.M9Thus. in the absence
of a collective consent by the warlords, the critics argue that the proper intervening body

is the UN. On this second aspect, the cntics argue that only the United Nations has the
legal mandate to receive and act upon an invitation for intervention by a troubled

incumbent governrnent. They have thus likened the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia to
the unilateral intervention of the United States of Arnenca in the tiny Caribbean republic

of ~ r e n a d a ~ ~ ~Soviet
a n d intemention in ~zechos1ovakia~~'which
al1 received univenal

condemnations. These arguments by the critics of the ECOWAS action are finally spiced
with liberal references to the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the
Definition of ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o n ~ ' * w harguably
ich
defines aggression to include the ECOWAS
intervention in ~iberia."~
For the above reasons, the ECOWAS action, the critics argue, constituted
"enforcement action" under Chapter 8 of the United Nations and since it was effected
without pnor authonzation of the Secwity Council, it was unlawful. This thesis will
shortly examine the merits of these arguments, but before doing so, it is pertinent to
examine the history of multi-lateral interventions in the pre-Charter era.47'~hediscussion
is to afford a historical background for subsequent analysis of the contemporary regirne
as it affects the Liberian case on the question of collective security as presently
469
4 i0

Supra note 135 at 386. See also supra note 136 at 533.

This intervention was condernned by the General Assembly in a Resolution. See General Assembly
Resolution 38/72" Nov. 1983, 43d Plenary Meeting, reprintcd in WiHiarn Gilmore The Grenada
Intervention: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell Publishin, 1984) 107-108. The purported
invitation to intervene was largcly dismisscd as the authority to make the invitation was in grave doubt.
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This intervention was condemned in a Security Council draft Resolution which failed by the Soviet veto.
See 144Yd Meeting, Security Council Official Records 22" August 1968, p.34. Note also that the
purported invitation to intcrvene in this case and in the case of Hungary were dismissed as they were
patently manufactured and or coerced.
Annex to Gentral Assernbly Resolution 33 14 (XXIX) 14" Dccember 1974.
473
But note that the United Nations Secretary General had obscrved that the ECOWAS did not need the
UN prior authorization. See Ofodilt, supra note 135 at 4 14.
'"'Akindele, supra note 343 at 54-84.

"'

~ i s t o r i c a l l ~ , ' ~ ~concept
the
of non-intervention is no stranger to imprecision.J77
This state of affairs is probably a function of the manifold aspects of intervention in
domestic affairs of other states. Oppenheim has defined intervention in terms of a
"dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of
maintaining or altering the actual condition of things."'78 This is a classical definition but

in the context of the subject of this thesis it must be restricted to military

inter~entions-~~~~lthou~h
the doctrine of non-intervention is a well established pnnciple
of international law, scholars have done well to remind us that "it did not spnng fidl
b l ~ w n . Rather,
' ~ ~ ~ its contemporary feahires have their roots deeply embedded in the
practice of states spanning over five centuries.48' To locate the earliest scholarly
articulation of its noms, historians have referred to the writïngs o f Wolff and ~ a t t e l ? ~

These writings probably afforded intellectual clarity for the dissonant practice of states on
the issue. Reasons for this historical practice range fiom the genuine fear of internai
conflicts destabilizing an entire region to the reactionary escapades of fatally threatened
regimes such as the Holy Alliance, of whkh later.
In 1823, England, France and Russia rnilitarily intervened in Greece on the

ostensible ground that the Greek civil war threatened the security of ~ u r o ~ e Similarly,
.'~~
between 1875 and 1876, Europe was upset by the recunent Turkish outrages which
threatened European security. It intervened by force of axms.lg4 Further, the revolts in

"'Henkin, supra note 453 at 160
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Ann Thomas & A-Thomas, Non Intervention @allas:Southern Mcthodist University Press,
1956) at 3. [Hcreinafter, Thomas]
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Richard Little, Intervention: Extemal Involvement In Civil Wars (London: 1975) at 2.
Emest Oppenhcim, International Law,H-Lautcrpacht cd., Vol. 9 (London: Longman, 1992) at 432.
" 9 Richard Connaughton, Militav Intervention in the 1990s (New York: Routledgt; 1992) at ix.
480Thornas.supra note 476 at 3.
4%I
Ellery Stowell, Intervention in Intemational Law (Washington, D.C,: John Byme &Co,1921) at 47.
Vattel has been quoted as positing that "to intenncddle in the domestic affairs of another nation or to
undenake to rcsuain its counciis is to do it an injury. Sec, Thomas,, supra note 476 at 14.
483
Dr.F.X. De Lima. Intervention in Internarional Law (Nctherlands: The Hague. 1971) at 126.
484
Ibid. Further, Russia and Saxony had by their armed intervention in Poland in 1733-63 placed the Sa-xon
king on the throne of Poland.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina against Turkish misrule and atrocities persuaded the imperial
couds in Russia and Austria to adopt the Berlin ~ e r n o r a n d u m . ~These
~ ' cases show that
it was not unusual for states to agree to put a tottering neighbouring state in order.

However, it appears that the intervening states were obliged to show that the problem in
the troubled state was of such magnitude and character as to endanger the general
security of the region or of neighbouring states.
As such, it was not every outrage or conflict in neighbouring states that rose to the
Ievei of threat to the security of the region and therefore, an acceptable basis for
collective military action. For instance, although the trouble in Belgrade in
1903~~~shocked
Europe and was wholly condemned, it was not enough to compel the
European states to intervene. The atrocities had shocked and outraged the entirety of
Europe and Iefi in its wake very severe diplornatic consequences for the usurpers in
BeIgrade. However, as Admiral Morin of Italy observed "...though this feeling
dominates al1 other impressions in the presence of this temble tragedy, the govemrnent
must remember that the events which took place at Belgrade relate to intemal affairs.r d 8 7
In spite of this restraint and rationalization which was to distinguish collective
actions for collective security from unilateral interventions, the Holy ~ l l i a n c e ~ ~ ~ e r n e r ~ e d

"'Ibid. The Berlin Mernorandum was an international instrument which imposed certain obligations on
Turkey on how she was to administer her tonexhg empire. Needless to Say, this was a clear act of
"intervention" in a domestic problea Although England did not accede to the Mernorandum, France, ItaIy
and Russia acceded to it. Whcn the Turks could not control their empire tiom imploding and threatening
European security, Russia purporting to act in behalf of Europe militarily intcrvcned.
On the night of 1 0 lune
~ 1903. an anocious military uprising against the royal house in Belgrade e m e d
the King 40 deep cuts and the Queen 65. Othcr mernbers of the royal house and mling class received
sirnilar acts of savagery. However, some early writcn insisted that the right to non-intervention yields to
the duty to intervcne when non-intervention gives rise to disproportionate injury to the neighbouring states,
See H.Lauterpacht, supra note 456 at 286.1
'"Lauterpacht, supra, at 141. Similarly. the British condemned the intervention by the Holy Alliance in the
republican upnsing in Naples which had deposed the monarchy and instituted a popular parliament. The
British foreign minister argued that such as intervention could only be justified "...if dangers from such
interna1 affairs constitute clcar, grave, and imminent and actual danger; rnilitary in character to
neighbouring states. "
In spite of its grand name, this was a rcactionary group of Monarchists detemincd to crush by force of
arrns, the nsing wave of republicanism in Europe. It appointcd itself to combine force of arms for the
restoration to the throne of e x p k d Moaarchs. See, Hannis Taylor, A Trealire on Public International Law
(Chicago: Cailaghim and Co., 1901) at 140.

to stretch the emerging state practice. The European Monarchy, on its way to
obsolescence hastened by the rising wave of republicanism, did not yield without a
whimper. The monarchists saw the spreading wave of republicanism, as a raging
conflagration which must be put out. As the " c ~ n f l a ~ r a t i o n " ~ ~ ~
Europe,
s w e ~ tthe Holy
Alliance felt itself persuaded to intervene and contain the spreading "contagion of
r e v o ~ u t i o n . 'In
~ ~addition to the contempt with which most states in Europe held the
objectives of the Holy Alliance, the contagion doctrine and its variants were destitute of
respect among pub1icists.'91~itt~e
wonder its limited life span as a legal justification for
extemal intervention in domestic affairs.

In arguing against the Holy Alliance's intervention in Spain, Britain distinguished
its earlier intervention in the French polity. According to Lord Castlereagh, British
intervention in Napoleonic France (unlike the Spanish case) was because France
"attempted to propagate fint her pnnciples and then her domain (of Europe) by the
s ~ o r d . ' ~ ~ ~ T hcontrary
us,
to the presumptions of the Holy Alliance, there was an
The HoIy Alliance under Mettemich attempted to enforce the "contagion theory" by rnilitarily
suppressing revolutionary movements in the Euopean states which had overthrown their monarchies. It
was argued by the Monarcbists that the spread of rcpublicanism was Iike a raging conflagration which
wouId consume and destroy Europe. Thus, in the preliminary Protoc01 of Troppau, the Holy Alliance
declared that "states which have undergone a change of govemment due to revolution, the result of which
threatens other states, the Princes bind thernselves by peacefiil means or if nced be bv arms to brinq back
the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance." The spread of republicanism in Europe which the
blue blooded princes of the Holy Alliance consmed as a "conflagration" was roundly rebutted by a witty
French woman. She rcminded the agitated Royalty that "what you believe to be a conflagration is only an
illumination." See Stowel supra note 449 at 387.
JW At the Conference of Verona in 1822, British opposition to the preswnptions of the Holy Alliance was
brushed aside whcn they (the Holy Alliance) authorized h p e r i a l France to rnilitarily intervene in Spain to
restore the dcposed Spanish King Ferdinand VI1 to the throue. Spanish monarchical institutions were
successfÙlly restored. Great Britain in vain argued that "no proof was produced ...on the part of Spanish
government to invade the temtory of France.. .or any project to undermine her political institutions; and so
long as the troubles and disnubances of Spain should bc c o d i d within her own temtory, they could not
be admitted by the British Governmcnt to afford a plea for foreign interference." Stowell, ibid.
19 1
According to Bowett, "as long as what is going on in your neighbour's house does not dircctly concem
you, there cannot be that pressing cal1 for self defencc which the plea assume~.~Stowell~upra
note 48 1 at
386. This concept is not as simple as it look. Those making the determination of whethcr the "intemal"
problem has become international rely on fluid factors of geo-politics to make thtir judgmcnts.
"" Stowell, supra note 48 1 at 10. 'lhis distinction appearcd to lay the test upon which legality of
interventions was judged for over one century. Sce Thomas, supra note 476 at 20. Lord Castlereagh
dismissed the Holy Alliance as "sublime mysticism and nonsense" and Lord Metternich of Austria later
ridiculed it as " a loud sounding nothing." See Baron De Savigny, Mettemich and His Times(London:
Longman, 1962) at 129. It is equally rernarkable that the presumptions of the Holy Alliance did not stop the

emerging opinion arnong states that the rnere existence of a pemicious institution in a
neighbouring state does not warrant or justifi externai intervention. Here, it seems that
the cnix of the matter turned on finding the test with which "illuminations" may be
distinguished from "conflagrations."

While "illuminations" were strictly out of bounds

for foreign states, it was emerging as acceptable and admissible in international law that
states who had a centralized and objective fiarnework for detemining the existence of
raging "conflagrations" might act collectively to put out the inferno without breaching the
n o m on interventions. The latta action came to be known as "collective a~tion."'~'
Regarding this regime, it was writers such as Von Martens who distilled from the
practice of states, coherent principles of legality for multilateral actions.'94 Dunng the
days of the Holy Alliance and for long thereafter, the determination of the legality or
otherwise of multilateral military interventions largely depended on third party perception
of the rnotive of the inter~enors.'~' This chaotic regime4%lackingappreciable scientific
order, was thus largely articulated and clarified by other observers such as ~ericke.'~'
Shortly before the emergence of the United Nations Charter, (of which later) the
following factors and tests marked out collective actions from unilateral interventions.
According to the findings of the inter-American ~urists.'~*thedistinctions include that
collective actions, uniike unilateral interventions, are usually undertaken by states in a
spread of the contagion of republicanism which was actively supportcd by immanuel Kant in his
"Philosophical Essays on Perpetual Peacc (1795). See De Lima, supra note 483 at 14.
493
Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts., eds., Oppenheim's inmational L w , ghed.. (London: Longman,
1992) at 447.[Hereinafter, Jennings &Watts]
49' P.HWinîïeld, "The History of Intervention in international Law" (1922-3) B. Y.I.L. 130 at 138. Between
1820- 1832, there were at l e s t sevcn multilateral interventions in Europe of varying consequences.
495 Winfield, supra at 133.
1%
Winfield Iamented that "the non-intervention mie appears to be a patent consequence of independence
with a host of disordcrly exceptions fastened upon it"
497 Winfield supra , at 137. He had already exhiïited his despair when he lamentcd that "the subject of
intervention is one of the vaguest branches of intemational law. We arc told it is a right; that it is a crime;
that it is the exception; that it is never permissible at all. A reader. aftcr perusing Phillimore's chapter upon
intervention, might close the book with the impmsion that intervention might bc anything fiorn a speech of
Lord Paimenton's in the House of Commons to the Partition of Poland."
498
D~flerencesBehveen Intervention and Collective Action, Inter-Amcrican Juridical Cornmittee. OAS
Offkial RecordOOEA/Scr. 1 M . 2 (PanAmerican Union, Gencral Secretatriat. OAS, Washington, D-C,
1996)

treaty based or clearly defined relationship. Second, while unilateral interventions
disregard the findamental rights of states, collective action always tend to restore the
vio1ated right. Third, while unilateral intervention is arbitrary and is for certain interests,
collective action defends al1 the member states of the organization. Fourth, while
intervention signifies an attitude that exceeds the cornpetence of a state, collective action
is exercised within the framework of the multi-lateral b ~ d ~ . ' ~ % Ivor
i r Jennings has
acknowledged the work of ~ u r d o c h ~ ~the~ subject
on
as being decisive?''

It is equally

interesting to note that Murdoch's conclusions are similar toSoZthoseof the interAmencan Jurists. However, the pre-Charter regime marked by its reliance on ad-hoc
c ~ n f e r e n c e s ~ ~the
~ f omaintenance
r
of collective security has been supervened by the
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 504
However, the Liberian crisis is probably a "hard caserrSO5as it questions an
intervention by a regional organization and the extent to which the provisions of the
United Nations Charter (primarily designed to regulate inter-state c o n f l i c t ~ ) ~ ~ be
rna~
adapted in justikng the legal problems posed by the crisis and consequent intervention
by ECOWAS."' The importance of this is further underscored by the increasing number

of such crises, a phenornenon which Luard, aptly notes as "unique in h i s t ~ r ~ If. "as~ ~ ~
Ibid.
James Oliver Murdoch, "Collective Security Distinguished fiom intervention" (1962) 56 A.J.I.L. at 500.
501
Oppenheim's Intemarional Law, supra note 478 at 448.
' O 2 Supra note 500.
' O 3 F. Kirgis, International Organizations in Their Legal Setring (Minn: West Publishing Co. 1993) at 2.
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Ian Brownlie, Inrernational Law and rhe Use ofForce (Oxford: CIarendon Press, 1963) at
345.[Hereinaftcr, Brownlie]
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Roger Shiner, N o m and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thoughr (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at
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Anthony Clark., "The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Military Operations The Past and
The Present" ( 1996) 7 Duke J. of Comp. & fnr. Law at 3. ~ercinafter,Clark]
507
Provisions of Chapter 8 of the U.N Chapter refer mainly to inter-state aggrcssion. However, since the
adoption of the Charter, a new type of military operation has developed, which has become known as
peacekeeping." ibid. See also, William Durch., Evolurion of UN.Peacekeping: Case Studies and
Compararive Analysis (New York: St- Mar& Press, 1993) at the introduction.
508
Supra note 333 at 8. Scholars have dubbed confiicts like the Laberian war, "mixed conflicts." These are
civil wars with substantial but indirect extemal intervention. Set John Norton Moore "Toward an Applied
Theory for the Regulation of intervention" in John Norton Moore ed., Law and Civil War In The Modern
CYorld (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.,1974) at 3.
"

Luard argues, the cirafiers of the UN Charter do not seem to have envisaged that the UN
"

would have any role at al1 to playrrS09-ln such types of conflict, under what regime of laws
would the legitimacy of the ECOWAS intervention to be evaluated? In answering this
question, the issue of the legality of Doe's invitation to ECOWAS and the applicability of
the principles of collective self defence to the Liberian problem will be explored in the
next chapter. Thereafier, the legality of the Security Council ratification of the ECOWAS
intervention will be addressed in Chapter five.

Luard, supra note 333 at 22.

CHAPTER FOUR
INTERVENTION BY INVITATION AMI COLLECTIVE SELF
DEFENCE
4.1 : INTRODUCTION

in examining the legal arguments on collective security made by ECOWAS and

critics of the intervention, this chapter seeks to ascertain the applicability of the pertinent
Iegal defences raised by ECOWAS in the Liberian case. The arguments here are
decidedly nuanced and located within the security peculiarities of the West AErican subrcgion. This chapter is divided into five sections. While section one is introductory,
section two examines Doe's authority to invite ECOWAS intervention and the scope of
activities ECOWAS could lawfully undertake in Liberia on the basis of that invitation by
Doe. This issue also dwells on the capacity of the ECOWAS to act on such invitation.
Secondly, even if Doe could not invite extemal intervention, the question still remains
whether ECOWAS acting under the the principles of its Protocol on Mutual Assistance in

Defence (PMAD) and the traditional principles of the right of collective self defence was
entitied to intervene.

in this context, section three traces the origins, elements and character of the
doctrine of collective self-defence as a d e of customary international law. From its early
appearances in the Perperucil Peace of 1292 between the Swiss Forest Commwiities, the
right of collective self-defence is traced to its contemporary character. Section four
examines the impact, if any, of the UN Charter on the customary international right of
collective self-defence. Attention is also paid to its doctrinal modification and adaptation
in the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD). The characteristics

of the PMAD, which in addition to the traditional preoccupation with problems of
extemal aggression, has provisions relating to mutual assistance on externally supponed
interna1 rebellion, are exarnined.
Section five explores such questions as whether the PMAD provisions afford
legal justification for ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the impact of PMAD on the
general notions on collective secwity vis-à-vis the question of what constitutes intemal or
domestic matter in an increasingly shrinking globe. Further the suitability of such
agreements as the PMAD for developing states like Liberia caught in the grips of a
dictatorship is evaluated. Eow would the UN security system cope with the growing
regional assertiveness in the enforcement of peace? This section and the entirety of
chapter four teases out these questions and explores the nuances of the issues raised. It
concludes that the ECOWAS action in Liberia is defensibie both under the authority of
President Doe to invite ECOWAS and the principles of collective self defence as adapted
under under the PMAD.

4.2: INTERVENTION AT THE INVITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

In section 3.2, Kuffour and Offodile, the critics of the intervention by ECOWAS

in Liberia have made the distinction that the ECOWAS action would have been lawful at
the invitation of the effective government of Libena, they have argued that Doe lacked
effectiveness and secondly, that the proper intervening body is the UN. On the foregoing
grounds, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is likened to the intervention of the United
States of Americô in the tiny Caribbean republic of Grenada and the Soviet intervention
in ~ z e c h o s l o v a k i a . The
~ ~ ~ critics also argue that the intervention by ECOWAS

constituted "enforcement action" under Chapter 8 of the United Nations and without the
prior authorization of the Security Council, it was unlawtiil.

~ u f f o d "and Ofodiles'*have M e r argued that once a conflict such as the
Liberian crisis degenerates into a civil war, intervention is illegal without the consent of
the warring parties. On the first leg, it has been urged that the intervention by the

ECOWAS without the unanimous consent and invitation of the warring factions in
Libena, was not only a violaion of the sovereignty of Liberia but an unlawful
abridgment of the right of Liberian peoples to self determinati~n.''~Kuffior funher
argues that the ECOWAS decision to intervene lacks legitimacy because it was "not
based on a consensus amongst the member states of the ~ o m m u n i t ~ .in
" ~effect.
'~
it is
argued that since the ECOWAS treaty adopts the "unanimity r~le"''~inarriving at it's
decisions, the decision to intervene, taken in the teeth of opposition by two rnember
-
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This intervention was condemned in a Security Couacil draft Resolution which failed by the Soviet veto.

See 1442"~
Meeting, Security Council Oficial Records 22* August 1968, p.34. Note also that the
purported invitation to intervent in this case and in the case o f Hungary were dismisscd as patcntly
manufactured and or coerced.
S u p n note 136 at 549.
Supra note 135 at 407.
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Heather Wilson. I n fernational Law und the Use of Force by National Liberation Movemenrs (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988) at 7.[Hcreinaficr, Wilson]
514
ibid. This is a curious argument. The two c o u a i e s (Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire) which initially
opposed the intervention, were acknowlcdged to have financed and equipped the rebels.
H.G Schermers, Infernational Institurional Law (The Hague: AIphen & Noordorf, 1980) at 39 1 .
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"

~tates,~'%asfatally defective. The critics therefore query "whether the decision to
intervene was one by the Community itself or rather, by a nurnber of Member states
acting under the guise of the Community's a ~ t h o r i t ~ . "This
~ " section examines the merits
of these arguments.
The question of the legal validity of military intervention by invitation of the
govemments'8is one that may be answered by specific reference to two issues. The first is
the relevant international noms. The second is the factual scenario on effectiveness of
the incumbent regime as at the material time an invitation to intervene is made. In the
context of the Liberian cnsis, the issue may be b m e d as follows: whether having regard
to the material circwnstances in Liberia, President Doe had the authonty to invite
ECOWAS intervention. The second, whether the ECOWAS had the legal capacity to act

on the invitation by Doe. The third is on the extent of the powers of ECOWAS in
responding to the invitation. In addressing these issues, this section will attempt to restate the Law on military intervention by invitation of the govemment, examine the factual
scenario in Liberia at the matenal time of the invitation and by applying the former to the
latter, argue that the ECOWAS action was lawful. It will also examine the scope of
lawfùl measures ECOWAS's ECOMOG, as a peacekeeping body, could undertake in
Liberia in its resolution of the crisis.
International law recognizes the validity of a state or a group of states sending
troops to another state upon invitation for certain limited ~ ~ e r a t i o n . Indeed,
''~
Article 3
of the General Assembly Resolution 33 14 on the Defintion of ~ ~ g r e s s i o n , ~ * ~ a l b e i t
5 16

Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. Although the activities of these two States may not meet the austere
requirements poscd by the Nicaragua Case, of which later, these two countries, for diverse reasons.
su oned the NPFL.
l P . ~ note
P ~ 136
~ a 539. Note that Builcina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire change* their minds and supponed the
intervention when they alleged the discovery of "NPFL sponsorcd attempts to destabilizt" their own
countries. See Ofodilc, supra note 135 at 384.
5 18
Louise Doswald-Beck "The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by the Invitation of the
Government" ( 1985) 56 B. Y./.L. 189.~ereinafter,Doswald-Beck]
l9 lbid.
'O
Definition of Aggression, G.A.Res.33 14, U.N. GAOR 29& Sers..Supp.No.3 1. at 142, U.N.Doc.A/963 1
( 1974). See also supra note 457.

negatively, excepts invited m i l i t q intervention fiom its definition of what constitutes
international acts of aggression. Such limited operations have been recognized to include
use of peacekeeping forces which do not become involved in the internal affair~,~"certain
rescue missions and quelling of minor intemal

dis turban ce^.^^' When a govemment is in

effective control of most of the state, this principle also affords "a clear alternative to
Security Council authorization as a b a i s for justifying extemal inter~ention.""~Provided
the consent to extemal intervention is clear, voluntary and fiom the effective authority in
the state, its legal validity is hardly a matter of c o n t r o v e r ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~
According to Roberto Ago (then Special Rapporteur), the rationale for this is that
consent to intervention acts as a f o m of bilateral agreement between the intervening and
consenting states and this suspends the normal operation of the legal rules that would
othewise govem their r e l a t i ~ n s h i ~Moreover,
.~*~
it is an expression of a state's sovereign
right to choose its mode of bilateral or multi-lateral relations with other states within the
bounds of international law. Oftentimes, this finds expression in treaties on mutual
defence but is not limited to that. Although states are absîract entities, international law
presumes that when a government exercises effective control over the territory and its
population, the government of that state possesses the exclusive authority to express the
will of the

tat te.^*^

This is borne out by the consistent practice of states. As Farer

observes, there is a virtuaI 'iuùforrn practice in international relations of treating any

group of nationals in effective control of their state as constituting its legitimate
governrnent."527This supposition has little reference to how that group of persons in

"'

Doswald-Beck, supra note 5 18, ibid.
Ibid. in 1964, Britain intemencd in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya to help incumbent govemments
quel1 internal mutinies, France has intervened more than a dozcn times in Afkican states to help beleaguered
oveniments regain control in the face o f attempted miliatry coup d'etats.
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Tom Farer, "Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm" (1990) 84 A.J.I.L.5 10 at 5 13. Sec also, Ian
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effective control of their state acquired the power S2gandis probably derived fkom both
practical and theoretical cons ide ration^.^'^
States thus accept this position as the only viable means of conducting their
relations and by extension, accord legitimacy to interventions by invitation made by the
effective regime. However, the legality of the invitation becomes questionable when the
alleged invitation is tainted with certain vitiating elements such as error, fkaud, violence
or corruption.530Similady, the presumption of effectiveness of govemments and the nght
to invite intervention becomes probtematic when the govenunent is very shaky. The

question may revolve on who is entitled to express the will of the state in inviting
extemal interventi~n.'~' This scenario arises when the govemrnent's authont). to
represent the state is in issue. The global outrage over the Soviet intervention in Hungary
( 1%6),

Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979) are in point.532 Similar

disapproval greeted United States' intervention in Grenada (1983) and in the Dominican
Republic (1965)."~ In those cases, what was questioned was not the validity of the
principle of the legality of intervention by invitation, but the validity of the purported
invitations. This issue will be revisited anon.
As an aside, the Cold War created a situation of near absolute state sovereignty
and this was in tum translated to mean unbridged support for "effective*' govemments
fighting for their li~es.~'~Xn
the Afncan context, control of the capital city and the
presidentilal mansion seemed enough to create the right for a president of a state to speak
for the state and request extemal intervention when necessary. According to Clapham.
Browlie, supra note 504 at 327.
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sce U.N.Doc. SmV.2 185 (1980).
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[Slave for occasional and exceptional circumstances,. ..the
international community tacitly adopted the rule that the government of a
state consisted of that group of people who controlled the most important
buildings in the national capital. This may be described as 'letterbox
sovereignty', in the sense that whoever opened the letten in the
presidential palace received the invitation to represent the state concemed
in the United Nations and other international bodies.535
it goes without saying that such occupant of the presidential mansion in control of the
capital city, even if he was dictatorial in character and suffered huge deficits of
Iegitimacy in governance. could lawfully invite extemal aid to assert his a ~ t h o r i t y ~ ) ~
Conversely, even if the opposing or rebelling forces espoused fieedom and respect for
human dignity, aid to them was perceived as a violation of the principle of non-

As the Court held in the Nicaragua Case, the principle of non-intervention
"would certainly lose its effectiveness

...if intervention were to be justified

by a mere

request for assistance by an opposition group in another state.,438 Accordingly, in that
case, aid by the U.S.Government to the rebels seeking the overthrow of the effective
Nicaraguan government was held i ~ l e ~ a l . in
' ~ ~addition, the Court reaffirmed
unequivocally that intervention is generally "allowable.. .at the request of the government
of a State.0 5 4 0
Subsidiary sources of international law such as the writings of publicists5'"
Clapham on A m a n Politics ofSuryiva1, supra note 154 at 20.
Tom Farer, "A Paradigm of Lcgitirnate Intervention" in Enforcing Resfrainr, supra note 393 at 3 16-34 1.
Wippmui on "Consent". supra note 523 at 2 13.
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Nicaragua Cme. supra note 462 at 126.
5'9 fbid. Note that although the U.S intervention in Panama ousted a dictatorial regime, it was widely
condemned as "a flagrant violation of international iaw." Sec G.A Rcs. 44240, U.N.GAOR, 44"
Sess.,Supp. No.49.88& plen. Mtg. At 52. (1989). See also, Louis Henkin, "The invasion of Panama Under
International Law: A Gross Violation" (1991) 29 Colum. J. Transnat '1 L. at 293.
"O fbid.
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Article 38 of the Statute of the international Court of Justice. Reproduced in Kindred, i n f i note 932
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"'

confim the legality of an effective government inviting extemal intervention in the
domestic polity. According to Henkin, "upon authentic invitation, a state may introduce
rnilitary forces into the territory of another to assist the government for various purposes,
including maintaining intemal ~ r d e r . ' ~ A
' ' ~caveat must be entered here. That is. an
"effective govenunent may not authorize extemal intervention against a national
liberation movement opposing racist or colonial d~rnination.""~ This is a direct
application of the general principle that a state rnay not lawfilly authorize another state to
take any action which would be illegal under international law if undertaken by the
authorizing state itself. Since the prohibition on racial discrimination and the right to self
detemination of peoples have the character of ius c ~ ~ e n s , ~ ~ ware
h i cnon-derogable
h
rights Save when altered by a principle of similar character,%is

exception seems to

strengthen the

The practice of states, especially in M c a , confirms that an incumbent
government, even when it has lost control of a substantial portion of the state, rnay
lawfûlly invite extemal intervention, provided it retains control over the capital city and
is not in irnmediate danger of c o ~ l a ~ sSimilarly,
e . ~ ~ ~ states and international organizations
are slow to withdraw recognition fiom an incumbent government, even when the

government has lost control of much of the state."* Premature withdrawal of recognition
-

-

-

(supplement) at 33.See also, The Paquere Habana Case 175 U.S677. Reproduced in exrenso in Eric Heinz
& Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., Landmark Cares in Internatinal Law (Hague: Kluwer International.. 1998)
rit 23.
Louis Henkin, "Use of Force: Law and U.S Policy" in Louis Hecd., Right v. Might: Intemutional
Law and the Use of Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991) at 67.
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(1 966) Y.B.I.L.C. at 247-9.
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Wilson, supra note 5 13 at 9 1.
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may even be constned as illicit support for the rebel~.~"The disposition to lawfully aid
the beleaguered goverment is further strengthened when it is obvious that the opposing
forces are receiving substantial aid and assistance fiom third states. In the circumstsnces,
aid to the incurnbent may be perceived as counter-intervention,s50if
not an exercise of the

right of collective self-defence. Given the austere conditions required for a valid exercise
of the nght of collective self-defence as judicially expoused in the Nicaragua Case and
the sumeptitious and secretive nature of third-state support for insurrections, the latter
claim of right may be more difficult to sustain.
However, it is interesthg to note that this regime, especiaily under the Cold War
era, worked in favour of incumbents who acted "as if they have a virtually unlimited right
to obtain help nom third states in seeking to suppress intemal rebelli~ns."~~'
Save for the

exceptional cases of ~ u n ~ a r ~ ,the
' ' ~ Dominican ~e~ublic,'" ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ,and
~~'
~ r e n a d a , ~the
~ ' legality of a request for extemal intemention by beleaguered regimes has
been surprisingly consistent at customary international law.
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The invitation of the UN

by the beleaguered govemments in Lebanon (in 1958) which had control of a part of the

capital city and small pieces of the temtory is in point. In addition, invited extemal
"
(of which, later), ~ a r n b i a Lebanon,
, ~ ~ ~ Ethiopia,
interventions in Oman in 1 9 ~ 7 , ~Chad

inviting govemrnent collapsed s w n after the invitation was made to the OAU.
Oppenheims International Law. supra note 478 at 74.
John Perkins, "The Right o f Counterintervention"(1986) 17 Ga. J.Int;l & Comp.L. at 17 1. See afso,
Henkin, supra note 542 at 64.
Wippman, supra note 523 at 22 1.
Doswald-Beck supra note 5 18 at 222.
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Security Council Resolution 387 of 1976 reaffmns this principk by acknowlcdging "the inherent and
lawful right o f every State. in the excrcise of its sovercignty to request assistance fiom any other state or
~;oup of states."
' UK Contemporary Practice, ( 1958) 1.C.L.Q. at 99- 102.
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"'

Congo, and other countries at the behest of beleaguered regimes bears out this customary
international law.
Notwithstanding the formidable array of opinion in favour of the right of a
beleaguered

govenunent

to

invite

external

intervention,

some

scholars

Iike

~a11,~~~'Thornas,~*and
Quincy wrightS6'have forcefully argued to the contrary. In their
view, the existence of widespread rebellion against a governrnent evidences jts loss of de
facto control and hence, the right to invite extemal intervention. This aspect of their
argument needs qualification as the right to invite external intervention as demonstrated
in the Kuwaiti, Haitian, Sierra Leonean situations may indeed remain extant and subsist
notwithstanding the contrary pretensions of the usurpers. Hall, Thomas and Quincy
Wright M e r argue in the above-mentioned texts that such a state of affairs as
widespread rebellion against the incurnbent g o v e m e n t will ultimately abridge the right
to self-determination if the right to invite extemal intervention in the circumstances were
extant. This comection of their argument to the right to self detemination is formidable
since the right is anchored in ius cogens.

The right to self determination of peoples probably finds its most eloquent
exposition in the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Principles of
International Law Conceming Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst

tat tes?'

Paragraph 7 of the elaboration of the Declaration stipulates that "every State has the duty
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration
of the pnncipie on equal rights and self detemination of their right to self determination

Hall, A Treatke on international Law (8' edn., 1924) at 347.
Supra note 476 at 94.
56 1
Supra note 53 1 at 112.
567
Supra note , ibid.
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and freedorn and independence."s63Although Higgins has alluded to the doubt in some
quarters over which "self the right of self-determination applies 1 0 , the
~ ~noms of the
right to self-determination, as surnmarized below do not allow for such doubts in the
circumstsnces of the Liberian c ~ n f l i c t . ~ ~ ~Liberian
T h e case cannot be regarded as a battle
for self-determination because international law as evidenced in the Geneva Protocol 1 of
1977~~~defines
stmggles for self-detemination in the context of fights against colonial
and alien occupation and racist regimes. The Liberian crisis was not such a type of

conflict. It was not a secessionist war of independence nor a stmggle by the Liberian
peoples against alien domination.
Secondly, unlike recognized national liberation movements, fiactious struggles
for power such as the warring Liberian factions or their Somali counterparts, have no
legal personality at international law and it would be difficult to argue that third states
owe them a duty not to intervene against them. Therefore, arguments on the legality or
otherwise of foreign intervention in the Liberian scenario may be more useful within the
framework of the law on non-interference as opposd to inapposite references to and
reliance on the noms of self determination of peoples.567in this context, the law on
belligerency may be explored briefly.'68 This is not an easy regime to apply to the
Liberian case. In the first place, the status of belligerency which obligates third states to
Ibid.
Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law and Civil Conflict" in Luard cd., The International Regularion of
Civil Wars (New York: New York University Press, 1W2), supra note 333 at 186.
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sa

be neutral in cases of civil wars is not attained merely by the spread of violence in a civil

~ a r ~ ~upon
~ b the
u t fblfilrnent of four conditions. The conditions include the existence of
war and hostilities, occupation and a measure of orderly administation of a substantial
part of the national territory by the insurgent, observance of the rules of warfare on the

part of the insurgents and a practical necessity for third states to define their attitude.'"
While the wamng factions in Liberia may scale the first two hurdles, they will probably
fail the last two tests.

In addition to the obligation of neutrality imposed on third states, a jundical value
in according a rebel organization recognition as a belligerent force, and as the de facto
g o v e m e n t over territories held by it, is to bring it within the ambits of the law of
conflicts. Thus by Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva ~onventions"' and Protocol 2 concluded

in Geneva in 1977,572belligerent forces are obliged to uphold certain humanitarian mles
of war.") However, before coming to a definitive view on the legality of Doe's invitation
to ECOWAS and whether the warring factions were recognized as belligerent forces, it is

useful to recapitulate the factual scenario surrounding the invitation to ECOWAS by Doe

and the means and methods adopted by the warring factions in their prosecution of the
rebellion.
The initial impression created by the Liberian govenunent in international circles
was that the rebellion was

a "thwarted coup d'etats7'which had been brought under

control. However, within one week of the rebellion, over 10,000 Liberian refùgees had
-
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Jemings & Watts, supra note 493 at 166.
Ibid.
U.N.T.S 75 at 3 1.

"'
'"(1977) 16 1.L.M. 1442.
'" Oswald-Beck, supra note 5 18 at 197. It should be noted that sincc the end of Ancrican Civil War,
recognition of belligcrency has not k e n givcn. Therc arc doubts whether it has not fallen into disuse.
WeIler, supra note 5 at 32. Howevcr, the Liberian g o v e m e n t recalled it's arnbassador to Cote d'Ivoire

fled to the neighbouring Cote d' Ivoire and575govemmenttroops (dominated by Doe's

ethnic Krahn) sent to Nimba to quel1 the rebellion, were engaged in g e n ~ c i d e ~ ' ~the
of
Gio/Mano of the Nimba County. The atrocities by the govemment troops further
polarîzed the Liberian polity and pushed the GioMano to support the rebelli0n.~~~.4s

Doe's control waned, his htile plea to Libenans to "get their cutlasses, single barreled
guns and get in the bush in pursuit of the rebel~""~fel1on deaf ears.

It was ai this point that the ECOWAS, realizing the irnmensity of the problem, set
u p a Standing Mediation Cornmittee to look into the Liberian crisis. The rampaging

rebels seized over seventy percent of Liberian territocy. Doe's supporters and cronies
were deserting him and fleeing the country. Foreign nationals in Libena were also
leaving in droves. On 6 June 1990, the embattled Doe, wrote the United States President
asking for assistance "to cmsh the r e b e l ~ . " ~As
' ~ the rebels advanced on Monrovia, they
asked for Doe's r e ~ i ~ n a t i o n .According
'~~
to the rebel NPFL's chief negotiator, Tom

of al1 problems in Liberia.. .We are not calling for the total
~ o e w i y u ~ ~ ' is-the
" ~ o source
e

for "consultations" and imposed a dusk to dam curfew on the Nimba County.
'"ibid.
Article 11 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and huiishment of the Crime of Genocide which
enterred into force in 1951 defines genocide to mean the intentional destruction in wholc or in part,
national, racial, ethnic or rcligious groups. See J.G.Starke, Introduction to International Law (london:
Butterworths; 184) at 60-61. wcreinafier. Starke]
5 77
WeIler, supra note 5 at 35. "...Numerous reports from refigecs in Cote d'Ivoire allege that govemment
soldiers had massacred many Gio and Mano inhabitants..." See also, 101" United States Congres, 2d
Session, House of Representatives Resolution 345, 7 March 1900. Paragraph 8 thereof notes b a t "...media
reports and international reports.. .have estimatcd that at least 200 people, primarily members of the Gio
and Mano ethnic groups have been killed by troops of the govemment of Liberia." Reproduced in Welter.
ibid.. On the other han4 the rcbels wcrc "killing manbers of Samuel Doe's Krahn tribe." Ibid at 56.
ibid.
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid. "...the one thing that is clear is that thcy (the rebels) cannot reach any agreement with the
Government unless there is a cornmitment for President Doc to rcsign. Thcy are holding fast to this
negotiating position."
58 1
Recall chat this same Tom Woewiyu atteniptcd to dcpose Charles Taylor. When this rebellion-within-a rebellion failed, he fomed his own rebel group.

dissolution of the Liberian govemment but for the resignation of ~ o e . " 'AS
~ ~the rebels
negotiated with the Liberian govement, President Doe declared his readiness to
"welcome any peacekeeping force from the USA, the OAU, ECOWAS or the
Meanwhile, Yormie Johnson, alleging excessive Libyan control over the NPFL and
financial irregularities, broke away from the NPFL and formed his own rebel group with
the objective of stopping Charles Taylor from taking Monrovia and becoming President
of ~ i b e r i a . ~ ~ ' '

The govemment forces were "greatly reduced due to desertion and losses.. .down
to about 1,000 men to defend ~ o n r o v i a . "In~the
~ ~ pithy words of Congressman Burton
of the United States, "he (Charles Taylor) has got the guy P o e ) by the short hair right

no^."^^^

Within the capital city Monrovia, "opposition parties and professionals

rnobilized civil demands for Doe's immediate r e ~ i ~ n a t i o n . "The
~ ~ ' situation got more
d e ~ ~ e r a t eHence,
. ' ~ ~ Wippman's contention that the Doe govemment had not only lost

control of a substantial porticn of the state but that the "government's international
(formal) legitimacy was othenvise subject to d o ~ b t . However,
" ~ ~ ~ the capital city refbsed
to yield to the NPFL rebels. This was because the breakaway INPFL and Doe's tmncated
Armed Forces of Liberia (A.F.L) maintained their vice iike grip on the capital city of

5 8 2 ~ e l ~supra
e r , note 5 at 57.
Ibid.
'"~eller, ibid. at 61. Having fnistrated Taylor's desired conquest of Monrovia, the embattled Taylor. on a
radio announcement, pwportedly "dissolved Doe's govtnvnent and declared himself President of Liberia
under the "National Patnotic Reconstruction Assembly." Further, Taylor "suspendcd" various provisions of
the Liberian Constitution and "appointed" his "ministem."
Ibid.
586
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Monrovia and the presidential palace. The result was a deadlock. In the words of

[Allthough most observers assumed the rebel forces would quickly
vanquish the AFL and drive Doe fiom his fortified mansion, the rebels
proved unable to do so. The conflict settled into a military stalemate. The
result was anarchy. Each warring faction exercised a slight measure of "de
facto executive and judicial power" in it's particular area of control, but
for the most part, al1 semblance of civilian authority was gone.590
The atrocities against the Liberian civil populace ~ontinued.'~'It was at this stage that
Doe extended an invitation to the ECOWAS asking that organization to intervene in

~ i b e r i a . *According
~~
to the beleaguered President,

...[I]t is with profound appreciation that 1 convey to
your Excellencies compliments and goodwill of the
G o v e r n e n t and people of Liberia.. .As you may no doubt
be aware, since the crisis in o u country, I have done
everything possible to resolve the situation and restore
peace to our motherland.. .I wish to bring to your attention
that Our iterative accession to peaceful process has only
been rewarded by continuing positions of intransigence and
bellicosity on the part of Mr. Taylor and the NPFL.. .They
(the NPFL) continue to create more turmoil and tension in
the people of Liberia. Right now in the suburbs of
Monrovia thousands have been displaced by the NPFL
forces, homes have been destroyed, hundreds slaughtered,
even before their victory is achieved. 1 am therefore
concerned that the fighting could accelerate in Monrovia
and thus inflame the suffering of the people of Liberia.
Consistent with my oath of office to protect and defend the
Govenunent and people of Liberia, 1 cannot countenance
Taylor's continu4 mission to destroy Liberia and it's
inhabitants because of his inordinate greed to become
President ...any attempt to subvert the process of
democracy by displacing the Constitution through force of
arms would lead to an endless succession of anned
insurrection, bring more deaths and destruction, as well as
disrupt the socio-political and economic tranquility not
590
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Letter Addressed by President Samuel Kanyon Doe to The C h a i .And Members of the MinisteriaI
Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation Cornmittee, 14 July 1990. Reproduced in WeIlcr, supra note 5 at 60.
591

'9'

only of Liberia, but also the sub-region of the ECOWAS as
a whole.. .to avert the wanton destruction of lives and
properties.. .It would seem most expedient at this time to
introduce an ECOWAS Peace-keeping Force into Libena
to forestall increasing tenor and tension and to assure a
peacefil transitional environment. While assuring you of
my fillest CO-operation,1 remain.. .
Samuel Kanyon Doe (President of ~iberia)'~)

ECOWAS, weighing the regional dimensions of the crisiss9' drew the attention of
the OAU to the crisis and considered imposing a mandatory cease-fire in Libena to stop
the carnage.s95The Liberian Representative at the United Nations unsuccessfully nied to

~ aECOWAS
t
meeting in
place the crisis on the agenda of the Security Council a ~ ~ d ' ~the
Banjul, The Gambia, ECOWAS decided to inter~ene.*~'
The facts above represent the

circumstances under which Doe invited ECOWAS and it is within this background that
its legaiity will be examined.

In exarnining the legality of Doe's invitation to ECOWAS, it has to be re-affinned

Ibid. [Underlining suppiicd]
Weller, ibid, at 63.
595
Weller, ibid. From the moment the idea was mooted, Charles Taylor opposed it arguing that it amounted
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crisis on the agenda of the Security Council.
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Reproduced in Weller, supra note 5 at 69. in spite of the opposition of the NPFL to the ECOMOG
intervention, President Lansana Conte of Guinea speaking for the ECOWAS insisted that "...we do not
need the permission of any party involved in the conflict to implemcnt the decisions reachcd in Banjul. So
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at 66. Yonnie Johnson of the W F L welcomed the intervention saying that he was "rcady to die to make
the Monrovia port conducive for ECOWAS landing." Initially, President Doe, holed inside the Presidential
Villa was dilatory as his cnvisaged plan to use the intervention as a shield and rccover his position failed.
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and the rebels. However, he noted his "happiness with the ECOWAS intervention. ..but hoped that it (the
ECOMOG) would not take sides." See Weller, supra at 88
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that state practice598stronglysupports the right of an effective govemment to invite
extemal intervention in the event of an upnsisng in the state. In the absence of vitiating
elements including fiaud and coercison, the test of legality of such invitation is a îünction
of the effectiveness of the government making the i n ~ i t a t i oThe
. ~ ~human
~
rights record
of the effective regime does not affect the legality of the invitation but may influence the

scope and quality of response such invitations may get. Accordingly, Doe's miserable
deficiency in legitimacy and good governance are of little consequence in exarnining his
capacity to invite extemal intervention. The facts of the Liberian case show that the
government of Doe was the de j u r e govemment of Liberia and in àppreciable control of
the capital city and the presidential mansion. Al1 insignia of office were still with him at
the moment of making the invitation.
The argument that the Liberians were fighting for self detemination rnistakes a
fratricidal struggle for power with w a r ~of national liberation where the leaders of such
movements may indeed lawfully request help fiom the international c o m m ~ n i t ~ .The
~*
Libenan crisis was neither a war against a racist regime nor an anti-colonial stmggle or
war against alien domination which characterizes struggles for self determination."'
was simply a brutal and

It

personalized struggle for power inspired by the excesses of a

decadent polity and permitted by a redefined global securïty order. On the question of
belligerency, none of the waning factions in Liberia, unlike recognized movements for
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Malcolm Shaw, "The International Status of National Likration Movements" in Frederick Snyder and
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Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 150.
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nationel liberation, were seised of legal personality at international law. Therefore. they
could not be the bearers of legal duties of non-intervention by third States. Second,
virtually al1 the resolutions passed by the United Nations on the Liberian situation clearly
identified them as warring factions pursuing the narrow agendas of their respective
leaders at the expense of the average Liberian. They were thus not accorded recognition
as belligerent forces. Accordingly, the contention that the rebels' consent was necessary

for the legality of the ECOWAS intervention is at best, a matter of prudence, not law.

According to Christine Gray, "the consent of other parties involved in the conflict is
important as a matter of practical necessity. The peacekeeping force would not 'ue able to
function without the cooperation of the parties on the g r o ~ n d . " ~As
~ *a matter of law. the
Liberian rebels could not have consented to the ECOWAS action in Liberia.
Returning to the question of whether the rebels could have attained the status of
b e ~ l i ~ e r e n c ~it, "is~ argueci that they had no respect for established international n o m s
on armed conflicts and this weighed against thern. According to Mr. Cohen, the US
Assistant Secretary of State for Afncan Affairs, ''when we talk of troops (rebels), we are
talking of young kids, 14 to 17 years of age, who are running around with
Kalashnikovs.r r 6 0 4The prevalence of "child soldien" in the Liberian crisis is a notorious
fact. According to a United Nations report,

Christine Gray, "Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekccping in Yugoslavia" (1996) 7 Duke J.
Cornp.& & Int 1 Law at 241. (underlining supplied) Similar consensus was reached in the cases of
Namibia, Cambodia, and Mozambique. But thesc wars wert of a totally differcnt charmer from the
Liberian war. See also, Milan Sahovic, "Non-Aligned Counûies and the Cunent Regulation on the Use of
Force" in Cassese ed., n e Current Legal Regulation on the Use of Force (Dordretch, The Netherlands:
Mamnus Nijhoff, 1986) at 479. Bercinafier, Cassesse] But sec, Lori Fislcr Damroch, in Enforcing
Restrainr, supra note 393 at 10.
b03
On belligerency and insurgcncy, the Spanish civil war prcsents fertile ground for legal analysis. See
Crawford, supra note 238 at 268-9.
* Weller, supra note 5 at 49. See also Jcftiey Goldberg, "A War Without Purpose in a Country Without
Identity" New York Times Magazine, Jan. 22 1995 at 37.
6
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[Ojf the apprgximately 1.4 million children now living in Liberia,
it is believed that 15,000 served as child soldiers in the civil war. The
rnajority of fighters demobilized at the end of the war were between
fifteen and twenty-eight years old. Of those aged seventeen and under, the
majority-69 percent-were fifteen to seventeen years old, and had served an
average of four years. 27 per cent of the remaining fighters under 17 were
between the ages of twelve and fourteen years old ...Many of these
children were forced to become soidiers by combatants desperate for able
bodies of any age to augment their ranks...Some became practiced killers,
and most were exposed to atrocities on a daily basis ...The youngest
cornbatants were six years.605
In the testimony of one of the child soldiers, "1 was given pills that made me crazy. 1 beat
people and hurt thern until they bled.*& These atrocities were committed by al1 the
warring factions. in addition, cannibalism was encouraged by the rebel leaders as a

Acts of genocide canied out by the various factions probably reached i r height
with the massacre of over 600 Gio/Manos seeking refbge in a church. According to one
of the few survivors of that war crime, "...over 600 people were killed. There are still
blood stains on the altar; they had placed mal1 children there and made them scream,
' ~ ~hystencal woman telling of
'there is no God,' as they (the rebels) cut their t h r o a t ~ .An
how rebels troops at road blocks would take bets on the sex of an unborn children
lamented that, "they wouid slice the women open to pull out the fetus with a bayonet to

'O5

Megan Mckenna, "The Reintegration o f Child Soldim in Liberia" >online

http://www .unicefÙsa.ora/issues98/nov98/Liberia-iump.html,
last modified on 14 March, 1999. See also,

Bianerfer Nowrojee, supra note 86 at 133.
Human Rights Watch interview. >Online h~://www.ora/rcam~ai~:n/c~/voices/hmil
last modificd on 13
March 1999. See also Yacl Daneli., et al e&., International Response ro Traumatic S i r a s (New York:
Bayword Publishing Corporation., 1998) at 334.
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Human SkuH, Monrovia, Liberia.Online>http://www.lifewater.ca/shll.htm. last rnodified on 14 March
1999. According to a child-soldier,ÿou h o w we ate people during the war; not because wc were hungry,
but because we were scarcd, and to eat your enemy d e s you strong. That was what they told us." The
rebels, particularly the NPFL, tumed their base at the Spriggs-Payne Airport into a convenient cemeteV
for the bunal of those who were unwiiling to j o b them in "the Iikration of Lihria-" According to
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realize who had won the bet. r ,609 In the summative language of Lori Damrosch. "the
savagery of Liberia's civil war is alrnost unimaginable.r r 6 1 0 These are hardly the kind of

behaviour capable of encouraging third-state recognition of the rebels as belligerent
forces and impose on third states the obligation of neutrality in the conflict.
It is equally important to note that even though Doe had the right to invite
ECOWAS or any other external State or organization to intervene, the ECOWAS

'

intervention was not to his advantage. The ECOWAS did not intervene b r ~ o e . " In
addition, owing to the interference of several states in the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS
intervention may also be construed as conter-intervention. Although probative proof of
external interference in the Liberian conflict may not meet the austere requirements as
articulated in the Nicaragua ~ a ( e , ~ ' *has
i t been demonstrated in section 5 of chapter two
that most states in the sub-region had intetests in the conflict. Similarly, the conflict had
spread beyond the borders of Liberia as some of the warring factions, for diverse reasons
attacked countries like Sierra Leone, (necessitating Security Council's intervention)
Guinea and Ivory Coasts. Although these issues have been explored in section five of
chapter two and their lrgal significance will be examined in subsequent sections of this
chapter, suffice it to note here that they put the Liberian case beyond the purview of the
regime on invitation of externaI intervention in intemal conflicts.
Furthemore, as invitations for external intervention for the restoration of
democracy6'3(when the incumbent govemment614has lost effective control of the
Ibid.
Enforcing Restrainr, supra 465 at 19.
61 1
George Nolte, "Restoring Peace by Regional Action: international Law Aspects of the Liberian
Conflict." Cited in Wippman on "Consent,"supra note 523 at 225.
6'2 Supra note 462 at 98.
613
Clarke, supra note 506 at 29. See aiso, W. Michacl Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling
Democracies" (1 995) 18 Fordham Int '1 L.J. at 794.
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610

governrnent) gains universal s ~ p ~ o r t , ~
is 'dificult
~it
to deny that Doe, a dej u r e president
with control of a substantial part of the capital city and the presidential rnansion, could

not invite extemal intervention. Although this trend may reveal support for the argument
in section two of this chapter on the increasingly cosmopolitan character of human

rights6"hd collective security, it equally supports the view that a de jure regime may
still invite extemal intervention even when it's effectiveness hangs on the baian~e.~"In
both the Sierra Leonean and Haitian case6" the inviting incurnbents had in fact lost
e ffectiveness.
It has also been argued that the scope of actvities and measures undertaken by
ECOWAS was illegal and ultra vires a peacekeeping body?19 The cornplaint here is that
ECOMOG went too far in constituting an interim government for Liberia, organizing and

overseeing elections to various political offices in Liberia and re-organizing the Liberian
army and police. This is an important accusation which merits consideration here. The

practice of peacekeeping is a contemporary phenomenon.620 According to Brian
Urquhart, "the technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United

Nations. The Charter does not mention it. It was discovered, like penicillin."621
Peacekeeping originated during United Nations intervention in the Greek civil war in

"'S.C.Res. 1132. U.N.SCOR

51' Sess., 3822 Mtg. Para. 1, U.N.Doc. S/Res/l132 (1997). Note that

ECOMOG intervention was not directly authorized by the Security Council. Sec also, See alsoS. C. Res.
1 156, U.S.SCOR, 52" Sess. 386 1 mtg. Para.U.N.Doc. S/Res. 1 156 ( 1998)

"'McCoubrey & White, supra note 445 at 34.
6'6

alv vina Haiberstam, "The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy" (1993) 34

Harv. inr 'I. L. J. at 163.
6 ' 7 OAS DOC.
CPlSN896192 and CP/Doc.2248/92, April 1 1992. (as cited in Acevedo, ibis). The military
coups d 'etor in Burundi and in Sierra Leone, which had satisfied the test of effectiveness werc mistrated
by international isolation and delegitimation.
'18 U.N.SCOR, 49&Sess., 3 4 1 3 Mtg.
~ At 1, U.N.Doc. S/Res/940 (1994) Note also chat this was the f m t
time chat the Security Council was authorizing the use of force for the restoration of democracy
619
Kuffour, supra note 136 at 120. Offodile, supra 135 at 340.
"'O
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Kirgis, supra note 503 at 7 16.
lbld.

1 9 4 7 ~ ~ ~ ahas
n d usually been employed in rnaintaining cease-fires, assisting in the
withdrawal of troops and the provision of buffer between opposing forces.""
Peacekeeping operations are usuaily temporary and not really engaged in the settlement
of conflicts but to provide auspicious conditions h r peacefùl resolution of conflicts.

In effect, peacekeeping operations are not, as the Court held in the Certain
actions.
e n t However, in accomplishing
Expenses of the United Notions ~ a r e , ~ ~ ~ e n f o r c e m
their missions, peacekeeping forces may have both miliary and civilian components
necessary for the aforementioned tasks and provision of humanitarian services. Although
they are charactenzed by the absence of enforcement capabilities, they may use miltary
force in self defence. Be that as it may, contemporary events have shown the pragmatic
character of peacekeeping operations. In Namibia, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Liberia, and
Cambodia, they have engaged in roles hardly consistent with mere separation of warring
forces and enhancement of humanitarian services in crisis situations. This is particuIarly
tme with those operations sanctioned by the Security Council.
Accordingly, the absence of consent of warring parties in such UN sanctioned
peacekeeping operations appears to be of little impediment to the despatch of
peacekeeping forces to troubled spots. Sirnilarly, the scope oftheir operations seem to be
tailored to the peculiarities of each crisis. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations
confimed in his report to the General Assembly entitled, Supplement to the Agenda for
Peace,

[Tlhree aspects of recent mandates, in particular, have led
peacekeeping operations to forfeit the consent of parties, to behave in a
way that was not perceived of or to use force other than in self defence.

These were the task of protecting humanitaian operations durine fiehtinq,
the protection of civilian ovulations in safe areas, pressing parties to
accept national reconciliation at a Dace faster than they were ready to
a c ~ e ~ t . ~ ~ ~
As Berdal has pointedly noted. the volatile, complex and dangerous nature of
intemal conflicts. which O fien i d i c t senous fatalities6"on peacekeepers, has given nse
to the contemporary practice whereby host-state consent and traditional peacekeeping
" ~ " are other cases
have yielded to what is now known as "robust p e a ~ e k e e ~ i n ~ .There
evidencing a noticeable trend in conternporary international law where traditional
peacekeeping yields occasionally to peace enforcement or other roles not wholly
compatible with traditional notions of peacekeeping.628 For instance, in 1989-90 the
to supervise the
United Nations set up the UN Transition Assistance Croup (UNTAG)~~'
electoral process in Namibia. This task is clearly outside the traditional task of
monitoring a cease-fire or s u p e ~ s i n gthe withdrawal of belligerent forces. in another
instance, the United Nations between 1991-2 set up the United Nations Advance Mission
in Cambodia (UNTAMIC)~~~
and the United Nations Temporary Authority In Carnbodia

UN TAC)^^'^^ s u p e ~ s egovemment h c t i o w and eventual elections while rebuilding
625

Supplement to an Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occcasion of the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. U.N. SCOR 50* Sess., paras.34-35, U.N. Doc. Si 199Y1 ( 1995)

(underlining supplied) ~crcinafter,Supplemant to Agenda for Peace]
62%ats Berdal. "The Secuxity Council, Pcacekeeping and interna1 Conflict Aftcr the Cold War" ( 1995-7)
6-7 Duke J. Comp. & Int 'l L. at 71. He notes that "as of late 1994, there had bcen 130 fatalities in the in the
U.N. forces in Yugoslavia.. .and as of early 1996, therc had been 4 10 fatalities in U.N peacekeeping
operations in the former Yugoslavia.
'"Richard Connoughton, " T h e to Clear the Doetrine Dilemma" 2 1 Jane's Defence Weekly (1994) at 19.
'"Margaret Vogts, "The Roblems and Challenges of Peace-Makhg: From Peacc-Keeping to Peace
Enforcement" in Vogts., cd, supra note 41 at 150.
6'9 Nico Schrijvens, bLIntrodu~ing
Second Generation Peacekecping: The Case of Namibia" (1 994) 6 A.
J./. C.L. at 1. Sec also, Sylvester E h d a y o , "ECOMOG-A Mode1 For Atncan Peacc-kceping" October 16.
1998 AfricaNews at 12. According to him, " it should be emphasized that the concept, nature and scope and
practice of peacekeeping arc changing rapidly with the emergcnce of new types of conflict situations in the
continent. Both the United Nations and the ECOWAS have recognizcd this, and have had to adapt
traditional peacekeeping to meet specific iatra-state conflicts such as verification of cease-firc agreements,
securityiprotection for refugees and humanitarian relief workers, demobilization and disaxmament of
combatak. and observation of demxratic political processes in the form of clectionr, and refercnda."
'O

Ibid.

Cambodia uid disarming the factions.632
This "second generation peacekeeping ,633 is closer to conflict management and
99

peace enforcement than mere separation of waning parties. The new thinking and
practice that peacekeeping should move "beyond the Sheriff' s posse"b3"probably re flects
pragmatism635andevidence of what the international society considers to be prudent and
necessary in the contemporary circumstsnces. In view of the fact that the controversial
measures taken by the ECOMOG peacekeepers were undetaken in active conjuction with

the UN'S UNOivIlL (of which later) and sanctioned and or ratified by the Security
Council, the objections by Kuffour and Offodile on the point are r n i s c ~ n c e i v e d . ~ ~ ~
Secondly, the invitation by Doe did not delimit the scope of measures whicti ECOMOG
could adopt to put the crisis under control. Thirdly, the ECOMOG mandate was not

limited to merely separating the Libenan warlords. On the issue that the ECOWAS
decision to intervene was taken without cornpliance with the necessary mles contained in
the ECOWAS PMAD embodying its pnnciples on collective security, it is now proposed
to examine in the next sections the applicability of the doctrine of collective self defence
to the Liberian crisis and the ECOWAS action.

Vogts, supra notc 628 at 150.
Schrijvens, supra notc 629 at 3.
634 Jinmi Adisa, "The Politics of Rcgioaal Military Cwpcration: The Case of ECOMOG" in Vogts, supra
note 41 at 217.
635 Walter S h a w " Protecting The Avatar of Intcmational Peace" (1995) 7 Duke J- Int '2 &Cornp. L. at 102.
636
In Carnbodia the U N pcacckccpcrs cxtrciscd sovercign authority within the state and in Somalia they
adopted enforcement rneasurcs to stop the anarchy, starvation and bloodletting .

4.3: COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

World peace, like war has tended to become indivisible?'

The ECOWAS argument on collective self-defence has been flayed6380nthe

grounds that the rebellion did not constitute an armed attack on Liberia as envisaged by
by the doctrine.639In addition, the applicability or otherwise of the Protocol Relating to

Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) to the Liberian case has been questioned.610 It
has been further argued that even if the PMAD is applicable, the necessary procedural

mechanism for the invocation of the right of collective self-defence was not followed by
ECOWAS. Therefore, the critics contend, the intervention was unlawfiil at international
law. Since these arguments turn on very important principles in international law

regarding the use of force, subsequent sections will examine them in detail. It is perhaps
e collective self defence.
pertinent to proceed fiom the historical origins of the p ~ c i p l of
The right of collective self defence, like most legal principles, is distilled From
practical experience. According to Kelsen,
Pletween the moment the illegal attack starts and the moment the
centralized machinery of collective security is put into action, there is even
in case of perfectly prompt fhctioning, a space of time, an interval which
may be disastrous to the ~ i c t i r n . ~ '
It is probably in this context that Grotius argued that it is a right rooted in
nature.M2

637

However, the scope of the exercise of the right of self-defence is delimited by

Akindele, supra note 343 at 3.
Kufour, supra note 136 at 545.
639
Supra, at 546.
610
Supra, at 537.
Ham Kelsen, "Collective Security and Collective Self Defcnce Un&r the Charter"(1948) 42 A.J.1.L. at
875.[Hereinafter, Kelsen on Collective Self Dcfcnce]
Grotius. supra note 373 at 112.
638

positive lawbM3As rhe name suggests, self-defence is the defence of self. It is different
from necessity as it "arises when a wrong has been done.*,wSecondly, unlike a reprisal it

is not an enforcement of perceived legal rights, which function is a preserve of the civil
state. To quote Bowett, it "is not a means of enforcing a perceived legal nght".6J5~hirdly,
unlike a reprisai, it is invoked at a moment of imminent danger which is of such character

that waiting on the regular agencies of law enforcement for protection would be fatal to
the potential victim of the attack. Max Sorensen has argued that the pnnciples governing
self-defence by States in international law are analogous to and derived fkom the
municipal laws on self d e f e n ~ e If
. ~this
~ ~argument is accepted, it follows as McDougal
and Feliciano affim, that the principles goveming recourse to self defence in a collective
arrangement in international law are in themselves similara7to those rules applicable in
the individual context. Self defence is tempered by the conditions of necessity,
immediacy and proportionality and these elements combine to afford j u s t i f i c a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Contmy to Vattel's argument that self-defence is a "sacred d ~ t ~ ' ~ ~ wahstate
ich
must exercise, international law merely recognizes the rightfiil option of recourse to selfdefence and imposes no duty to exercise it. As Dinstein shrewdly noted,
[a] prudent state may decline to exercise this nght on the ground that a
political compromise is preferable to a clash of arms. The indubitable
military supremacy of the adversary may have a sobering effect on the
target state, inhibiting it fiom steps that would transmute a theoretical right
64 3

H.Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition", (1 946) 23 B. Y.I.L at 30-38.
Josef Kunz,"Individuai and Collective Self Defense in Article 5 1 of the Charter o f the United Nations"
( 1 947) 4 1 A- J .I .L 875. Ifiereinaftcr, Kunz]
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D.W-Bowett,Self Defence in International Law (Manchester Univ.Press., Manchester, 1958) at 6
(Hereinafter, Bowett]
Mt5
Sorensen Max,Manual of Public International &w (London: Macmillan,, 1968) at 765.
b(7
Dickinson," The Analogy Between Nanual Persons and Intemational Law in the Law of Nations," 26
Yale Law Journal at 265. See atso, M y e s McDougal., International Law of War (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994) at 247.
618
R v. Botrrell(198 1). 60 C.C.C (2d) 2 1 1 ; R. v. Deegan (1979) 49 C.C.C.(Zd) 417; Section 34 ( 1 ) Criminal
Code. R.S., c.C-34, s.1.; Kunz ,supra note 644 at 876.
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C.G Fenwick, nie Principles of International i u w (New Haven: Yale University Press.1962) at 125.
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into a practical disaster. The idea that a state must sacrifice realism at the
altar of conceptualism and risk defeat while prodded on by a "sacred
duty"is incongrous. 650
One of the theoretical conundrums surrounding the concept of collective selfdefence is whether it in fact means the defence of others or a defence of a theoretical

"comprehensive ~elf.'"~'In addition to these ~ o r n ~ l e x i t i e s , ~concept
~ ~ t h e of self-defence

is compounded by the (dis)honesty of its assertion by ~ t a t e s . ~Victirns
'~
of aggression
may therefore dispute assertions of the rÎght by the presumed aggressor.6 5 4 ~ h i s
a ~ n b i ~ u i $ 'compounds
~
the tieoretical and practical difficulties in the evaluation of the
concept.
In examining the applicability of the principles of collective self defence to the

ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, regard will be had to the customary international law,
the practice of States, the ECOWAS PMAD, and subsidiary sources of international law

such as judicial decisions and the opinion of writers. The analysis will however, be made
within the context of collective security peculiarities of the West Afiican sub-region. It is
perhaps usehl to start off with the practice and principles of the doctrine of collecticve
self defence under customary international ~aw?
Conhary to the argument of Judge Oda in the celebrated Nicaragua C'use6" that
the right of coIlective self-defence is of contemporary origin, scholars such as Georg

650
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Yorarn Distein, "International Law as a Primitive Legal System" (1986-7) 19 N.Y.UJJ.L at 12.

~MyresMcDougal & Fiorentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Order-The Legal Replation of
/nternatîonal Coercion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) 246-260. wereinafter, McDougal &
Feliciano]
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tan Browntie."The Use of Force in Self Defense" (1961) 37 B.Y.1.L 183.
653
Oscar Schacter, "Self Defense and the Rule of Law" (1989) 83 A.J.1.L at 259.
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Myres McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 65 1, ibid
655 Shaw, M . N, International Law (Grotius Publications, London, 1991) at 698.
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Roger Clark, supra note 3 at 35.
657
Nicaragua Case, supra note 462.

~ c h w a r z e n b e r ~ e rhave
~ ' ~ traced the practice to the provisions of the Perpaud League
(1 291) between the Swiss forest communities and the Union of Utrecht (1579) between

Great Britain and France, which treaties acknowledged the concept of collective selfd e f e n ~ e . ~ ~ ~before
~ h u sthe
, Civil War in Spain in 1936-1938 (where there was an express
agreement by States not to aid the parties in the conflict), there existed alliances for
collective self-defence?

Therefore, the doctrine of collective self-defence pre-dates the

UN Charter provisions of Article 5 1
It is probable that the right of collective self-defence attained refinement as a rute

of customary international law during the 19* century and early 20" century. At this

period, the European continent and the Amencas were the foci of the exercise of the
right. It literally formed the theoretical basis for the continental and regional
arrangements for security. it was entrenched in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance concluded on 2 September 1947"~vide Article 3 of that Treaty. During the
negotiations for the United Nations Charter, the Latin Arnerican countries insisted that
they would not sacrifice this right at the altar of the nascent United ~ations?
The right of collective self-defence was M e r confinned by the United States
policy of the famous Monroe f oc truie.^ The right of collective self-defence, (furiher
articulated in the Declaration of Lima) probably influenced the letter of Article 5 1 of the
Charter of the United Nations, of which, later. It also probably influenced the Court's
interpretation of the customary law right of collective self defence in the Nicaragua Case
-
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(1975) 14 I.L.M.1117
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of which, later. It was not only the United States of America that afflmed the existence
of the nght as state practice and adopted it as a state policy. Other states such as Great

s ri ta id^' made claims of acting in collective self defence with colonies as far away and
as diverse as Persia, Egypt and ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ?Thus,
~
in comection with the

Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928, Great Britain observed that "there are certain regions of the
world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute special and vital interest to Our
peace...their protection against attack is to the British empire a measure of self
defense. 9,667 It was this liberal construction of the right that publicists have theoretically
construed as the rotion of a comprehensive self. This concept will be exarnined shortly.
However, the liberal construction of the right of collective self-defence in the
guise of a virtudly unlimited notion of comprehensive self was rejected by most
publicists.668 To Hans Wehberg, the British claim was sheer imperialism which
"diminished the significance of the Kellogg Pact to a considerable degree. 9,669 To Bowett,
it was sheer greed for terrironal expansion.670Notwithstanding this quarrel with scholars,

state practice, which reflected customary international law on the question, permitted a
Iiberal notion of which states may act collectively to repel aggression against one state.
Thus the claims by those powerfùl states characterized their conception of what they

considered to be their spheres of influence. It is therefore safe to Say that at customary
international law, especially before the wind of anti-colonialism shrank the fiontiers of
those states, the right of collective self-defence was exercised on the basis of a common
Ibid.
Supra note 646 at 257.
666
Pearce - Higgins, "lbe Monroe Doctrine ' (1924) 5 B. Y.I.L.at 114
R.I.1.A Documents (1928) Cmd3 109 at 25.
668
Hans Wehberg, The Otrtlawry of War (Washington: Carnegie Endowmwat for International Ptace.,
1931) at 86.
"9 Ibid.
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"'

regional security arrangement or where recognizable "vital intere~ts'"~'werethreatened
by state aggression.

The concept of vital interest and similar linkages of interests or inter-connectivity

of security, which scholars re-defined as the notion of a comprehensive self was a wide
umbrella covenng diverse notions including geographic and imperialistic assumptions.
Often, however, it tended to involve states in a proximate or contigous relati~nshi~.~'''
Dinstein, fiom his analysis of state practice, has argued that the doctrine of self interest or
vital interest is sufficient to warrant an invocation of the right of collective selfd e f e n ~ e ~ ' ~customary
at
international law. However, a caveat has been entered here, to
wit; the security of states acting in collective self defence must be closely interwoven to
warrant the invocation of that nght. in effect, an attack on one state must by some
objective cnteria constitute an attack on the other states so as to warrant their intervention
in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.
These broad principles have not drowned loud theoretical and practical
cornplaints about the nature of what constitues a comprehensive self. Nor about whether a
state whch is contigous to an attacked state but not itself the direct victim of the
aggression rnay lawfblly invoke the doctrine of collective self-defence under customary
international Law and about whether a state fa.away fiom the field of original aggression
but possessing some vital interest there may purport to be acting in collective selfdefence with the initial victim. McDougal and Feliciano have articulated state practice in
this regard and their explanation accords with customary international law on the matter.
6 70
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According to them,
[A] daim of collective self-defence arises whenever a number of
traditional bodies-politic asserting certain demands for security as well as
common expectations that such security can be achieved only by larger
cooperative efforts, and purporting to define their respective identification
structures so as to create a common overlap and interlock, confiont an
opponent, and present themselves to the rest of the general community as
one uni fied group or collectivity for purposes of security and defence.'""

The above fonnulation therefore encompasses the following eiements as creating a
cornprehensive self. There must be first, a pnor assertion by the relevant states of mutual
securities arising from overlapping and interiocking securities and a public assertion and
recognition of the means of securing that interlocking security by collective rneans.
In the context of West Afica, the overlapping and interlocking nature of the
ethnic groups there, their common assertion of collective security and assurance of it

through collective efforts arnounts to a prima fade case of the existence of a
comprehensive self in the sub-region. This aspect will be addressed later. However, at
customary international law, the existence of a comprehensive self only creates a nght of
~ ' ~
for states in the
collective self-defence and does not impose it as a d ~ t y Furthemore,
region to assert the nght of coll~ctiveself-defence the attack on one must constitute a
clear and present danger to the inter-locking security of the entire region. Having regard
to the dangers of abuse and hegemonic tendencies, the threshold bar of secunty must of
necessity remain high if the right is not to be a cloak for the ulterior interests of the
"assisting state(s)."
The exercise of collective self-defence is naturally premised upon a confrontation
with immediate danger and this raises the issue of who construes or determines what
danger or aggression is "clear and present" to that comprehensive self to warrant an

exercise of the right of collective selfdefence? Customary international law allowed for
--
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"auto interp~etation'"'~0fwhat constituted clear and imminent danger shon of m e d
attack?'

In consequence, the exercise of collective self defense was not only probable in

the absence of actual armed attack but members of the comprehensive self were at liberty
to determine by themselves the existence or otherwise of an imminent armed attack.678
McDougal & Feliciano insist, "imminence of attack of such high degree as to preclude
effective resort by the intended victim to non-violent rnodalities of response has always
been recognized as sufficient justification. 4 7 9
Oppenheim supports this view and cites some histoncal instances such: (a) the
British preemptive shelling in 1807 of the Danish fieet at Copenhagen to fnistrate
Napoleon's (French) secret pact between Denmark ana d rance;^'' (b) The Arnelia Islands
invasion in 1817 by the United States to flush out pirates on the Spanish Island; (c) the

German invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium in 1914; (d) the sinking of the French fleet
at Oran in 1940; and (e) the Anglo-Soviet preemptive collective self defensive occupation

of han in 1941. in the 1928 Kellog-Briand Treaty for the Renunciation of War, France
and the United States had declareci that a state purporting to be exercising the right, "was

alone competent to decide whether circunistances require recourse to war in self

'

defen~e.'*~~
This principle has drawn considerable disagreement from some pub licists.
Lauterpacht contends that "such a claim is self contradictory as it purports to be based on
legal right and at the same time, it dissociates itself fiom regdation and evaluation of the

law.r r 6 8 2 During the Nuremberg trials, the ~ r i b u n a l ~reasoned
"
in a similar vein and held
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that "whether action taken under the daim of self defence was in fact aggressive or
defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation or adjudication if international law
is ever to be enf~rced.'"~' in conclusion, it may therefore be said that at customary

international law, the principle of auto-interpretation685ispermitted but the claim is
justiciable.686
Another element of the right of collective self-defence is the immediacy of the
response to the danger or peril constituted by the initial unlawfùl anack. On this question,
it seerns that regard is had to the means and readîness of articulating a response by the
comprehensive self to the danger in

The difficulty here is that a belated response

could confuse an exercise of the right with acts in the nature of reprisais. Save for cases

of "continuing aggressionrr ,688the repulsion of the initial aggression has to be executed
with relative despatch and under circumstances where such response is the only option
"to secure a return to lawfùl noms. 9489 As American Secretary of State Daniel Webster

of the United States argued in his correspondence in the Caroline ~ a s e . ~for
~ Othe right to
avail the United Kingdom, it should,
[slhow a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation and the action must
involve nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the
necessity of self defence, must be lunited by that necessity and kept
clearly within it.691
Webster's test largely remains the classical surnmation of the right individually or in the
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collective context under custornary law. Similarly, the response was to be Limited "in
intensity and magnitude to what was reasonably necessaty promptly to secure the
permissible objectives of self defence under the conditions of ne~essity."~~'
The twin
essential elements of necessity and proportionality in the exercise of the right of
collective self defence at customary international law was recently reaff~rmedby the
Court in the Nucfear Weapons

and in the Nicaragua ~ o s e , ~ ~ 'which
of
later. A

s u m a r y of the elements of customary international Law on collective self-defence may
be stated as follows: (a) there must be an unlawfiil armed attack or at least an imminent
unlawfiil armed attack,(b) the attack or imminence thereof must be of such chaiacter that
there cannot be a reasonable expectation by the victim of a recourse to pacific settlement,
(c) Save for "continuing aggression", the response to the attack or the imminent a m e d

attack must be of an immediate character regard being had to the nature of the attack or

threat and the means of its removal, (d) the response must be reasonable and proportional
to the threat or the unlawfid aggression, (e) The States acting collectively must have some
acceptable degree of proximate relationship between them and rnust have given adequate
notive to the international community of the existence thereof. Before applying these
principles to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the next section will examine the
impact, of the üN Charter on the customary international law regime on collective selfdefence.
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McDougal, supra note 65 1 at 588. In a rather extrcrne case, the United States' army in 19 16, struck deep
into Mexican territory to pcrmanently incapacitatc some bandits who engagcd in cross border raids fiom
Mexico to the United States*temtory. Sec G.A. Finch, "Mexico and the United States " ( 1 9 17) 17 A. J .f .L
at 399-406.

4.4: COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND

THE UN CHARTER

Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United ~ a t i o n s "provides
~
as follows,
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self defense if an arrned attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by members in the exercise of this right of self defence shall be
imediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and s e ~ u r i t ~ . ~ %
The tme meaning of these words in the application of the principles of collective selfdefence has been pr~blematic.~~'
While some publicists argue that the right the customary
international law right of collective seif defence has been tempered by and subsumed in
Article 5 1,698 another school of thought maintains that the right exists in its classical state
untouched by the Charter provisions.699 The former view seems better and has been
affirmed by the Court in the Nicaragua Case. In the view of the Court, Article 5 1 has not
"subsumed and supewened9,700 the customary international law right of collective selfdefence. Hence, it may be said that there are two parallel regimes on the right of
collective self-defence.
The salient issue here is that "in considering the extent to which the United
Nations Charter has limited the scope of the customary international law on collective
self defence ...one cannot ignore the effectiveness or otherwise of international machinery
693
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as a substitute for individual action."70' This is the c m of the problem. The corollary

question therefore is the extent, if any, of the influence on customary international law of
the spirit and letter of Article SI.''* Without preempting the arguments that will appear
below, it seems that the question whether the practice of states has been qualified by
Article 5 1 betrays an expectation that Article 5 1 of the Charter ought to curtail the rather

liberal regime of collective self-defence under customary international iaw.'''

The

question may well be asked, should state practice be read subject to the Charîer?
Having regard to the prevailing circumstances under which the Charter was
negotiated, drawn, and agreed to by member states and its raison dezre, there is a
discernible attitude and disposition against the use of force by states in their dealings with

one another. Article 2(4) of the Charter expressly reinforces this teleological
d i ~ ~ o s i t i o nThe
. ' ~ provisions of Articles 25 and 28 of the Charter M e r confirm this
view as they seek to confer a monopoly of the use of force in international law on the

Security Council. ï h i s raises the presumption that the recourse to the nght of collective
self-defence should be a last resort by states and therefore be justiciable under Article 51
only. For the purposes of assessing the validity of the ECOWAS members that their
action in Liberia also falls within the rubric of Article 5 1, an evaluation of the opinion of
scholars and the Court on the various aspects of the issue is prudent. This will of course,
take into consideration the collective peculiarities of the West Afiican sub-region as
affirmed and iterated in the PMAD of ECOWAS."'
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Scholm like ~ e l s e n , ~ ~ ~ . J e s s ~
u e~n~k~i d~~a *nhda argued
ve
that under Article 5 1,
the right to colIective self-defence is conditional upon the occurrence of an armed attack.

In the rather blunt words of Henkin, the argument on anticipatory collective self defence
under this regime "is unfounded, its reasoning fallacious and, its doctrine pemicious."i09
On the other hand. another formidable school of thought represented by ~instein"' and
McDougal and ~e1iciano'"has made a persuasive case for anticipatory self-defence under
Article 51. Although the Court in the Nicaragua Case did not express a view on this
issue, because it was decided under the nonnative regime of customary international law,
the Court did a

b that under customary law, "the exercise of this right is conditional on

armed atta~k.""~Be that as it may, when Article 51 is read in the overall context of the
Charter to avoid and reduce the fiequency and scope of armed conflicts, the better view
would be that exercise of the right under Article 51 is lirnited to cases of armed attack.
What then is an arrned attack and who determines when it has occurred? The
consensus of opinion is that this is a pnvilege of the victim of the m e d attack. However,
like under customary international law, this privilege is clearly j~sticiable."~What is the
meaning of "mned attack"? It seems that the Court and a majonty of the publicists have
no disagreement with the definition offered by Article 3, paragraph ( g ) of The Definition
of Aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 33 14 XXIX.'" Thus, in addition
to sending regular forces across an international border, "the sending by or on behalf of a
706
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state of m e d bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of amed
force against another state of such gravity as to amount to ...armed attack if carried out by
regular forces- constitutes armed attack for the purposes of Article 51."'"

It is

rernarkable that the Court adopted a rather restrictive interpretation of this phrase. This
perhaps affims the teleological intention of the Charter. Although the dissenting view of
Judge Jennings accords more with the reality of world geo-politics, it opens the door for a
liberal recouse to fûrther violence.
The question of who may lawfiilly act in collective self-defence under Article 51
has not been any less controversial under Article 5 1than under its customary international
law counterpart. The Court in the Nicaragua Case indirectly considered the concept of a
comprehensive self. The facts of the case as found by the Court were that sequel to the
collapse of the Somoza regime and its replacement by the junta led by Daniel Ortega, the
Ortega junta reneged on its promises to the United States. It did so by adopting socialist
policies and also by refùsing to democratize. Further, the juta becarne very fiiendly with
the communist regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba and with the communist bloc. The United
States of America then started aiding other neighbouring countries in the hemisphere
such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to subvert the Ortega regime. The United
States also h d e d and assisted a band of Nicaraguan rebels dedicated to the overthrow of
the Ortega led regime. In addition, the United States also mined Nicaraguan ports.

In consequence of these activities, the Nicaraguan government filed a daim in the
Court against the United States. On the question of whether the U.S could maintain a

714

Supra note 457.
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for a more liberal construction o f the phrase and which argument appears quite realistic in the context of
contemporary realitics

daim of collective self with El Salvador for acts of aggression allegedly carrïed out by

the Ortega govemment some four to five years before the US aided subversion of
Nicaragua, the Court had cause to address the notion of collectivity of interest and the
alleged requirement that a victim state must request third-state help before a claim of
collective self-defence would be admissible. This aspect of the Court's decision is
difficult to reconcile under customary international law and the Charter.
First, the condition of fomal request for help is novel and of dubious v a ~ i d i t ~ . ' ' ~
No such requirernent is evident on the face of Article 51. Second, it seems to
rnisapprehend the philosophy of the nght of collective self-defence. Collective selfdefence is not necessarily the defence of another state but the defence of self on the
principle that an aggression on another state constitutes (for reasons including mutual
security and interdependence), a direct attack on a comprehensive self. The "assisting"
State in effect defends itself. It is not a champion of the pnmary victim of the aggression.
Third, the Court, in adjudicating the Nicaragua Case,was probably unduly influenced by
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of which Article 3(2) makes the

exercise of the right of collective self defence conditional upon a request by the "primary
victim."' It is difficult to appreciate why the Court imposed this limitation on the nght of
collective self defence especially as it purported to be applying "customary international
law" and not the provisions of the Rio ~eclaration."~
Even if the Court was motivated by
the understandable need to restrict the scope of the nght to collective self-defence, it still
does not warrant the interpretation placed on it by the Court. The request for assistance is
therefore not part of the jurispmdence of c u s t o m q international law nor of Article 5 1.
-
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Regarding the question of parties who may partake in collective self-defence
under the Charter, Kunz has argued that in the absence of any treaty obligation, collective

self defence is only a right and not a duty but this hardly answers the question.719The
Court in the Nicaragua Case did not specifically address this issue as none of the parties
made an issue of it.720 However, it appean that there is no strict requirement for the
existence of a forma1 defence pact between states before recourse can be had by them to
the right of collective self-defence under Article 5 1 .72'~instein722
shares this view and in
the absence of any provision to the contrary on the face of Article 51, it is probabIy

correct. It may therefore be said that where the security of states are closely interwoven
and such a circumstance is brought to the knowledge of third states, an attack on one state

rnay constitute an attack on the other states. Accordingly, the right of collective selfdefence under Article 5 1 may be invoked.
However, Bowett has argued that having regard to the travaux preparatoires of

the Charter and Article 5 1, the exercise of the right to collective self defence is limited to
states in a defense pa~t723
or in a regional arrangement for mutual s e c ~ r i t ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ h i s
argument is intriguing as it re-echoes the debate whether the right of collective selfdefence originated fiom the Latin American position at the Dumbarton Oaks Con ference
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or whether it ante-dates it. The question has already been resolved in favour of the latter
view. Whilst the travaux preparatoires might be helpful in elucidating the provisions and

intention of the Article, it is well to remember that the Latin American experience is not
necessarily summative of the practice of states as it was at best, a continental peculiarity
of a universal phenornenon. As such, Bowett's arguments on this issue may not be wholly

correct. In sum, the right of collective self defence under Article 5 1 is not limited to States
in a regional pact but the threshold bar of connectivity of collective security must of
necessity remain high if the right is not to be a cloak for aggression or regional
hegemony.
As regards the question of the acceptable time span between the act of aggression

and the exercise of the right of self-defence, it appears that Article 5 1 maintains the
customary international law rule that it should be relatively contemporaneous to the
attack. On the issue of the requirement that states resorting to collective self defence
should imrnediately report" measures taken in the exercise of the right to the Security
Council, some publicists like Kelsen have argued that this is mandatory. Who detemines
whether the measures taken by the Security Council are necessary to restore the peace?

Kelsen nas argued that this is a responsibility of the Security ~ o ~ n c i l . 'On
* ~the other
hand, other scholars like Greig have argued that the requirement of reporting to the

Security Council of measures ostensibly taken in collective self-defece is directory and
exhortatory and not mandatory. His argument is that doing otherwise does not invalidate
the exercise of the nght.726However, the better view, and as f i e r confirmed by the
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Court in the Nuclear Weapons Case,"' is that the assisting state must report the steps
taken by it to the Security Council as it substantially reflects on the bona fides of the
belief in the right. This view is consistent with the attitude of the Charter to restrain the
use of force by States and also enhances the justiciability of the assertion of the right.

On the question of the scope of the right of collective self defence when the
Security Council intervenes, it seems that the obligation to cease acting in collective self
defence would only arise when the steps taken by the Security Council are by themselves

capable of rernoving the attack giving rise to the resort to collective self defense. An
extreme view contends that s t a t ~ sexercising the right of collective self defense have the
right to pursue the right to a logical conclusion by defeating the aggressor and irnposing a
peace treaty on the vanquished aggressor.72s This view is problematic as it introduces to
the right alien elements of reprisais, punishment and self-help. It seems that in this

context, the right is not at large and must be measured on the standard bar of what is
reasonable and proportional to the initial aggression.
In summary, the principles governhg the exercise of collective self-defence under
the Charter may be stated as follows:
There must be an armed attack and the detennination of its occurrence is the
responsibility of the victim or comprehensive self but this claim remains justiciable
and is subject to public scrutiny.

There must be a strong mutual security relationship or nexus between the victim and
the assisting state constituting a comprehensive self and the initial aggression must
constitute a clear and present danger to the security of the comprehensive self.
727
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Save for cases of "continuing" aggression, the response by the comprehensive self

must be immediate, regard being had to the nature of the aggression and the
reasonable time it would take to assess the manner and the nature of the response to
be adopted.

The victim of the anned attack, that is in this case, the cornprehensive self as

represented by the ECOWAS is obliged to report al1 measures taken in collective self
defence to the Security Council.
Parties to the conflict are to hold their peace once the Security Council has effectively
intervened to restore peace.
Having examined the principles o f coIlective self defence under the regimes of the
Charter and customary international law, it is clear that the Charter regime is narrower

and better if recourse to use of force is to be reduced. Accordingly, notwithstanding the
coexistence of both regimes, the parameters of the Charter regime will be used in
evaluating the legality or othenvise of ECOWAS action in Liberia under the doctrine of
CO llective self-defence.

4.5: JUSTIFICATION OF ECOWAS UNDER COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE

The threshold point for the invocation of the right of collective self-defence is the
occurrence of an "armed attack. ~ 7 2 9The question now is whether the NPFL invasion of
Liberia and or its support by some third states rose to the level of an armed attack as
contemplated by Article 5 1.730 The Definition of ~ ~ ~ r e s s i o contained
n'~'
in the General
Assembiy Resolution 33 14 of Decernber 1974 contains binding normative definitions of
what constitutes anned attack. This has hrther been articulated and reiterated by the

Court in both the Nicaragua Case and the Nuclear Weupons Case. However, some
publicists like B r n o Simma are pessimistic in this regard. In his view, "despite the
exertion of considerable effort a generally recognized definition of 'anned attack' has not
been f o ~ n d . " ~ ~ ~

Be that as it may, Article 3, paragraph (g) of The Definition of Aggression
~h
armed attack as
annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 X X I X 7 3 3 ~ h idefines
including the sending of regular forces across an international border; the sending by or
on behalf of a state of anned bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which cany out
acts of armed force against another state of sucn gravity as to amount to ...armed attack

would suffice for the purposes of this analy$s. Being a declaration of the United Nations
adopted with substantial support by states, it is evidence of international law on the

natter.^^^ The issue to be resolved is whether the facts of the rebellion and the ostensible
third state support for it constitutes armed attack for the purposes of Article 5 1 and
customary international law on collective self defence.

The alleged support given to the rebels by various states within and around the
-
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West African sub-region has already been documented in the preceding chapters. While a
repetition of those allegations is hardly helpful, for the purposes of the elucidation of the
arguments here, some of the more pertinent instances will be revisited and their legal
implications addressed. The training of the NPFL rebels in Libya has already been
detailed in chapter two. The Libyan motive is raîher controversial. Some commentators
such as Mark Huband who interviewed some of the ex-NPFL rebels contend that
Ghadaffi wanted a beachhead in West Africa and control of the sophisticated Amencan
Omega Relay satellite in ~iberia.'~'Other reasons include his alleged desire to use the

NPFL rebels to seize the relatively large number of Amencans in ~ i b e n a . 'Be
~ ~that as it
may, the crucial question here is whether the alleged support of the various factions by
diverse states is sufficiently attributable to those states and whether it constitutes armed
attack.
It is not in doubt that the NPFL rebels iaunched the rebellion fiom Cote d'Ivoire

and allegedly received extensive support fiom both the Ivoirean government and the
government of Burkina

as o.'^^ These are not without

legal consequences. The critical

test here is whether the government of Cote d'Ivoire and Btrkina Faso merely neglected
to safeguard their temtories fiom being used by the rebels or whether they (the two

governments) voluntarîly placed their territories at the disposal of the rebels. in the
former case, it would be a delict at international law. While these speculations may have
their relative elements of truth, they afford little probative utility to the international
lawyer. As the Court pertinently noted in the Co*

Channel Case,

(I]t cannot be concluded fiom the mere fact of the control
exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily
knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein,
nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This
fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima

''' Huband, supra note 74 at 65.
'16
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facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.99738
Moreover, the use of a state's temtory by a rebel group does not amount to armed attack
but rnay constitute subversion of the victim state. In addition, the support of the w h n g
factions by some States does not necessarily make them the agents of their benefactors.
As the Court held in the Nicaragua Case, it must be shown that the waning factions were

not only created by those states financing their carnpaign but that they were under their
~ontrol."~
Offenng logistic support and finances to the rebel group is not enough. The
element of control is critical. In the absence of probative proof that Cote d'Ivoire,
Burkina Faso and Libya created and controlled the warring factions, the question of the
existence or not of an armed attack under this heading does not

But this is not the

end of the matter as the sending of 400 Burkina Faso troops by the Burkinabe
govemment to Liberia to fight alongside the NPFL rebels is a different kettle of fish.
As already indicated in sections four and five of chapter two, the govemment of

Burkina Faso acknowledged sending over 400 of its state army to the NPFL rebets which
it justified as "moral ~ u p ~ o r t " ~ ~the
' f orebels.
r
The legal significance of this fact is quite
v e s doubt that the
radical. The decision of the Court in the Nicaraguu ~ a s e ~ ~ ~ l e alittle
Burkinabe action took the matter out of the rubric of indirect aggression7e3toone of actual
direct aggression constituting armed attack. According to the Court,

[I]n particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed
attack must be understood as including, not merely action by regular
armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by or on
738
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behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of anned force against another state of such gravity as to
amount to inter alia to an armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its
substantial involvement therein.7a(emphasis added)
Although these remarks were made in respect of the customary law regime, they
apply with equal force to the Charter regime"'on

collective self-defence. Accordingly,

the sending of 400 Burkinabe troops to Liberia by the govemment of Burkina Faso to
fight alongside the NPFL rebels is nothing short of an armed attack against Liberia. Even
if the despatch of Burkinabe troops to Liberia was at the request of the rebel NPFL in
Liberia, it still constitutes armed attack against Liberia since the existence of a civil war

does not necessarily mean the disappearance of Liberian sovereignty. As the Court held
in the Nicaragua Case, state sovereignty and the doctrine of non-intervention "would
certainly lose its effectiveness ...if intervention were to be justified by a mere request for
assistance by an opposition group in another state.r.746 Accordingly, the unlawhil
despatch of Burkina Faso troops across its borders to Liberia to help in the rebellion
against Doe violated intenational law and constituted anned attack against Liberia.
Having crossed the threshold point on collective self defence, the second test is

whether ECOWAS and its constitutive States is a comprehensive self warranting its
intervention. In answenng this question, the crucial test ought to be the substantiality of
the new comprehensive self created by public assertions of an inter-connectedness of
securities by the affected States. Ln the Liberian case, its collective security arrangement
in the ECOWAS PMAD is sufficient to create and assert its comprehesivity of self. The
preamble to the ECOWAS PMAD and its substantive Articles leave no doubt about the
existence of a comprehensive self. The preamble does not only "recognize that Member
States belong to the same geographical ~ e a * * ,aflirms
~ ~ ~ ithe
t consciousness of ECOWAS
that regional security can best be achieved by pooling together their resources within a
744
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cornrnon agency.748Thus, in addition to the shared economic interests of the ECOWAS
mernber states, there exists an undentanding and public affirmation in the sub-region of
the interlocking and inter-dependent nature of their mutual securities. This undertstanding

finds ample expression in the substantive provisions of the PMAD and the ECOWAS
Non-Aggression Pact. Some of the pertinent provisions of the ECOWAS Protocoi on
Non-Aggression and the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) are
as follows:

Article 2 of the Non-Aggression Pact,
Each member shall renain fiom committing, encouraging or condoning
acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or
political independence of the other mernber ~tates.'~'
The provisions of Articles 3 and 4 impose a positive duty on member states to ensure that

their territories are not used for acts of regional and inter-state subversion.
Article 3 of PMAD:
[Elach member state shall undertake to prevent foreigners on its territory
fiom committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the
sovereignty and temtorial integrity of other member ~tates.~"
Article 4 of PMAD:
Each member state shall undertake to prevent non-resident foreigners from
using its tenitory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2
above against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states."'

In addition, the PMAD articulates ECOWAS explicit approbation of the doctrine of
collective self defence within the region as Article 2 of the PMAD provides that,

'"Ibid.
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[Mlember States declare and accept that any armed attack or aggression
directed against any Member state shall constitute a threat or aggression
against the entire ~ o m m u n i t ~ . ' ~ ~
Members of the ECOWAS are by virtue of Article 3 of the PMAD obliged to give mutual
aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.7s3 This objective is
to be achieved through the instrumentality of an Allied Armed Force of the Cornrnunity

to be composed of nationals Erom existing m e d forces of the Community earmarked for
that purpose and placed at the disposa1 of the Cornrnunity in cases of any "armed

inter~ention."'~~
The phrase "anned intervention" seems to have a contexnialized
meaning regard being to the provisions of Article 15 (1). That Article provides that
"intervention by AAFC (the Comrnunity's Allied Force) shall in al1 cases be justified by
the legitimate defence of the community." However, the ECOWAS Cornmunity shall not
employ this provision to intervene "if the confiict remains purely internai. 99755
It is very pertinent to note that by virtue of Article 18 of the PMAD, a conflict is
not internai if, as in the Liberian case it is "actively maintained and sustained fiom the
outside.,9756 Nor would it still be constnied as an intemal matter when it actually spilt

over into Sierra Leone with catastmphic consequences. The impact of the Liberian crisis

on Sierra Leone fomed the substance of the deliberations of the United Nations General
Assembly at its 86" Plenary meeting held on the 21R of December 1993.'~' The
subsequent Resolution passed by that body made the following findings,
that the spi11 over effect of the Liberian crisis had caused serious destruction and

devastation of the productive areas of the temtory of Sierra Leone and of its economy
as a hol le,'^^
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"'Article 13 o f PMAD.
Article 18 o f PMAD.
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InternationaI Assistance to Sierra Leone, GA. Rcs.48/196,U.N.GAOR Supp. (No.49) at 171, U.N Doc.
A/48/49(1993).
758 Paragraph 5, ibid.
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The. conflict in Liberia had "devastated lives and properties in the eastem and
southem provinces of Sierra ~ e o n e , causing
~'~
a "massive outflows of rehigees and
displaced persons.9,760
On the foregoing grounds grounds, it is argued that in addition to the treaty obligations
imposed on rnember states by the ECOWAS Non-Aggression Pact and the PMAD, their
clearly exists the collectivity of interest and a comprehensive self justifjmg the assertion
of a right in collective self-defence by ECOWAS.

It has been argued by cntics of the intervention that the decision to iniervene via
the h e w o r k of the PMAD was flawed and invalid for alleged non-cornpliance with the
provisions of the PMAD and the ECOWAS ~reaty.'~'This argument is apparently
formidable. In support of the argument, Article 6 of the PMAD has been invoked. The
Article provides that
The ~ u t h o r i t y ~ ~ ~ sdecide
h a l l on the expediency of military action and
entrust its execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Forces of the
Community (AAFC)'~)
Since the decision to intervene militarily was taken by the Standing Mediation
~ o f of States and Govemment
Cornmittee, a delegate of the ECOWAS ~ u t h o r i t y ~ Heads
as provided above, the decision to intervene, it has been argued, was invalid. It has to be

recalled that the ECOWAS Authonty of Heads of State and Govemment, met on 30 May
1990 in Gambia established a Community Standing Mediation ~ o r n m i t t e e . ~This
~ ' body,

made up of four members of the ECOWAS Authority itself was appointed by that organ
Paragraph 6, ibid.
Ibid. Note also that in addition to other Resolutions of the General Asscmbly, Resolution 49 of 1994
appealed to the world comrnunity to aid the states around Liberia contcnd with the rcfugee crisis. See G.A.
Res. 49i26.49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) U.N.Doc.A/49/49 (1994).
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and chaired by the chairman of ECOWAS. Its mandate is tu suggest and explore

amicable ways of settling disputes in the sub-region and report to the full ~ u t h o r i t y . 'It~ ~
was

the Standing Mediation Cornittee that recommended despatch of peacekeeping

troops to Liberia. The argument that the decision to intervene taken by the Standing
Mediation Cornmittee, instead of the hl1 body of the Authority of Heads of States, was
illegal is erroneous and ignores subsequent developments on the issue.
At the extra-ordinary Summit of the Authority convened at Bamako, Mali
between November 27-28,1990, "the Authority expressed its appreciation to the members
of the Mediation Cornmittee for the initiatives taken in finding a peacefbl resoiution to
the cnsis in Liberia*' and moreover, "ratified the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia as
embodied in the Banjul Communique and Decisions of the Standing Mediation
Cornrniittee adopted on 7 August 1990."

'" Although

this clear ratification of the

decision to intervene taken by the Standing Mediation Comrnittee was e x post facto,
arguments on the purported incornpetence of the decision to intervene are not well
founded.

The other conditionality for justification under collective self-defence is whether
the response by the West Afncan states was both necessary, timely and proportional to
the threat posed by the conflict. in evaluating this aspect of the right to collective selfdefence, regard should be had to the complexities of the civil war in Liberia, its impact on
the countries in the sub-region, the relative difficuities in raising the necessary military

response and finally, the most reasonable solution to the problem. The impact of the
Liberian conflict on L i b e r i a , the region and the international community at large have
been explored in chapter two. It has already been noted that six weeks after the rebellion,
the neighbouring countries were aiready feeling the pangs and pain of the conflict as the
lbid.
ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Governemut, Decision A/DEC.1/11/90
Relating to the
Approval of the Decisions of the Community Standing Mediation Comrnittee Takcn During its First
Sessions from 6-7August 1990,Bamako,Republic of Mali,28 November 1990.Reproduced in Weller,
supra note 5 at 1 1 1.
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rate of the infiow of refugees was a already stretching the capacity and security of those
states?

Meanwhile, both the OAU and the UN, beyond platitudes and homilies on

peaceful coexistence and amicable settlement of conflicts, ignored the spreading disaster.
Meanwhile, the crisis had recorded numerous atrocities and was becoming increasingly
ethnicized, a phenornenon which, given the problems of the Berlin partitioning of Afiica,
was bound to draw the conflct, as it did, beyond the fiontiers of Liberia. It is therefore

argued that in view of the factors listed above, ECOWAS response was necessary.

On the question of timeliness of response and reporting to the Security Council of
rneasures taken under Article 51 of the Charter, it is important to recall that Doe's
letter769inviting the ECOWAS to intervene in the anarchy in Libena was addressed to
that body on the 14" July 1990. Three weeks thereafier, precisely on 71h August 1990, the
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Cornmittee, acting on behalf of the ECOWAS Authority

of Heads of States took the following de ci si on^^^' on Libena:
Established an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOIMOG),
Ordered a Cease-£ire in Liberia,
Ordered al1 combatants in the conflict to sunender al1 arms to the ECOMOG
Ordered al1 parties to the conflict to refrain fiom the importation of arms and
ammunition into Liberia,
Proposed the establishment of a democratically elected government in Liberia,
Proposed the establishment of an intenm Govemment for ~ibena."'
That these far reaching decisions were taken just shortly after Doe's intimation to
ECOWAS about the crisis in Liberia, can hardly be said to have been belated; moreover,

the crisis was in the nature of a continuing aggression. It is thus clear that the response by
the ECOWAS was very timely especially in the context of the efforts necessary to
-
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convene sixteen different states to agree on a comrnon agenda.
However, some commentators have argued that the ECOWAS response which
ultimately led to the resolution of the crisis and the installation of a dernocratically
elected govemment in Liberia was not proportiona1772tothe threat posed by the Liberian
crisis. This argument, attractive as it seems on the surface, makes a profound rnistake. As
Loius Henkin noted, any inquiry into the role of law "must take into account the state of
'the system9-thecharacter of international society and of the law at a given tirne."773This
is not to mean that scholars or international lawyers are at liberty to torture legal rules to
yield particularly pliable and amenable interpretations and justifications. Far fiom that;
the issue here is that to the extent that argument on this aspect of the question fails to take
into consideration the prevailing conditions and the intrinsic nature of the issues at hand,
the objection remains suspect.

It is well to recall the earlier arguments on the emergence of a pragmatic, instead of a
doctrinaire approach to peacekeeping or collective self-defence as the case may be. As
already noted, a study of multi-lateral responses to civil strife with international
repercussions shows that peacekeeping measures are more or less a necessary demand of
the nature of the crisis. Peacekeeping bodies intervening in intra-state conflicts

increasingly insist on universally obsewed elections in resolving those conflicts. In a
situation like Liberia's where the rebellion threatening the region was rooted in the
poverty of govemmental legitirnacy,'"it

stands to reason that democratic elections should

be part of the recommended remedy by those states acting in collective self-defence. it is

therefore argued that to the extent that the ECOWAS created and sustained an
environment whereby the warring factions were disarmed and a genuine democracy
instituted to enable the Liberian people to rebuild their country, the ECOWAS response
was proportional to the threat posed by the civil war. Moreover, the measures taken
772
773
774
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enabled most of the neighbouring member-states to reclaim their threatened sovereignty
and did not go beyond the ECOMOG mandate, nor was it limited by Doe's original

invitation.
The next criteria for justification in collective self defence under the Charter is

that parties acting in collective self-defence should speedily report to the Security
Council, the steps taken by them in pursuance of Article 51 of the Charter. Here the
ECOWAS action may well be the paragon of scnrpulous compliance. Although the

ECOWAS decision to act inter dia in collective selfkiefence was taken on the 7'h of

August 1990, it is significant to note that the Security Council was informed of those
decisions within 48 hours. Indeed by a letter'"

dated 9 August 1990 and addressed to the

Security Council, the Security Council was informed of the steps taken by the ECOWAS.
The pertinent aspects of the Ietter read thus,
1 consider it necessary to invite you to this brief session on the
tragic situation in Republic of Liberia and on the efforts at the regional
level to restore peace to that country.. .the Authority held its first Summit
in Banjul fÏom the 6-7 August 1990 and came up with effective steps for
ending the Liberkm tragedy. Conscious of its responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region, the Cornmittee on
behalf of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of States and Goverment,
decided as follows:

There shall be an irnmediate cease-fire. Ai1 parties to the conflict shall
cease al1 activities of a military and paramilitary nature as well as al1
acts of violence.
Under the authority of Chairman of ECOWAS, a cease-fire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was set up; it comprises military
contingents fiom member states of the of the ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee, as well as Guinea and Sierra Leone, Liberia's
neighbours.
ECOMOG shall assist the Committee in supervising the
implementation and ensuring strict compliance of the cease-fire by al1
the parties to the conflict.
That a broad-based hterim National Govemment shall be set up in the
Republic of Liberia to administer that country and organise fiee and

-

fair elections, leading to a democratically elected govement. The
composition of the Interim Governrnent shaIl be determined by al1
parties to the conflict, including political parties and other interest
groups.
None of the leaders of the warring parties shall head the Intenm
Govemment.
For the purposes of carrying out a peacekeeping role and monitoring
the peace process in Liberia, a special emergency fund was
established. There shali be voluntary contribution by the member
states of ECOWAS, the OAU and other fnendly countries to the
special fiind. A budget of about USSO million is projected for
financing the military operations, and for the immediate humanitarian
needs of the Liberian people.'76

The letter concludes with a statement that the ECOMOG action was not designed to take
sides in the conflicts and urging the international community to support the ECOWAS in
its initiative. The letter dispels any doubt as to whether the ECOWAS satisfied this leg of
the conditions for a valid invocation of the rights of collective self defence as provided by

Article 5 1 of the Charter.
The last condition is that the states a c ~ ign collective self defence should cease

hxther actions in that regard once the Security Council takes effective steps to resolve the
conflict. With particular reference to the case of the ECOWAS action in Liberia, it is
remarkable that the Security Council not only approved of the actions taken by the
ECOWAS but within 18 months after the initial ECOWAS intervention, engaged in an

unprecedented alliance with that body. n i e alliance, in the form of the creation of the
United Nations Observer Monitoring Group in Liberia (UNOMIL) lasted fiom 1992 to

Zn view of the various implications of this novel arrangement and its impact on
collective security and the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to regional
arrangements, attention will shifi in this thesis to the continuing expansion of the
meaning of the phrase, "threat to international peace," and its role as the eigger
mechanism for the provisions of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The next chapter will argue
U.N Doc. SQ48 1 1 of Novcmber 16, 1992 (Anncx)

that recent state practice shows an untidy and incoherent cornpliance with the relevant
Charter provisions on regional ebforcement actions. In most cases like that of Liberia, the
relationship between regional bodies and the Security Council in the application of
chapter 7 of the UN Charter is accidental and leaves much to be desired. This seems to
present the Security Council with the need to ratify whatever presurnptous or
unathourized measures adopted by muhi-lateral security organizations without the prior
authorization of the Council. The cases of Liberia and Kosovo are in point. One of the

grave dangers in this evolving practice is that regional organizations may now proceed to
engage in ilIicit military interventions in the knowledge that presented with a fait
accompli, the Security Council would "ratiw' such brazea usurpation of responsibility.

With respect to this chapter, it is argued that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is not

only legaly justifiable under the principles of invitation by an officila and recognized
g o v e m e t (though threatened) but also under the principtes guiding resort to the
doctrine of collective self-defence under Article 5 1 of the UN Charter.

CHAPTER 8 OF THE UN CaARTER AND RATIFICATION O F THE ECOWAS
ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The principal task of the student of international organization is not to
waste more time debating over regionalism versus universalism but to

study the ways in which, in concrete cases, the two principles can be
utilized in combination and the standards to be applied in deterrnining the
dosage of each to be a d ~ ~ t e d . ' ~ '

S. 1: INTRODUCTION

is now common knowledge that the increasing rate of intemal conflicts of international

It

character imposes a huge strain on the United ~ a t i o n s . "This
~ trend has probably resulted
in the apparent readiness of the United Nations to welcome regional initiatives or
collaboration in the maintenance of international security or in some cases, to merely

spectate when such efforts are taken by regional organizations. Witness the cases of the
OAS intervention in Haiti, the lslamic Conference and Arab League initiatives in the

Somali Crisis, the Association of South East Asia Nations efforts in the Cambodian crisis
and the OSCE initiatives regarding the new states in the defunt Soviet Union and

779

the

1999 European Uniod NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.
On the Liberia crisis, the Report of the United Nations on the Observer Mission
in Liberia, (UNOMIL) acknowledges that "the United Nations, h m the beginning of the

conflict, supported the efforts of the ECOWAS mernber ~ t a t e s . " ' ~
This
~ sense of support
for the ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ and
' ~evennÿilly
r a d uyielded
a l lto~a diminished CM role in Liberia.
This subordination of the UN was justified by Secretary-General of the United Nations as
"reaffirming ...cornmitment to a systematic cooperation ktween the United Nations and
m Pimian Potter, cited in Akindele, supra note 343 at forcword.
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a regio-1

organization, as envisaged in Chapter Vm of the ~harter."~The UN contented

itself with giving ECOWAS assistance on politicai reconciliation, humanitarian
assistance and electoral assistance.
It is remarkable that this Report and subsequent proceedings and events Ieading to

the unprecedented close cooperation between a regional organization and the United
Nations h ~ escaped
s
the relative close scrutiny of scholars. in this chapter an attempt will
be made to examine the legality of the ECOWAS action in Liberia in the context of this

trend and as it impacts on the Charter of the United Nations on enforcement actions.
Towards this objective, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one is
introductory.
Section 5.2 is a doctrinal exercise on the pertinent aspects of the Charter on the
maintenance of global peace. The essence is to highlight the general consensus of writers
and commentators that it is the Security Council that has the responsibility of maintaining
peace globally. The critical question here is whether having regard to the provisions of
the Charter, a regional body c m proceed to undertake enforcement actions without the
prior approvai and authorization of the Security Council. It also explores the continuing
expanded meaning of the phrase, 'Weat to international peace" in its role as the trigger

mechanism for the provisions of chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
Section 5.3 examines the juridical nature of the UN Security Council resolutions
and traces the process of ratification of the ECOWAS action in Liberia. However, this
section contends that recent state practice on chapter 8 of the Charter is untidy and
incoherent and also examines the process by which the aberrant action of the ECOWAS
in Liberia gained apparent legitimacy by ratification. It is remarkable that the United

Nations Security Council passed 16 unanimous resolutions approving and appreciating
the ECOWAS enforcernent action in Liberia. Similarly, the General Assembly passed 6
resolutions cornmending and justifjing the ECOWAS action in Liberia. The corollary
78Z Ibid.

issue is. whether a post facto ratification of any such enforcement actions is possible
within the fiarnework of the United Nations. That is to Say, is there a place for ratification

and retroactive validation of regional enforcement actions at international law? Could
those resoIutions have legitirnated the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia? Regard is also had
to the probable reasons why the ECOWAS action in Liberia enabled it to gain the

approval by the Security Council and the General Assembly? This is achieved by a short
cornparison with OAU intervention in Chad and OAS intervention in Haiti.
As the dangers inherent in such ex p s t facto ratification are apparent, this section

sets the tone for discussion on how the emerging trend may be remedied. Section three
and indeed the whole of chapter five conclude with the observation that in view of the
Security Council's ratification, the ECOWAS action, notwithstanding some of its obvious
defects, was lawfûl at international law.

5.2: REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND THE

UN CHARTER

As a way of providing ECOMOG with sufficient rneans to ensure the
implementation of the Agreement, and with the support of the Security
Counc il, the Secretary-General established a trust fùnd, under the auspices
of the United Nations, that can be utilized to enable Afncan countries to
send reinforcements to ECOMOG, to provide assistance to countries
already participating in ECOMOG, and for humanitarian assistance,
elections and demobili~ation.'~~
In the final quarter of the twentieth century the character and significance
of international law, 1 believe, will be importantly influenced by the Third
~orld.'~'

The unified response of the Security Council to the Gulf conflict raised the prospect of a
"new world order" of global commitment to the maintenance of international law and

removal of threats to international peace.785As subsequent events indicate, the euphona
died a sudden death as it was apparently motivated by concems other than the vindication
of international law or a sincere concern for collective security. The fond expectation of a

world govemed by law and of the willingness of the great powers to lend their might in
defence of nght, justice and international law has since the end of the Second World War

been hstrated by their self serving, provincial andl or ideological agendas. The end of
that war had given rise to a resounding determination and resolve by States to "save

" ~ United
~ ~ Nations was set up with
succeeding generations fiom the scourge of ~ a r . The
a fundamental purpose of maintainhg "international peace and ~ecurity."'~~
This was to

be achieved primarily by taking "effective collective measures for the mevention and
removal of threats to the ~eace."'*~
Although the phrase "threat to international peace" is not defined in the Charter,
the body capable of making that determination was provided for in Chapter five of the
BOUUOSBoums Ghali, .Report of the U.N Secrctary Gencral, United Nations Observer Mission in
Lnberia, Online> hppt-Jlwwwlun.org/Depts/DPKOMision/unomiV-b-htm,
accessed on 1911 1/98.
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Charrer. This chapter makes clear provision for the mechanism by which such crucial

functions may be exercised. m i l e Article 7 of the Charter establishes the Secunty
Council, Articles 23 and 24 state the responsibility of the Security ~ouncil.'" Article 24
provides that the Members of the United Nations,
[Clonfer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
m a i n t e G e of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf.790
However, the power to maintain international peace is not to be exercised at the
whims and caprices of the Security Council. Articie 24 (2) delimits and circurnscnbes the

scope of this responsibility. Thus it clearly provides that 'Tn discharging these duties the
Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
~ations."'~'To reinforce the supremacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of
international peace, the determination of what constitutes a threat to international peace
and security is the sole responsibility of the Secuity Council. Hence Article 39 of the

Charter provides that
[Tlhe Secunty Council shall detemine the existence of anv threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recornmendations or decide what measues shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
secu~ity.'~~
This regime of supreme and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace appears to be tempered by a desue in the Charter to strike a balance behueen
regional imperatives and the need for international collective security. In effect, some of
the responsibilities relating to the maintenance of international security need not be
discharged by the Security Council itself but may be discharged on its behalf by regional
-
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Ibid.
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Article 39 (Underlinhg supplied).

~t~encies."~
Thus, Article 52 provides that
[Nlothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regionai action. 794
This compromise is quickly qualified by the provisions of the Charter which Iimits this
margin of regional initiatives to measures not necessitating what it refers to as
"enforcement actions. ,9795 Thus, while the regional bodies may be used for enforcement
actions by the Security Council, they cannot Iawfblly seize such initiatives on their own
volition. In the express words of Article 53 the Charter,

[Tlhe Security Council shail, where appropriate, utilize such regional
agencies or arrangements for enforcement action under its authoritv. But
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security ~ o u n c i l . ' ~ ~

The rules above purport that if any enforcement action is to be undertaken by any
regional agency, it must be with the prior authorization of the Security Council first
sought and obtained. For the assessment of the lawfulness of the ECOWAS action in
Liberia under the prevailing Charter regime, three issues arise here. The first is the
meaning of threat to international peace. The second is the meaning of "enforcement
action". The third is if an enforcement action is undertaken to remove a threat to
international peace but without the prior authorization of the Security Council, may such

an action be accorded ex posr facto ratification. It is upon these three sets of issues that
the legality of the ECOWAS action in Liberia and consequent UN response will be
evaluated.
However, it must be remembered that the Charter provisions on regional
793
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Setting" in Snydcr and Sathirathai, th.,supra note 600 at 197-206.
794 Article 53 of the Charter, supra note 388.
795 Ibid.
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arrangements and initiatives like other provisions of the Charter are ostensibly designed
for inter-state confli~ts.'~'Thus, Article 2 (4) containing the ban on the use of force and
Articles 39, 51, 52 and 53 which contain the exceptions thereto apply basically to

rnember states in their relations with each ~ t h e r . 'Be
~ ~that as it may, the emergence of
the contemporary rash of civil wars has probably resulted in the Security Council

interpretation of Article
engaging in an ingenious and relatively liberal con~tniction~~~and
39 of the Charter. This awesome provision confers on the Security Council the powers to

act, and if need be, ovemide the limitations posed by the principles of non-intervention.
It is upon making this detennination, that it may take rneasures necessary for its
kemovai. This duty overrides the prohibition on the Council and states from interferhg in
matters which are purely "internai 9,800to a state, when the cnsis in issue constitutes a clear
and present threat to international peace and security. The detexmination of the existence

of a threat to international peace and security is the gateway to enforcement actions and

military delimitation of state sovereignty. Therefore, it is important that the phrase "threat
to international peace and security" be properly scrutinized and its boundaries delimited
with as much precision as possible.
Recent state practice reflecting the gradua1 evolution of a holistic and global
conception of collective security (which has been discussed in chapter 3)80'pointsto the
emergence of a rather liberal regime on the detennination of what constitutes threat to
international peace and security. This trend has been most noticeable in the increasing
cases of outbreak of civil wars. It is interesting to note that the Somali d e b a ~ l e , ~the
'~
Yugoslavian c n ~ i s , ~ ~Sierra
~ t h eLeonean crisis and several other cases of civil wars have
797

798
799
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Article 2 (7) UN Charter, supra note 388.
Michael Reisman, "Coercionand Self Determination: Construing Cbartcr Article 2(4)" (1984) 78
A.J.I.L. 642.
'O2 Wippman on Consent, supra notc 523 at 234.
'O3 But see Mark Weisburd, " Thc Emptincss of the Concept offus Cogen, as Illustrated by the War in
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al1 been determined by the Security Council as constituting threats to international peace

and security. The coilapse of a g o v e r n e n t in a civil war, genocide, and refùgee crises

have been construed in contemporary times as threats to international peace and security
and thus beyond the domestic jurisdiction of the affected stategM In other words,

intemally generated crises which physically impact on neighbounng states are being
increasingly perceived of as threats to international peace warranting the intervention of
the Security Council in the prmary source zone of crisis.
As states have pursuant to Aiticle 25 of the Charter undertaken to "accept and

carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter" it is
beyond doubt that where such deteminations have been made, member states are obliged
to collectively enforce such

de ci si on^.^^^

While widespread human rights a b ~ s e s . ~ ~ ~ t h e

denial of the nght to self-detemination, extreme violence,"'civil

wars, genocide and

overthrow of democratic regimes by force may now be construed as threats to

international peace where they impact on neighbouring states, the tme test may probably
be political rather than legal, even though the issue rnay be presented o t h e r ~ i s eAs
. ~ the
~~

gatt-way to the use of force by the Security Council, and by delegation, regionai
bodiesTso9theneed for clarity and objectivity as to the elements of and a priori contents of
what constitutes a threat to international peace c m hardly be overstated.
The malleability of the concept of threat to international peace appears to be
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substantially reduced or avoided on the rare occasions where the Security Council has
made such decisions by unanimous votes.810 However, the practice of the Security
Council seems to indicate an appreciable latitude in its determination of what constites a
threat to international peace.8'1 Needless to Say, for the Security Council to make the
determination that a particular crisis is a threat to international peace, it needs the relevant
information fkom those states who are directly confronted with the threat. This is
probably the aspect where the margin of appreciation possessed by regional bodies
becomes very ~ s e f Ù l . ~ ' ~aspect
~ h i s will be M e r exploreci in the last chapter.
Be that as it may, the elasticity of the concept of threat to international peace as

McCoubrey and White argue, is apparent in the extensive and varied use made of it8I3
between 1965 and 1968."~
Similarly, it is reflected in the ~ontemporary8'~resur~ence
of
civil conflicts. One may refer to the examples of Iraq,816Yugoslavia,s'7Soma~ia,818~aiti,
of which later, to buttress this point. Why should the crisis in Yugoslavia be construed as
a threat to international peace when the chronic civil war in Sudan has remained
relatively ignored inspite of the endless bloodshed and genocide there and the
destabilizing impact on neighbouring states? Why Iraq and not Turkey? Are the Kurds in
Iraq better deserving of protection that their Turkish kins?

In the Liberia case, it suffices to note that the Security Council by Resolution 788
of 1992 made a determination that the violence in that country was a threat to
international peace.819 Having crossed that thresh01d;~Othe next issue is what is an
8 10

Frowein, supra note 807 at 6 10.
supra at 613.
B. Boutres Ghali, Agenciafir Peace, (1992) SC Doc.S/24111, 17 Iune 1992.
C.G Fenwick, "When is Thcre a b a t to the Peace?-Rhodesia 61 A.J.1.L 753-5
8 1 4 McCoubrey & White, supra note 445 at 37,
815
H. Freudenschub, "Article 39 o f the UN Charter Rcvisitcd: Threats to the Peace and the Rccent Practice
of the UN Security Council" (1993) 46 Austriaa Journal of Public International Law at 1-39.
816
Following the iraqi invasion o f Kuwait in August 1990, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 688 of 5 April 199 1 detcnnining that the Iraqi suppression o f ihc Kurds was a threat to
international peace.
8 1 7 SC/Res 713,46 UN SCOR (1991)
*18 McCoubrey & White supra note 445 at 4 1.
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"enforcement action"? Article 53 of the Charter and other provisions of the Charter are
not helpful, as they do not offer any definition of this ail-important phrase.82' The editors
of the European Comrnenta?y on the Charter of the United Nations are of the considered
view that by virtue of the travaux preparatoires of the Charter, al1 measures under

. ~ ~the
~ other
chapter 8 of the Charter, without exception, are enforcement r n e a ~ u r e s On
hand, a section of North and South American scholars are agreed that it refers to use of

military force and mandatory sanctions excluding purely defensive a~tions.''~The better
view seems to be that it relates to those actions (excluding defensive acts) which

ultimately require military coercion or force for their effect. This much was the finding of
the Security Council in the Dominicun case,

In the Dominican Case, the collective measures taken by the OAS against the
Dominican Republic which fell short of armed force was impliedly held by the Security
Council not to be an enforcement action as contemplated by chapters 7 and 8 of the
Charter. The Security Council's three power resolution merely urged the Council to "take
note"824of the OAS action. In effect, the economic sanctions by the OAS against the

Dominican Republic as a regional action not requiring the use of arrned force for its
execution was constnied as not being an enforcement action for the purposes of Article
~ 3 . This
~ ~ 'interpretation by the Security Council is however incompatible with its
~ the Security Council by
subsequent reaction to the Cuban Quarantine of 1 9 6 2 . ' ~Here
necessary implication decided that the naval blockade imposed on Cuba by the USIOAS
Ofodile, supra note 135 at 41 1.
I. Wolf, "Regionai Arrangements and the UN Charter" (1983) 6 E.P./.L at 289-95.
Sirnma, eds., supra note 729 at 732.
823
McCoubrey & White, supra note 445 at 46; Sec also, Michel Akehursf "Enforcement Action by
Reg ional Agencies With Spccial Rcfercnce to the Organization of American States" ( 1967) 7 B.Y.1.L. at
175-227
*" In 1960, there was an unsuccessful attempt by hcsident Trujillo of the Dornican Republic to assassinate
President Betancourt of Venezuela. The member states of the OAS acting undcr Articles 6and 8 of the Rio
Treaty agreed to impose sanctions on the Dominican Republic and a break of dipiomatic relations with it.
At the Security Council, the Soviet Delcgatc argucd that the OAS action amounted to an enforcement
action requiring the prior authorization of the Security Council. UN.Doc.s14491(1960)
825 AkindeIe, supra note 343 at 1
10.
U.S. Dept of state, (1962) Bulletin xlvii at 15.
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and which obviously required military manoeuvres for its effectiveness was not an

enforcenment action requiring the Council's prior auti~orization.~~'
It may well be that in
this case, the heavy hand of superpower politics in the Security Council was tnumphant.

Be that as it rnay, the hallowed grounds of enforcement action can hardly be
defiled by cosmetic use of the terni "peacekeeping. 9,828 As the leamed editors of the
European Commentary on the Charter have noted,
[I]t is problematic to state categorically that peacekeeping is not
enforcement action because peacekeeping activities cari be performed in
various guises. It is apparent that some observation missions fiuiction as
means for peaceful settlement of disputes. But it is difficult to draw a line
which will ensure in every particular casc, that peacekeeping forces do not
resort to coercive measures; especially when the forces are on the
initiative of a regionai arrangement.82g
The short point here is that the ECOWAS action in Liberia, being a clear use of rnilitary
force, albeit for the ostensible good of the region and Liberia, was an enforcement action
requinng the pnor authorization of the Security Council first sought and obtained.
However, scholars such as Binaefer Nowrojee have argued that regional enforcement
actions may be validly undertaken without the prior authorization of the Security Council
provided that the enforcernent action "is consistent with the Principles and Purposes of
attractive as it may appear, is hardly compatible
the United ~ a t i o n sThis
. ~ ~argument,
~
and consistent with the clear letter of the Charter as already stated. Having made that

determination, the next issue is whether in spite of the absence of a prior authorization of
the enforcement action taken by the ECOMOG, the Security Council was competent to
ratiSf such enforcement action by ECOWAS.

IJN DOCS/PV.992-8(1962). See also, Aichdele, supra note 343 at 110.
Christopher Grcenwwd "Protection of Peacekeepers:IIhc Lcgal Reghe" (1996)7 Duke J. ofInt '1.
&Comp.i. at 185.
829
Georg Ress, "Article 53 of the United Nations Charter*'in SUnma cd., supra note 729 at 732.
Binaeffer Nowrojce, supra notc 86 at 13 1.
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5.3: THE PROCESS AND CHARACTER O F RATIFICATION

The United Nations is legislator as well as judge and executive and its
judgrnents are political not j~ridical.~'

'

In examining the nature of the powers of the Secunty Council to ratify

enforcement actions undertaken by regional bodies without its pnor authorization, the
~
attitude of the Security Council in the Dorninicnn Case is perhaps h e ~ ~ f u l .In~ 'that
instance, the Soviet Union surnmoned the Security Council in September 1960 "to
approve the decision of the OAS, so as to give it legal effect and render it more
effective."833Another member of the Security Council, Poland, joined the Soviet Union
in arguing that the "Security Council is entitled to annul or revise as well as complete
regional measures.3,834 It is remarkable that no member of the Council doubted the
powers of the Security Council to annul, revise or complete enforcement actions
undertaken by a regional body. However, the crucial deteminant here was whether the
sanctions imposed on Venezuala arnounted to "enforcement actions" as contemplated by
Article 53 of the Charter.
The position of the Security Council is consistent with its paramount role as the
ultimate guardian of peace and security in the world. In principle, the primacy of the
Security Council in the maintenance of peace is not necessarily impaired merely because
a regional organization jumped into a confict before the Security Council did. The

Security Council may rat@ or reverse the measure taken by the regional bodies if
undertaken without its permission first sought and obtained, or even where authorization
was given but exceeded by the regional organization. Where then does this power corne

From and what is the juridical nature and character of UN Security Council resolutions.
Louis Henkin, supra note 453 at 168.

''' See UN SCOR 893d mtg. Sept. 8 1960 at 4.
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U.N Doc.SlPV.893. par.24. nie obvious implication according to inis Claude is that the groundwork
being laid by the Soviet Union to disapprove of the measures taken by the OAS. See Inis Claude, "The
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OAS, the UN and the United States" International Conciliation (March 1964) at 48-9.
Ibid at 38-39. See also, R St MacDonald, "The Developing Etrelations Bbeteween Superior and
Coordinate Bodies at iutcmational law" (1964) 2 Can.Ki.L. at 2 1.

Malintoppi has argued that being the apex body of a universal organization
committed to certain values and aspirations, its resolutions represent the manifestation of

what its members believe to be their general feeling.'"

Given the unrepresentative

character of that body, and glaring inconsistencies in the resolution o f international crises,
one cannot be very enthusiastic about Malintoppi's articulation of the issue. Another

difficulty with his conception of the matter is that in the absence of that quality of
repetition which evidences a nonnative prescription or obligation at international law, it
is difficult to believe that a resolution adopted by the five concurring permanent members

plus five other selected members of the council is a tme reflection of general feeling on
an issue. At best, the resolution may well pre-empt an embryonic n o m

oï actually

be the

product of hard and shrewd behind-the-scene negotiation between the permanent
members of the Council as opposed to a true attestation of consensus on the question.836
If the juridical character of a resolution of the Security Council is to have meaning, it is
argued that such resolutions should substsntially scale the above-mentioned hurdles.

Although ~chwebe1'~'and~ r r a n ~ i o - ~ u i z ~ their
~ ~ hdoubts
a v e about the normative
content and character of resolutions (especially these of the General Assembly), most
scholars are agreed that the Resolutions passed by the Security Council, depending upon
their content and context have a normative e f f e ~ t . *HigginsW0and
~~
the editors of
OppenheirnsJ' (to mention a few) are of the view that the United Nations Security

Council resolutions passed in the discharge of its responsiblities under chapter 7 are
835

J-Castenada, Legal Efleca of United Nations Resolutions (New York: CoIurnbia University Press., 1969)

at 170-1.

Kirgis, supra note 503 at 336.
Before he became a judge at the ùitcmational Court of Justice. Stcphcn Schwebei, "The Efkct of
Resolutions of the U.N. Generai Assembly on Customary ntcmational Law" (1979) Proc. Am. Soc 'y. /nt 'l
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Rosalyn Higgins, "The UN and Law Making" (1970) Proc. Am. Soc y. h t '1 L at 42. Set also supra note
387.
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binding-on al1 states. In addition to an analogy to treaty obligations at international law
which could be made in respect of Charter obligations, the Security Council being the
apex organ of the UN body, is deemed to portray in many instances, the practice of states

as to what they consider to be obligatory. Accordingly, apart fiom its resoiution passed
pursuant to chapter 7 of the Charter, its other resolutions rnay, depending on the
circumstances, generate new n o m s and also serve as a revelation of the subjective
This rnay well be a function of the fact
element of international law i.e opinio juri.~.~~'
that the permanent members of the Security Council largely represent the configuration
of the balance of military and economic might, veritable tools in the enforcernent of
"law".
On the other hand, the United Nations, in a manner of speaking acts as a peculiar
form of legislative body for the globe. This it does by the process of the adoption of
Resolutions. According to Sir Robert Jenning and Arthur Watts, "resolutions adopted
unanimously, being a matter of consensual agreement, are sometimes regarded as
equivalent to treaties concluded in simplified f ~ r r n . " * With
~ ~ specific reference to
Resolutions passed pursuant to Chapters 7and 8 of the Charter which is the raison d 'efre
of the United Nations, there is hardly any doubt that they are more than
recomrnendations. Membership of the UN or any other body imports obligation to
comply with the rules of that organization. Article 25 of the Charter makes clear the
normative nature of decisions on international peace taken by the Security Council as
members are obliged to comply with the measures adopted. Where an obligation created
by treaties of a regional body conflict with the Charter obligations of a member of the

United Nations, there is no doubt that the Charter provisions will preva.l.8" Similarly, it
cannot be questioned that the Security CounciI has the legal authonty to remove threats to

'"But see Anthony D*Amato who dismisses the concept of opinio juris as "otiose.," D 'Amato, "Custorn
and Treaty: a Response to Professor Weisburâ" (1988) 21 Vanderbilr J. of Transn '1 law 459 at 47 1.
'"
Oppenheimrn S fnxernartional law, supra note 478 at 48.
844
Article 103, of the UN Charter, supra note 388.

international peace. If it decides to achieve this by authorizing a state or a regional body
to use force on its behalf, such use of force is for al1 practical purposes, an exercise of the

will of the Security Council on behalf of the United ~ations.'~'

What is required is a clear indication by the Secunty Council of the "extent and
nature"846of the armed force to be used by the agent state or regional organizations. Of
course, any such use of force whether by the Security Council directly or any of its

appointees must be geared towards the validation of the pnnciples and purposes of the
United Nations. Thus, if states exercising this function on behalf of the Security Council
wish to use less o r more force, they must first seek and obtain a mandate or change
thereof fkom the Security ~ouncil."' This is usually done at the Securïty Council by the
adoption of relevant resolutions. Reference may be made to the instances presented by
the cases of Southem ~hodesia,~~'and
Yugoslavia, of which, later. However, there is
hardly any reason at international law why an enforcement action undertaken by a reginal
organization without prior authorization of the Security Council may not be subsequently
ratified by the Security Council if circumstances warrant. In the overall context of the
Liberian tragedy, it stands to reason that the Security Council resolutions on the crisis
have a normative quality. An examination of the ratification process by the Security
Council of the ECOWAS enforcement action is necessary.
The ratification process of the ECOWAS action in Liberia started in 1992. In

effect, while the Liberian civil war had blossomed into a h l 1 humanitarian and regional
cnsis in six months of its explosion, the world feigned ignorance of the unfolding
tragedy. It is equally ironic that it was the other Afiican states of Zaire and Ethiopia who
McCoubrey & White. supra note 445 at 238.
Ibid It should however be noted that authority should not bc delegated without adequate safeguards to
nationai interests fiom outstripping collective security interests.
&,revent
Ibid. Some scholars have rightly argued that even if the actions of the ECOMOG was an enforcernent
process, they were justifieci, regard king had to the fact that it was the rebels who attacked the ECOMOG
troops. Thus, the ECOMOG was entitled to act in self defence even if it may be cousmed as constituting
enforcement actions. See Weller, supra note 5 at 24 1.
8.18
McDougat & Reisman, "Rhodcsia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern"
(1968) 62 A.J.I.L. at 1-19.
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at the material times were non-permanent memben of the Security Council, that blocked
the attempts by the Liberian Permanent Representative at the United Nations to table the
cnsis before that body."9 In addition, France trying to "protect its business interests in
the war tom c o ~ n t r ~ , " ~ ~not
~ wvery
a s enthusiastic about bringing the crisis to the agenda

of the Security Council.

These issues raise doubts about the propnety of having as members of the
Security Council, states which have little semblance of legitimacy and order at home.
How couid Zaire and Ethiopia, war tom and ravaged as a result of decades of intemal
misrule and corruption, sit on the Security Council? 11 is equally significant in this
context to recall that at the start of the Rwandan genocide, Rwanda was presiding at the
Security Council! It will be argued in the last chapter that instead of having only states as
memben of the Security Council, regional organktions should have seats in the Security
Council especially when matters of security involving their regions are under
consideration. If this arrangement was in place, the similar machinations of France (a
permanent member of the Security Council) to &strate UN intervention would have
been nipped in the bud. This arrangement would also ensure that other conflicts totally
ignored by the Security Council, but no less deadly and destructive would at least be
tabled on the Council's agenda.
As an aside, the case of the people of Southern Sudan is directly in point. In the
harrowing words of a church leader in that war-ravaged part of the c o u n q , "1 have told
my people: let us die silently now'. ..the world has forgotten

The "political

the people of Southem
domination and brutal oppression dictated by ~hartou.m'~~~'of
lu9

Raymond Hopkins, " Anornie, System Reform, and Challenges to the UN System" in Miltom Esman
and Shibley Teihami, e h . , International Organizationsand Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Corne11
University Press, 1995) at 95. Both couutries apparcntly did not want to set the prccedcnt whereby their
similarly circumstanced civil w a n would eventually becorne the subject of Sccurity Council intervention.
"O Binaefer Nowrojec. supro note 86 at 142.
"' Julie Flint, "The Unwinnable War" (1993) Nov-Dec. Afii-can Report at 46-49.
Angela Lloyd, "The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession" (1994-5) 32 Columbia J. of
Transn 'I Law 4 19 at 420.

Sudan has largely gone unnoticed notwithstanding its chronic ~ h a r a c t e r . ~ Sudan
'~
epitomizes the inequities and instabilities bom by the imposition of artificial boundaries
drawn in accord with colonial preferences rather than national

inter est^.^'^ Its neglect by

the Security Council, however, is one out of many instances casting serious doubts on the

presumption that members of the Security have a global, rather than a parochial agenda in
maintenance of world peace. The corollary point here is that unless an honest and serious
effort has been made to bring a crisis to the attention of the Security and that body fails
and/ or refuses to act accordingly, it will be difficult to justie any regionai initiative

ostensibly designed to address that situation, even if the Security Council thereafter
purports to raftify such unilateral actions. The Charter process ought to be exhausted
before any such mutti-lateral actions could be taken.
Be that as it may, Resolution 788 of 1992~"is the starting point in the ratification
of the ECOWAS action in Liberia by the Security Council. That resolution:
Determined that the situation in Liberia was a threat to "international
peace, particularly in West Afnca as a whole,
Welcomed and comrnended ECOWAS actions in Liberia,
Condemned al1 attacks on the ECOMOG troops and recognized the

ECOWAS action in Liberia as a peacekeeping exercise,
h p o s e d a complete arms embargo on Liberia except for arrns destined
for the ECOWAS in Liberia,
Requested al1 member states to respect the measures established by

ECOWAS to bnng about a peacefiil solution to the conflict in Liberia,
-
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Supra at 42 1 . See also, Adila Abusharaf, "The Lcgal Rclationship Bttwccn Multinational Oit
Corpoations and the Sudan: Problcm and Prospets" (1991) 43 Journal of Afncan Law 18.
8s5 Supra note 324.

Decided to remain seized of the matter.856
Similarly, Resolution 8 13 of 1993 made on the 26 of March 19938S7reaffirmedthe above
mentioned aspects o f Resolution 788 of 1992. In addition, it demanded that all parties
cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with ECOWAS to ensure
the full and prompt implementation of the Yamoussoukro Accord, and:

Declared its readiness to consider any appropnate measures in support of ECOWAS
if any party is unwilling to cooperate in implementation of the Yamoussoukro
Accords, in particular the encampment and d i s m a m e n t provisions,
Requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with ECOWAS to consider the
possibility of convening a meeting of the President of the Interim Government of
National Unity and the warring factions, aAer thorough and detailed groundwork, to
restate their cornmitment to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Accord within

an agreeable timetable.8s8
This unprecedented and growing cooperation between a regional body and the United
Nations in peace enforcement and peacekeeping was M e r cemented by the provisions
of Resolution 856 o f 1993 passed on the 10lh of August 1993 at its 3263* meeting.859
This resolution, the third in the series, welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to
send a technical tearn to the United Nations to gather and evaluate information relevant to
the proposed establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

(UNOMIL).~*
An advance team o f thirty military observers were despatched to Liberia to monitor,

in~addition,
the Secretary-General of the
investigate and report on cease-fire ~ i o l a t i o n s . ~
'

Ibid, paragraph 14.
Supra note 444.
Ibid.
S/Res/856 ( 1993)
1160
Ibid. The creation o f the UNOMIL was effectcd pursuant to Resolution 866 of the Security Council
adopted on the 22* of Septernber of 1993 (of which, latcr).
86 Ibid.
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"'

United Nations was requested to draw up a h e w o r k which would "ensure coordination
between the UNOMIL and the peacekeeping forces of ECOWAS and their respective
roles and respon~ibilities.~"Resolution 856 of 1993, like the earlier resolutions,
"commends (ed) ECOWAS for its efforts" to restore peace in Liberia. This remarkable
cooperation between the United Nations and the ECOWAS in Liberia did not end with
Resolution 856 of 1993.
Resolution 866863of 1993 passed on the ~2~ of September 1993 went m e r than the
three previous Resolutions and is arguably one of the most radical resolutions
substantiating the notion that the United Nations apparently ''fianchiseci" its primary
responsibility for peace enforcement to the ECOWAS. The preamble to this resolution
"emphasized that the Peace Agreements assigns ECOMOG the primarv resoonsibili~of
supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement and
envisages that the United Nations role shall be to rnonitor and verifv this process."864
The express letters of this aspect of Resolution 866 clearly relegates the United Nations
to the background role of monitoring the more aggressive and dominant ECOWAS in the

Libenan conflict.
In fact, Resolution 866 itself attests "that this would be the first ~eace-keeping
-

mission undertaken with a ~eacekemingmission alreadv set up bv another oraanization,
in this case ECOWAS."'~~
This admission clearly dispels any notion or illusion that the

United Nations was not fùlly aware of the nature and character of the relationship created
by it with the ECOWAS in the Libenan conflict. The Resolution M e r noted that this

unparalleled arrangement "would contribute significantly to the effective implementation
of the Peace ~ g e e r n e n t . " ~ ~ ~

To give teeth to this arrangement, a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Cornmittee (JCMC)

8M

Ibid.
S/Res/866 ( 1993)
Ibid.(Underlining mine)
Ibid. (Underlining mine)
Ibid.

composed of three Liberian waming parties, ECOMOG and the United Nations was
established. In addition, the UNOMIL as contemplated by Resolution 856 was finally
established. The UNOMIL was to be compnsed of military observers as weli as medical,
engineering, communications, transportation and electoral components together with the
minimal staff necessary to support it. A critical review of the mandate o f the UNOMIL
leaves the clear impression that the ECOMOG was the enforcement a m of the United
Nations while the UNOMIL took care of the more specialized aspects of peacekeeping.

This is understandable having regard to the relative inexpenence of the ECOMOG
in the more refined and intricate aspects of conternporary peacekeeping operations. This
"division of labour" and symbiotic cooperation between the two institutions immanent in
the mandate of the UNOMlL as contained in Resolution 866 may be listed as follows:

To receive and investigate al1 alleged incidents of breach of the Cease-fire
Agreement,
To monitor cornpliance with the embargo on arms supply to the rebels, especially at
the Sierra Leonean and other borders,

To observe and veriQ the election process,
To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance,
To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of
combatants,
To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary
General,

To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and in cooperation with ECOMOG,
coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance of mines and
unexploded b0rnbs,8~'
Without participation in enforcement ~ ~ e r a t i o ntos ,coordinate
~~~
with ECOMOG in
868

lbid.
Ibid.Here the United Nations clearly acknowledged that the ECOWAS action in Liberia was indeed a

peace enforcement action.

the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally and infonnally.

It is perhaps pertinent at this stage to comment on the constitution of the UNOMIL.
The UNOMIL consisted of several contributions of personnel and materials by several

member states of the United Nations. At its height, it consisted of at least 400 military
observers drawn fiom such states as Austria, Bangladesh, Belgiurn, Brazil, China, Congo,
Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden and
Its military cornmand was held sequnitially by Maj. General Sihandar Shami
of Pakistan, Col. David Magonone of Kenya, Maj. General Mahmoud Falka of Egypt and

Maj . General Ismael Opande of ~ e n ~ a . ~ "

Voluntary contributions for its budget came fiom many countries especially
Denmark, France, Japan , the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Canada and the
United States of ~menca.*" In addition, the General Assembly adopted a general
Resolution assessing the contributions to be made towards the financing of the
UNOMIL.*'~ It is also pertinent to note that the expenses of the UNOMIL were clearly

declared by the General Assembly to be "expenses of the Organization to be borne by
Member states in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United
~ a t i o n s . " ~in
' ~ effect, that the ECOMOGRMOMIL action in Liberia was technically
speaking, a United Nations operation with al1 its legal implications. In addition to
establishing the UNOMIL, Resolution 866 of 1993 encouraged al1 member states of the
OAU to send additional troops the ECOMOG and also estabiished a Trust Fund to offset

869

UNOMIL Facts and Figures as of 30 June 1997. Online >

h m :i~~\~\u..un.ore.De~ts.IDPKOhi
i s s i o n l u n o -!hm1 accessed on 30' March 1999.
''O

/bid.

'"Ihid.

Financing of the United Obsewer Mission in Liberia, G.A.RES.49/232,49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49)
28 1 , U.N.Doc. A/49/49/ (1994)
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/&id. Paragraph 4. On the implication o f this, sce The Cemin fipenses Case, supra note 6 17.
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some of the costs of the ECOWAS action of ~iberia."~The assessed contributions were
augmented by voluntari 1y contributions fiom several States.
The aflied and combined activities of the UNOMILiECOMOG formed an aspect of
the subsequent Resolution of the Security Council in 1994. Thus in ~ e s o l u t i o n ~
9 1~1*of

1994 adopted at the 3366" of the Security Council, the Council "welcomed the close

cooperation between UNOMIL and ECOMOG and stressed "the importance of
continued full cooperation and coordination between them in the implementation of their

respective t a ~ k s . * *Further,
'~~
it imploreci al1 parties to the confiict to cooperate with the
ECOMOG in its efforts to resolve the

ri sis.^^^ It should be remembered that the

Resolution once again affinns the detennination of the Security Council to remain
actively seized of the

natter.^''

The Security Council at its 3442ndmeeting held on the 2 1 of October 1994, reviewed
the events in Liberia and for the h t time acknowledged as per Resolution 950 of 2994

that the Liberian crisis in addition to being a "threat to international peace" had
degenerated into "ethnic warfare.,9879 As already noted, this exarcerbated "the widespread
killings of civilians and other violations of international humanitarian law by the factions

in Liberia, and the detention and the maltreatment of UNOMIL observers, ECOMOG

soldiers and other international personnel. 9,880
Hence, the Security Council condemned those atrocities and as per paragrapgh 8 of
Resolution 91 1 of 1994 demanded al1 factions in the dispute to respect the "status of
ECOMOG and WNOMIL personnel.'"81 Resolution 950 of 1994 reminded al1 pesons of
the Security Council's decision to remain actively seized of the matter.882 With the
Ibid.

"' S/Res/91 1( 1994)
Ibid.

'"Ibid.
878

Ibid.

879

S/Res/950 (1994)

880

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

"'

situation in Liberia M e r deteriorating and sorne of the neighbounng states pouring
arms into Liberia, the Security Council at its 3489h meeting convened on the 1 3 ' ~of

January 1995. In the Resolution adopted at the end of that meeting, the Council noting
"with concem that there has been a continuing inflow of arms into Liberia in violation of
the existing amis embargo'*883urgedthe ECOWAS to convene a meeting for the purposes
of "tightening the application of the anns embargo.99884

To m e r attest to the desire of the Security Council to have ECOMOG directly
resolve the crisis in Liberia, it is perhaps pertinent to note when the patience of Nigeria
and Ghana (the two leading contributors to the ECOMOG) wore thin and a pull-out of the

ECOMOG fkom Liberia was seriously contemplated, the Securïty Council became
aiarmed and reiterated "the need for the ECOWAS States to maintain their troops in

ECOMOG.vr885 These concems were reflected and reiterated in the subsequent Resolution
985 of 1995886which was passed at the 3517' meeting of the Security Council.

In fact, Resolution 985 of 1995 was one of the most far reaching effoxts by the
Security Council to curtail the infiow of arms into Liberia as it constituted the full
Security Council into a Cornmittee to monitor the flow of arms into ~ i b e n a . ~
'
Be~ that
as
it may, the fkactious nature of the Liberian crisis and the impact of external parties on the

crisis extended the agony of Liberians in the conflict.
Further, the proceeds fkom the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia could hardly be
utilized effectively to relieve the hardship imposed on Liberians caught up in the conflict.

In this season of despair, the Security Council vide Resolution 1001 of 1 9 9 5 , ~ ~ ~
"reaffirmed the continued necessity for ECOMOG and UNOMIL to cooperate in
fulfilling their respective mandates and to this end urge [ed] the ECOMOG to enhance its

-

-

Ibid.
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Supra note 309.
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cooperation with U N O M n at al1 levels to enable the mission to discharge its mandate."
889

In addition, it urged the ECOMOG to take "necessary action to provide security for

UNOMIL observers and civilian staff.>,wo
The Abuja ~ ~ r e e m e n t ~ ~ ' s on
i ~ n19e dAugust 1995 is probably the most significant
step towards the resolution of the Liberian cnsis as the subsequent disarming of the rebels
and the return to democratic governance in Liberia are based on it. It supplemented the

Cotonou ~ ~ r e e r n e n t , ~ Akosombo
~~the
~ g r e e r n e d ~ ~ athe
n d Accra

Its

importance is equally reflected in the decisions of the Sccurity Council at its 3577'h
meeting and embodied in Resolution 1014 of 1995."'
This ResoIution does not only continue with the numerous statements of support by
the Security Council for the ECOWAS initiative but made a case for "additional
resources in ternis of troops, equipment and logistics for ECOMOG in ~ i b e n a "to~ ~ ~
oversee the implementation of the various aspects of the agreement, in particular "the
disarmament and demobilization process.'T897Owing to the importance of some of its
features, to bener appreciate the subsequent discussion on this aspect of the Liberian
crisis, some of its very pertinent aspects are summarized below. They include the :
Adoption of measures to enhance the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOWAS;
Provision of financial, logistical, and other assistance in support of the ECOMOG to
enable it to carry out its mandate,898
Encouragement of Member States, in particular Afncan counhies to consider
providing troops to the expanded ECOMOG,
Ibid.
Ibid.
89' U.N.Doc/S. l995/742
R9' U.N.Doc/S.26272/
U.N.Doc.11994/1174
894 U.N.Doc./1995/7
895
U.N. Doc. SiRedl0 l 4 (1995) [Hereinafter, Resolution S 014 of 19951
896 Ibid.
897 Ibid.
Ibid.

"'

Demand that al1 factions in the conflict respect the status of the ECOMOG and the

UNOMIL,
Encouragement of the OAU to continue its pst-conflict peace-building collaboration
with ECOWAS in promoting the cause of peace in ~iberia.''~
After the adoption of Resolution 1014, the ECOMOG proceeded on a programme of
deployrnent of its troops throughout the areas hitherto occupied by the rebels. However,
this process suffered another setback as one of the rebels led by Generai Roosevelt
Johnson attacked ECOMOG in Tubmanburg on 28 December t 995 and H l e d several of
thernem
Following the Tubmanburg incident, the United Nations, acting in concert with the

OAU despatched mediators to the affécted areas to negotiate a return to relative
normalcy. This event and similar incidents of violations of the cease-fire agreements and
breach of fundamental noms of war necessitateci the strengthening of the ECOMOG.
Consequent on these factors some Afiican States such as Tanzania sent troops to the

ECOMOG, which was duly "appreciated"pO by the Security Comcil in Resolution 1020
of 1995 adopted at its 3 ~ 9 2 meeting
"~
held on 10 November 1995.
Resolution 1020 of 1995 "adjusted the mandate of the U N O M I L " ~ 'the
~ ~ following
manner;
To exercise its good offices to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the Liberian
National Transitional Govement (LNTG) to implement the peace agreements and to
cooperate with them for this purpose,

To investigate allegations of cease-fire violations,
To monitor cornpliance with the other military provisions of the peace agreements
including disengagement of forces, disarmament and observance of the arms embargo
/bid.
Liberia: UN Report, 01/29/96. OnIine ~http:www.gopher.undp.org/ll/uncun/sgreg/. Accesscd on the
3 0 March
~
1999.
90' U.N.Doc/S/Res/10201 (1995) [Hereinafter, Rcsolurion 1020 of 19951
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Ibid.

and to verify their impartial application,

To assist in the maintenance of assembly sites agreed upon by ECOMOG, the LNTG
and the factions in the implementation of a programme for demobilization of
combatants,
To observe and veriQ the election in consultation with the OAU and the
ECOWAS .'O3

In addition, Resolution 1020 of 1996 urged al1 member States to continue their
matenal and logistic support for ECOMOG and reiterated that the presence of the
UNOMIL was wholly predicated upon the security provided by the ECOMOG.~'~In

other words, the UNOMIL would not be in Liberia but for the ECOMOG which had
substantially created the conducive environment for the complimentary role played by it.
In this context, Resolution 1020 of 1996, like previous Resolutions stressed the need "for

close contacts and enhanced coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG in their
operational activities at al1 levels. 9905
To further reinforce that the UNOMIUECOMOG activities in Liberia were directly
under the control and guiding auspices of the United Nations Security Council,
Resolution 1020 of 1996 affirmed the decision of the Council to remain 'directly seized
of the rnat~er."~'~
These activities by the Unitcd Nations Security Council did not
necessarily bring about an irnmediate end to the cnsis. There were repeated attacks on the
ECOMOG and unanned civilians by the rebels and thus the Security Council at its 3624'h

meeting held on the 2gh of January 1996 considered and adopted Resolution 1041 of
1996.907Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Resolution did not only condemn the attacks but also
comrniserated with the victims of the unlawfûl attacks?'

"' Ibid.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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It addition, it reiterated the

status of the ECOMOG and UNOMIL as peacekeepen and demanded that that status be
accorded its traditional respect.909
The peace process in Liberia suffered serious setbacks again as the w h n g factions
escalated the regime of violence in Libena. The escalating violence warranted the
ECOWAS to resoIve not to recognize any governrnent in Libena that emerged by sheer
force of a r ~ n s .On
~ ' ~the other hand, the West Afiican states of Nigeria and Ghana, who

were the backbone of the ECOMOG, were compelled to threaten their immediate

withdrawal fiom the peacekeepng exer~ise.~"
At the debates of the Security Council in
May 1996, these developmmt necessitated the Council to adopt Resolution 1059 of 1996

condemning the ceasefire violations and "encouraging the ECOWAS to consider ways
and means to strengthen ECOMOG and persuade the faction leaders to resume the peace
process."912The Secunty Council also expressed its support for the ECOWAS stance not

to recognize any illegitimate but forcefully effective govenunent in ~ i b e r i a . ~ ' ~ ~ n o t h e r

significant aspect of Resolution 1059 of 1996 is that it reiterates the ultimate dependence
of the UNOMIL on ECOMOG. Thus, according to paragraph 8 of its preamble, the
Secuity Council stressed that "the presence of WNOMIL in Liberia is predicated on the

presence of ECOMOG and its cornmitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL military

observer^."^'^ This m e r evidences the symbiotic relationship between the ECOMOG
and the UNOMIL.

As the peace process now gained greater momentun, the Security Council at its
366gthmeeting held on the 30* August 1996 adopted another Resolution affinning once
again, the need for closer cooperation and coordination between the UNOMIL and
/bid.
This belated assurnption of a higher ground of legitimacy and it's probable role as a tool for the
reduction or elimînation of tyrannical regimes around the world will be explored in the next chapter as one
of the recornrnendations for the avoidance of civil wars.
9 i lbid.
9" LJ.N.Doc/S/Res/IO59 (1996)
9'3 /bid.
"* fbid.
909
910

ECOMOG.~'~
in addition, this resolution acknowledges another ugly aspect of the
Liberian crisis-the use of children by the rebels as combatants. Paragraph 9 of the
Resolution thus unequivocally condemned "the practice of some factions recruiting,
training and deploying children for combat.9,916 As this aspect has already been
addressed, fiuther ink will not be spent on it here. Moreover, Resolution 1083 of 1996
adopted at the 3717h meeting of the Security Council on November 27& 1996 reiterated
the Council's continued condernnation of that international d e l i ~ t ? ~

However, the disamament process of the warring factions had started in
e a r n e ~ t .This
~ ' ~ development is M e r evidenced by Security Council Resolution 1100 of
1 9 9 7 . ~The
' ~ last of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Liberian
crisis is Resolution 1116 of 1997 which was adopted at the 3793d meeting of the Security
Council. This Resolution not only extended the mandate of the UNOMIL to its terminal
date of 27" July 1997 but also expressed the gratitude of the Security Council to al1 the
members of the international community which had supported the ECOMOG in its action
in ~ i b e r i a . ~It~ 'is abundantly evident that the effect of the resolutions of the Security
Council on the Liberian cnsis has the clear legal effect of ratifymg the ECOMOG
initiative as lawful and legitimate.921~heWest Afncan action in Liberia was
consummated with the installation of a democratically eiected governent for Liberia
and the restructuring of the Liberian Axmy by the ECOMOG.'~~

It was not only the Security Council that took an active part in approving the
ECOWAS action in Liberia. At the 85th Plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that

" U.N.

Doc/S/Res/lO7 1 ( 1 996) Wereinafter, Resolution 1 O7 1 of lW6]
Ibid.
9 ' Ï U.N.Doc/S/ResllO83 ( 1996)
ibici.
91' U.N.Doc. SiRedl 100 (1997)
9'0 U.N Doc.S/Res/f 116 (1997).
91 B hupinder Singh Chimni "Towards A thirld World Approach to non-intervention: Through the
Labyrinth of Western Doctrine" in Snyder and Sathirathai, eds., supra note 600 at 73.
"Liberia, ECOMOG Tussk Over Restructuring of the Arrny" Panafrican News AgenCy, November 1 1 .
1997. Online~http:/lwww.afri~anews.org/PANNn~~s/l997111
l/featS.html accesscd on 0811 1/98
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body by an unanimous Resolution affirmed its "appreciation to the international
community for its support of the peace plan for Liberia of the ECOWAS, ...and hopes(d)
that the continuing efforts made at the sub-regional and international levels aimed at a
peaceful resolution of the Liberian will, within the shortest possible time, lead to national
reconciliation, reconstruction and d e ~ e l o ~ r n e n tThis
~ ~ ' universal validation of the
ECOWAS action in Liberia was not a mere solitary approval.
At the 8gh Plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on the 16Ih of
December 1992 another unanimous Resolution was adopted expressing universal
"appreciation for the continuing mediatory efforts of the ECOWAS to find a peaceful
solution to the Liberian crisis.,1924 This second global acclamation was immediately
followed by another ananimous Resolution adopted at the 92"dPlenary meeting of the
This Resolution equally restates
General Assembly held on the 18<"of December 1992.~~'
global vaIidation of the ECOWAS action in Liberia and calleci upon the international
community to quickly contribute humanitanan relief materials

to

embattled

~ i b e r i a . ~ ~ ~spate
T h eof universal approval and cornmendation of the ECOWAS action in
Liberia is also apparent in another unanimous Resolution adopted by the Generai
~
meeting held on the 2 0 of
~ Decernber 1 9 9 3 . ~ ~Here
'
the
Assernbly at its 8 5 Plenary

General Assembly for the fifth time in a row expressed its "appreciation" the efforts of
Liberia in the c r i s i ~ . ~ approbation
~ ~ ~ h e of this "regional effort,1929 in conflict management
and resolution was completed by another General Assembly Resolution adopted at the
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on 05/01/99,
Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Liberia, G.A. RES. 471154.47 U.N GAOR Supp. (No. 49) al 114,
U.N. Doc. A/47/49 ( f 992)
926 Ibid.
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94" Plenary meeting held on the 23d December 1994.~~'

Despite the near-universal acclamation of the ECOWAS action in Liberia, some
disturbing issues are raised by it. The first is an examination of why it was so popularly
received within the United Nations. The second is the impact of the precedent on the
Charter regime regarding the use of force by regional bodies. This will be valuated in the
context of the recent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Thirdly, how can the lapses in the

ECOWAS action in Liberia be usefully evaluated so as to enhance a cordinated
frarnework for regionaVuniversa1 cooperation for the maintenance of international
security under the United Nations fiarnework? The third question will be addressed in

chapter six.
With respect to the first question, the ECOWAS action in Liberia was not the first
regional initiative ostensibly advertised as an attempt to secure regional security and
peace. Previous cases exist at international law where multilateral actions supposedly
premised on concerns for regional security have been undertaken but condernned by the
international community. In some of those cases, the fear of hegemonism masking as
regional concem for peace was quite real.93'~thoughunilateral actions are forbidden by
the

regional organizations have under certain circumstances employed

themselves in the maintenance of peace. The cases of the OAU in Chad and the OAS in
Haiti readily come to mind. A short comparison may be usefûl here.

In 1981, members of the OAU sent a peacekeeping force to separate the waning
) measure was greeted
factions in Goukhoni Weddeye and Hissene Habre in ~ h a d . ~ 'This
ibid.
Ibid. Wimess the case of Czechoslovakia. Seventeen days after the Warsaw Pact which bound the
members to cooperate on the basis of "the pnnciples o f equality, respect for sovereignty and national
independence, those sarne members invaded the country on the pretext that there was an interna1 problem in
Czechoslovakia which threatened the sub-region. Similar abuses occwrcd in Hungary. See Richard Falk,
ed., The Internarional Law of Civil War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 197 1 ) at 419.
Hugh Kindred, et al e h . , International Law-Chie& as lnterpreted and Applied in Caneda 5' cd.
(Canada: Emond Publications, 1993) at 850-85 1. [Hereinafter, Kindred]
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Amadu Sesay, "The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU in Chad" (199 1)
vol. X 1 Conflicr Quanerly (Winter) at 7 .
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with acclaim across Afnca and touted as the beginning of Afncan solutions to Afncan
problems. Chad is the fi& largest country in Africa and one of the poorest with ninety
per cent of its temtory generally referred to as b6useless."934
From its independence from
France in 1960, its govemance has been marked with incornpetence, ethnic nvairy and
corruption. 935Thesefaction gave rise to intemal rebellions which like the Liberian case,
found its bloom with the end of the Cold War. These rebellions have been generally
acknowledged as largely sponsored by Ghadafi of Libya with the ostensible a h of
having the upper-hand in Chad/Libya7sperennial dispute over the Uranium rich Aouzou

stnp bordering both c o ~ n t r i e s . ~ ~ ~
The OAU decision to intervene has been rationalized on the grounds of Atncan
States7suspicion of foreign intervention in m c a n cnsis, especially, since the Congolese
crisis of the sixties which is generally perceived to have sabotaged the c'progressive"
govemment of Patrice ~umumba."' Similady, the orchestrated plan by the embattled

President Weddeye of Chad to enter Chad into a political union with Libya had distwbed
security concems in that region warranting the quickness with which the decision to

intervene was made.938With the promise of logistic support from France and the United
States, the OAU intervened to stop the conflict and pre-empt Ghadafi's plan of a "greater
Islamic State.,9939 Accordingly, troops from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire were despatched
under the auspices of the OAU to Chad. The agreement between the OAU and Weddeye
for the despatch of the peacekeeping troops to Chad was signed in Nairobi, Kenya on the
28 Noveber 1981.940 Soon after the arriva1 of the OAU peacekeepers, the beleaguered
934

935
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Orobola Fasehun & Amadu Sesay, "The OAU and Conflict Control" Mimeogragh. Deparment of
International Relations, University of Ife, 1980, at 12.
93b Supra note 933 a; 8.
937 Supra note 933.
938 fbid.
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Olusola Ojo & Amadu Saay. '* The OAU Peacekecping Force in Chad: Policy Implemcntation and
Failure" in C.A.B.Olowu & Victor Ayeni, A Nigenan Reader in the Policy Process (Ife:-University of Ife
Press, 1991) at 1-1 8.

government of Weddeye which had invited OAU's intervention was upstaged by forces
loyal to Hissene ~abre."' The intervention by OAU faltered and collapsed.
Although the OAU intervention in Chad, hampered by lack of resources and
absence of sincerity on the part of President Weddeye and the opposing political force of
Hissene Habre was a complete failure, its legality has not been questioned. However, like
the Liberian case, its domination by ~ i ~ e r i a ~ ~lack
a n of
d ~ r e d i b i l i t ~ ~ ~ ~ rsimilar
aises
questions regarding the limitations of peacekeeping operations by regional bodies. Be
that as it may, it is arguable that if Nigeria,as in the Liberian case, had been ready and
willing to spend as much as it did in Liberia and succeeded in its overall objective, the
OAU peacekeeping in Chad would have succeeded and would have been favourably

perceived. In addition to Weddeye's undoudted nght to invite OAU, which he did
(although, like Doe he was beleaguered and was finally ousted after four months of
inviting the OAU), the extant issue is whether the test of legality in the circumstances
depends on the "success" of the enforcement action by a regional organization? Does the
end justiw the means of intervention? This question dovetails into the second issue of the
precedential impact of the Security Council ratification of the ECOWAS action on the
Charter regime. Before examining this issue, a quick reference to the Haiti case may be

In the Haiti case,914 President JeamBertrand Aristide who won an intemationally
supervised election as the president of Haiti was overthrown in a miliatry coup on
September 30, 1991. The Organization of Arnencan States quickly reacted with a
package of diplornatic and economic sanctions against the Raul Cedras led jur~ta.~~'
In
addition, the OAS resolved not to recognize the illegitimate junta. Upon the invitation of
94 1

Arnate, supra note 30 at 187.
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Acevedo, supm note 400.
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the deposed President &istideW6that the OAS establish a civilian mission to pave way for
his return to power, the necessary mechanism was put in place. On May 17, 1992 the
OAS ad hoc Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers passed a resolution urging
member states to adopt whatever measures were necessary to restore democracy in

~aiti.~~'
Thereafter, the UN Secretary-General started working in consultation with the
OAS on the restoration of democracy in Haiti. The argument by the Security Council that

the Haitian crisis was an intemal problem of ~aiti"'in

which it could not lawfully

intervene soon yielded to a detemination by the Council under chapter 7 of the Charter
that the crisis was a threat to international peace.949Accordingly, it authorized members
of the OAS "to use al1 necessary means to facilitate the d e p m e from Haiti of the

military leadership and the restoration of the legitimate authonties of the government of
~ a i t i . " ~ ~ ~ ~ o n s e ~the
u eOAS
n t l ~Multinationai
,
Force entered Haiti to pave way for the
United Nations Mission in ~aiti~''which
organized the r e m of Aristide and maintained
peace in the interim.
Unlike the OAU in Chad where there was no UN collaboration with a regional
organization in the enforcement of peace, the ECOWAS/UNOMIL cooperation and the
OASAjNMH collaboration in Haiti raise certain issues and lessons. The first point is that

the legitimacy of both cases is largely dependent upon the recognition of the requirement
that the Security Council must assume some measure of control, directly or indirectly, in
the enforcement a ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~ ~ e c o n d ?such
~ ' f o regional
r
enforcement actions to be
916
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legitimate, they rnust be premised on a recognized institutional, procedural and
substantive fiamework. Although this condition is ostensibly designed to screen out
hegemonial tendencies fiorn the considmtion of a regional or multi-lateral decision to
intervene in a crisi~,~'~evidence
indicates otherwise. The ECOMOG was literally an
extension of the Nigerian amy, ditto for the OAU intervention in Chad. Third, the crisis
forming the subject for the intervention must be such, which clearly rises to the level of a
threat to international peace. The determination of this circumstance is a prerogative of
the Security Council and cannot be delegated. However, regional organizations, by their
proximity to the crisis may have a margin of appreciation of the danger, which they
should bring to the attention of the Council. This is not the same as their making the
determination by themselves that a particular state of affairs constitutes a threat to
international peace. It is not every crisis in a state, real or imaginary which affords a
gateway to Article 53 or which ipso facto constitutes an exception to Article 2 (7) of the

On the second issue of the precedential impact of the Security Council ratifiaction
of the ECOWAS action in Liberia on the Charter regime of chapter 8, an eloquent
expression of the fears of abuse is in the controversy over the NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia in April-May 1999. The human casuaities in that unilateral action have been
estimated at 2,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refbgees have been decried by
most cornrnentator~.~~~but
its legal implications deserve some attention here.957inasmuch
as editorial opinions and news reports seem to support the right of forceful humanitarian
intervention, the existence of that right in the post-Charter era has been very difficult to

"'/bid.
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estabiish and indeed, is very c o n t r o ~ e r s i a lWhile
. ~ ~ ~ this issue is outside the scope of this
thesis, it will suffice to note that the prevalent view is that the nght of humanitarian

intervention, if it existed, did not survive the
Be that as it may, the pertinent question here is whether the ratification of the

ECOWAS action in Liberia by the Security Council did not set a dangerous precedent
whereby powerfûl States would be engaging in illicit enforcement actions on the real or
even vague hope that the Security Council would ratiQ such acts. A related issue,
especially in respect of the bombing of Kosovo, is the validity of the peace agreements
between Yugoslavia and NATO in respect of cessation of the bombing and the resolution
of the Kosovo crisis. For the avoidance of doubt, Article 52 of the 1969 Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties voids any treaty concluded upon the use or threat of
use of force contrary to principles of international law as embodied in the

The

question then is, if the use of force by NATO in Yugoslavia is contrary to principles of
international law as embodied in the Charter, of what Iegal validity is the peace
agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia purportedly endorsed and ratified by the
Security Council? Can we place something on nothing? This is not the central issue in
this thesis, but only shows the quagmire into which the rash of "ratifications' by the

Security Council of unathourized regional enforcement actions has thrown international
law.
Although an appreciation of Article 53 of the Charter in good faith "leaves room
for the possibility of ex post facto a u t h o n z a t i ~ n " ~ ~
the
'b~
Security Council of regional

enforcement actions, the probability of abuse as already indicated is high. In further
reference to the Kosovo crisis it is remarkable that "When France called for a UN
958
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Security Council resolution to authorize the deployment of NATO peacekeepers, the US
State Department flatly refbsed, insisting that "NATO should be able to act
independently of the United ~ a t i o n s . "Appamtly,
~~
the US knew that its unilateral
actions in Yugoslavia would in the fuiness of time be "ratified" by the Security Council.
It is possible that it had not forgotten the lessons fiom Liberia. This instance is not

In the Iraq
isolated as the continous bombing of Iraq by US and its allies e~idence.%~
case, the US and its allies, by a torturd redehition of the content and meaning of
resolution 678 of 1 9 9 0 which
~ ~ ~ authowized the initial allied repulsion of Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait, have bypassed the Security Council and continously engaged in
unilateral enforcement actions.
Returning to the Kosovo crisis, it is instructive to note that President Clinton of
the United States had once noted that "unless human tragedy is caused by natural

disaster, there is no such thing as a purely significant humanitarian enterprise."965 The
siginificance of this is explored below. Thus, although the determination by the Security
Council that the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace was
made by resolution 1199 of 1998, Yugoslavia was requested to take urgent steps to arrest
the detenorating humanitarian ~ondition.'~For the avoidance of doubts, the Security

Council expressly reserved for itself the prerogative of deciding whether Yugoslavia had
remedied the situation and if not, to "consider hrther action and additional mesures to
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."967
Despite this and President Clinton's earlier disavowal of altniism in interventions
ostensibly geared to avert humanitarian tragedies, NATO subsequently proceeded to
Chomsky, supra note 965 at 16. vnderlining supplied]
Jules Lobel & Michael Ramer, "Bypassing the Sccurity Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use
Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime" (1999)AJ.2.L. at 1.
Reprinted in 29 I.L.M.1565 (1990)
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A TV remark, June 1994. Cited in Elwood Dunn, supra note 741 at 1 15. See also, Rakiya Omaar &
AIex de Waal, "The Lessons of Humanitarian Irnpenalism in Somali" (1993) War Report (Feb-March) at
12.
966 U.N.Doc. SC/Res/l199/1998.
967 Ibid.
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engage in enforcement actions on ~ u ~ o s l a v i a ~ ~ w i t hreference
out
to the Secunty
Council. This hi&-handed defiance and isolation of the Security Councii by NATO may
mark the beginning of a cornpetitive relationship between both bodies, which can hardIy
be masked by the subsequent "ratification" of the NATO conduct by the Security
Council. The impact of this is a gradual, if not rapid destruction of the framework of the
Charter on the regime on the use of force?'

As Cassese nghtly warns, ". ..one cannot

confine oneself to hoping that this ciramatic departure from the UN standards will rernain

an exception. Once a p u p of powerfiil states has realized that it can fieely escape the
stnctures of the UN Charter and resort to force without any censure, except for that of
public opinion, a Pandora's box may be opened.'9970 Sadly enough, the Security Council
as in the Liberian case, was made to bbbaptise"the NATO actions in Yugoslavia when it
purported to adopt a resolution in terms of NATO objectives.
Having examined these issues, the next chapter, concludes this discourse in three
parts. The first part posits preventative and curative measures the causative agents of

instability and violence in juridical states. The second part examines the adequacy or
otherwise of regional collective security machineries. The third and final part evaluates

deferred question of the impact of the growing cases of regional enforcement actions on
the Charter regime and how best regional organizations may be hamessed for coliective
security purposes. The cornmon theme is that individual liberty, state stability, regional
security and systemic coherence are inter-linked. These are some of the lessons immanent
in the Liberian crisis.
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CHAPTER SIX
LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNANCE, STATE STABILITY AM) GLOBAL
SYSTEMIC COHERENCE: THE TRINITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
It is the absence of legitimacy, of an established political order
comrnanding general consent, which is ofleu the uhimate cause of civil
wars.971
6.1 :INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapters have examined the origins of the rebellion in Liberia and
its impact on neighbouring States and international law. It is desirable to draw some

lessons fiom that tragic experïence. The first lesson is that fiom the three different levels

of analysis fiarne-work already adopted; the national, regional and global, events at the
first level enabled the regional and global factors to impact heavily on Liberia. At the
national level, the obvious issue is the question of bad govemance and abuse of human
rights in Liberia which pushed the people to despair. With the interna1 decay and

auspicious regional and global circumstances, recourse waç had by them to violence.
A considerable welter of opinion agrees that the intensification of contempt for

bad governments and rejection of the constitutionality of the state cause most civil
~ a r s . ~ 'In
' Greece, Lebanon, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, the issue was about

elections alleged to have been rigged.973In the CongoKatangese war, one of the main
issues was the power of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister. The NigeridBiafia
war was substantially about the type of federal structure in that country which would give

~
the war was about power and revenge for Doe's
vent to its d i v e r ~ i t ~ .In~ ' Liberia,
tyanny. In Somalia, the corrupt and debauched regime of Siad Barre exploded, pitting
the Hom of AMca in a bizzare conflict. In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko's e ~ ~ i r a t i o n ~ ' ~ h a s

left in its wake a civil war, which is eliciting an uncertain response fiom the Southem
-
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975 Schism in SA DC Over Congo Wa.r Ordine> hnr>:ll~w.6&v.co.za198/08/08ZO/newsl.htm visited on
25/ 1 1/W.

Afiican Development ~ o r n r n u n i t ~ . ~ ' ~
This chapter attempts to suggest solutions to the spate of civil wars with

international dimensions now raging across several Afncan states. It argues that regional
agencies have a role to play within the framework of the UN Charter towards managing
and resolving conflict but must do so within the confines of international law. It further
suggests ways which such regional organizations may best be employed in achieving
international peace and security. In expounding these arguments, this chapter is divided
into four sections of which section one is introductory. Section 6.2 bnefly examines the
concept and practice of legitimacy of govemance and how it could be applied, especially
in the juridical states with notorious inclinations for political violence which threatens the
stability of other states. It argues that the quest for legitirnacy of govemance is both a
municipal and international concem and suggests a role for states and multi-lateral
organizations. Section 6.3 suggests ways in which the relationship between regional
bodies and the Security Council may be enhanced, coordinated and strenghtened for
fniitfbl collaboration for the maintenance of global peace. Section 6.4 is a sumrnary of
the entire discussion in the thesis.
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The rebellion led by Laurent Kabila portended to be an end to the intemecine conflicts in that
country. Events have proved the expectations wrong. Shortly afier the emergence of the Kabila
regime in Zaire (Iater renarned Congo), the Foreign Minister of the rcgime Bizima Kazare and a
coalition of Banyamulenge (ethnic Tutsis of East Congo) rcbelled against the rule of Kabila alleging
that he was no better than the latc Mobutu. Accusing bun of comption, txîbalism, and dishonesty of
intention in claiming to return the country to democratic rule. 'lhe leading figures in the armed
rebellion against Kabila include Mr.Jean Piemc Ondekame a former commander of Kabila's a m y
which overthrew the regime of Mobum; Zahiti Ngorna, an international lawyer fomerly with the
UNESCO. It has becn alleged that the rebels who now occupy a significant portion of Congo are
backed by the governments of neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda and on this notion, the Congolese
g o v e r n e n t has refiised to negotiate with the rebels describcd as the "pawns of Rwanda and uganda."
Consequent upon this state of affairs, the Southcm African Developmcnt Cornmunity (SADC)
reviewed the situation an3 noting "the escalating conflict's potential for upsetting the region's
precarious balance," decided to intcrvcne. The fmt meanire taken was to impose an economic
blockade a g a k t the rebels. At the present moment, the SADC has intervencd militanly. See
Http://www. souùimovement.alphalink.comau./southne~~d-pana-mini~htm.
Visited on
08/08/99. In July 1999, the government of Zaire instituted an action at the International Court of
Justice against the governments of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda for their allegcd suppon of the
rebels and aggression against Zaire.

6.2: RECONCEIVING THE PARAMETERS OF GOVEWANCE

The doctrine of legitimism, which originally meant dynastic or
monarchical legitimism, has now divorced itself of its rather unfortunate
ancestry and has corne to be centred on the concept of popular
iegitimism.977

With the recent spate of interna1 confiicts, the concept of legitimacy of
governance978assumed greater significance. Illegitimacy of govemance may be
manifested in injustice in the distribution of state resources, denial of effective
participation in govemance and absence of transparency and accountability in the
political process.979~hesefactors disable the pemetration of popular desires into the
instruments and character of governance. From the discussion in previous chapters, it
seems that the prevalence of bad govemrnents in Africa peaked during the Cold War.
The preoccupation with the intrigues of the Cold War enabled such governrnents
to keep the lid shut on the irrepressible human quest for fieedom and justice. However,

with the relative and contemporary redefinition of global security, the hitherto empty
shell of govemance is ostensibly and gradually being filled up with other criteria of
legitimacy. Values such as democratic representation and liberal economics are assuming
international ascendancy and currency. Hence, those govemments unwilling to face up to
the challenges of the emerging order have been threatened. Unfominately, it is not only
some of those governrnents that are becoming history. More often than not, they pull the
state and its people with them to the bottomless pit. In most cases, especially in Afiica
with its heavy reliance on extemal trade and aid, this wind of change has blown from
across the Atlantic.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights posits certain normative
values as essential constitutive elements of a legitimate governrnent. While its preamble
977
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recognizes the inherent dignity of the human person and the foundation of global peace

on human fieedom and justice, Article 2 thereof enjoins al1 State parties to the
Convention to respect divenity of political opinions.980 ïndeed, Article 2 further enjoins
the parties to the Convention to fashion out constitutional and legislative processes for
the effective enjoyment of political and civil rights in the domestic polity. Save for public

emergencies wherein certain civi1 and political rights may be temporarily abndged under
the nmow conditions stipulated in its Artcle 4, Article 5 of the Convention forbids any

limitations on the enjoyment of civil and political rights by individuals and groups of
individuals in state parties to the ~ o n v m t i o n . ~ ~ '

The n o m s of the Convention expressly and implicitly recognize that civil and
political rights can best be enjoyed in representative govemments which are transparent
and accountable to-members of the state in an orderly and peacefûl manner. The General

Assembly of the United Nations has equally underscored the elements of good
govemance including the holding of £kee and fair elections at penodic intervals,gs' respect
movement towards strong anti-corruption
for human rights in al1 its ramifi~ations,~'~
measures and the pursuit of sound social poiicies by the governrnent. In effect, the
concept of legitimacy of govemance is "philosophical, legal and political,9,984 and its
central position within the international normative regime is well established.
It would be simplistic to assert that the conflicts in Afiica and other trouble spots

around the world, which threaten international peace, is necessarily a function of their
h e t e r ~ ~ e n e i t Rather,
~ . ~ ~ ' the tinderbox is ignited by the punuit of policies, which run
980
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against the grain of the Convention on Civil, and Political Rights and similar noms of
international law designed to enhance a full and unfettered enjoyrnent of human r i g h t ~ ? ~ ~
In Africa with a panoply of ethnic groups split across several states?*'the need for a
scnipulous respect for these n o m s of international law c m hardly be overstated.
Similarly, "fiscal federalism,9988or "economic self determination ,989 which are irnplicit
noms in the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and in the International Covenant

on Economic, Social and Cultural RighdgOmust be scrupulously respected and enforced.
A situation where people of a particular ethnic group are made to believe with reason that

resources fiom "their" part of the country are unfairly used to develop other parts of the
country at their expense does not bode well for civil stability. In the contemporary

Nigeria, this is one area of concern which perceptive scholars fear to be a cause for
concern capable of violently destabilizing that country. It is equally remarkable that the
economic exploitation of crude oil in Southem Sudan by the Khartoum regime at the
expense of the Southern Sudanese peoples fûels the civil war in that country.
As the Liberian case has shown, a situation in which a certain group of people
bonded by a cornmon hentage or ethnicity corners the wealth of the state for themselves
cannot endure too long nor create a sense of belonging among those on the receiving end.
According to Gambari, "one of the swiftest ways to the destruction of a state is to give

preference to one particular tribe over another, or to show favow to one group of people
rather than a n ~ t h e r Similarly,
.~~
the empowerment of the people by mass education
needs to be encouraged to enhance transparency and faith in govemance.99' Democracy
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and its virtues can hardly he appreciated by those whom illiteracy have rendered
impervious to extemal stimuli or contending ideas. Democracy and respect for human
rights thrive in literate societies. The high illiteracy in Liberia enabled their oppression
and domination.
The short point in the above-mentioned factors and issues is that "the problem of
civil conflict in Africa is essentially a problem of govemance.'*w3It is not a coincidence
that those Afncan States characterized by lack of democratic accountability, well
fùnctioning judicial systems, gmss and systemic abuse of human rights, and ethnic
politics994havefound themselves enmeshed in civil conflicts. It is not being suggested
here that democracy, good govemance and indigenous constitutions reflecting the culture
and aspirations of a people would instantaneously conjure political stability and

economic d e v e l ~ ~ r n e nRather,
t . ~ ~ good governmce in the long run, affords the best
avenue for the prevention and management of grievances which lead to violent intemal
c~nflicts.~~~
Those Afncans who argue that the elements of good governance are of relevance
only to the Western world are senously mistaken. It is as much ~ f n ' c a n ~ ~ it
' a is
s global.
Indeed, of late, several Afncan countries at various international fora have declared and
re-affirmed the direct relevance of good govemance to continental peace, economic
progress, stability and collective securityw8 This is evident in the lune 1990 OAU
993
994
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"Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Afnca" recognizing the
direct inter-dependence of collective security on good govemance in the continent.999At
the Afican Leadership Forum held in Kampala in May 1991 a conference on Security,

Stability, Development abd Cooperation in Africa modelled on the European Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe offered a holistic framework on good govemance
and collective s e c ~ r i t y . The
' ~ Conference clearly identified democratization, popular
participation and accountability as the key to security and stability in the continent.
Finally, at the 3sLhSurnmit of the OAU in Algiers, Algena held on 10-14 July 1999, the
heads of state of AfEcan countries while acknowledging the points above adopted an
unanimous resolution to "isolate any goveniment in the region that cornes to power by
force of arms.rrlOOl In addition, the body resolved to suspend membewhip of any country
under military rule. While one cannot really be sanguine about the seriousness of the
OAU's resolve in this regard, the nse of the conscioumess of the inherent dangers of
illegitimate govemance arnongst Afncan states is a welcome develoPment?"
Another aspect of the problem is "the consistent relationship between national
poverty and the level of respect for human rightsrr 1003which usually occasions civil strife.
The economic situation in Afnca which has been notoriously worsened by grafi,

corruption, appropriation and theft of the state purse by rulers has been fùrther
complicated by continous drop in the pnce of commodities and a shift of Western
attention to Eastern Europe. Legitimate govemance can hardly be sustained on empty
wallets and stomachs. According to a United Nations Report, Afncan countries lost SSO
billion between 1986 and 1992 as a result of falling commodity prices.'m It is interesting
on 2 1 July 1999.
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to note that the rebellion in Liberia was also fueled by the econornic downturn in that
country. With the fa11 in revenue earnings and loss of foreign economic aid which

hitherto flowed by virtue of Liberia's geo-political relevance under the Cold War, the
incornpetence and illegitimacy of the Doe regUne became more pronounced. The fa11 of
the Berlin Wall has both symbolically and practically pemiitted a massive movement of

financial and human capital to that part of the world by West European and North
Amencan govenunents and corpoations. In fact, the movement of scarce Afncan high
skilled labour to Europe and Amenca may not be u n c o ~ e c t e dwith the bad governance
and consequent strife in e c a n countries. It is not accidental that Afncan countries

witnessing civil strife are those in which economic institutions have al1 but collapsed. The
obvious loser is the African continent and its pe0p1es.l"~
The international comrnunity c m avoid and reduce cases of intemal civil strife by
other ways including revisiting the normative regime on the law on recognition of
govemments and non-intervention.Im PLfrican countries have tended to ignore the
negative normative impact of according recogniti~n'~~'to
cut-throat warlords in control
the capital city of their c o u n t r i e ~ . 'It~ ~
is~quite revealing that in the Liberian cnsis,

ECOWAS and the UN Security Councii passed resolutions declaring that they would not
recognize any govemment in Liberia that emerged through the smoking barrels of the

gun. If the Doe govenunent, which emerged by literally slitting the belly of President
Tolbert had been denied international recogntion, the normative impact might have been
enormous.
The point is that the international commuinty would do well to collectively refuse
IOOS
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to sanctiQ raw rnight as right. Of course, there is practicai wisdom in not ignoring an
effective govenunent but such governments need not be publicly recognized or consarted

with as if coming to power on the bones and blood of victims of human nghts abuses is
of no significance. Such public recognition expressly and implicitly conférs undeserved

international legitimacy on the rogue government. The virtues of a collective and unified
avoidance and shunning of such governments can hardly be overstated. M e n the Doe
g o v e r n e n t emerged, it is intereshg to recall that while some states refiised to recognise
it, others chose to do "buslliess" with it. There is a high normative value in the interrelationship of govemments. States would do well to actively explore the provisions of
Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights providing for the

making of cornplaints to the Human Rights Committee (established by Article 28 of the
Convention) regarding Miactions of the obligations created in the Convention. It is

remarkable that no state, not even members of ECOWAS deemed it fit to lodge a formal
cornplaint at the Human Rights Committee against the excesses of Samuel Doe.

Afkican multi-lateral organizations should clearly articulate and publicize the
criteria for good governance in their area and errant governments shouid not be welcorne
in their fold. It is remarkable that this suggestion has just been embraced by the OAU at

its Summit in Iuly 1999.1°09This approach worked perfectly well in Lesotho in 1994. III
that country, the King, for no ostensible reason, sacked the Prime Minister and appointed
a new one.'o10This arbitrary and illegal conduct threw the country into himioil. The

Southem &can

Development Comrnunity (SADC) immediately issued an ultimatum

denying legitimacy to the usurper and threatened sanctions against the whimsical King.
Whereupon, the King immediately restored of the Prime Minister to office. Similar
attempts have failed elsewhere for lack of serious res01ve.~~"Scholars like

kaf for,'^'^
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'Oo9

~ranckl*'~
and ~ u n a n s a n ~ ' ~ ' ~ a gîhat
r e esuch rneasures on delegitimation will have

"normative, jurisprudential, political or socio-economic effect on both the rogue
governrnent and on the international order.**IO15

If international law is to be "no more than congealed politics,rr1016 such measures
will aid, modifjr, and humanize the political processes by which international law is made
and validated. Jurisprudentially, it may result in the nullification and invalidation of the

official processes of the rogue governmnent in the eyes of the international

c o ~ n r n u n i t ~It. ~may
~ ' ~ also d

t in loss of sovereiga diplornatic or jurisdictional

immunities. Politicaily such govexnexnnts rnay not participate in and derive the benefits
of mutual international intercourse. Economicaliy, they may be punished with sanctions

and their assets fiozen or seized like those of the Ceciras regime in Haiti. In the normative

sense, such measures will enhance the character of international law in its compliancepull and strenghten its capacity to aîtract habitua1 ~bedience.'~"These lessons are

immanent in the Liberian cri~is'~'~and
show up the inadequacies in contemporary
assumptions and practices of international law.

Turning to the Security Council, the systemic incoherence in the world order
regarding the application or enforcement of international noms gives cause for anxiety.

While the Security Council made the determinations that the situations in Iraq and
Liberia respectively constituted threats to international peace, it responded differently to
participartory legitimacy ...failcd ..Congo, Guinca, Mali.. .rcfUsed to take part in the proceedings." See
Bolaji Akmyerni " The Organization of Afncan Unity and the Concept o f Non-Interference in Interna1
Affairs of Member States" in Snyder & Sathirathai, eds., supra note 600 at 78.
'O1' Supra note 600.
"13 T.M. Franck and M.M. Munansangy The International Economic Order: I n t m a t i o ~Law
l
in the
Making (New York: UNlTAR, 1982) i t 2.
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both crises. For Iraq, it amassed the greatest m a d a and arsenal known to hurnanity to

expel that country's forces out h m Kuwait. On Liberia, it pontificated on peace and

"approved"'020of ECOWAS initiatives.
The Security Council's refusa1 or unwillingcess to effectively intemene in Sudan,

Congo and Sierra Leone gives room for regional assertiveness and hegemonism. The
apparent inconsistency inherent where "the butchers of Tiananmen and the Butcher of

Ham are embraced so that the United Nations can repel the Butcher of Baghdad,r r l O 2 l
undermines the international order of security. One is aware that political and meta-legal

considerations have largely detennined Security Council's articulation and execution of
its responsibilty.
However, in the diaiectical interaction between nonnative idealism and the
national

inter est^'"^ of the

Security Council permament members, the defeat of the

is a tragedy. In the prescient words of Edward C m ,

[Tlhe ideal once embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and
becomes the expresion of a selnsh interest, which must be destroyed in the
narne of a new ideal. This constant interaction of irreconciliable forces is
the stufT of politics. Every political situation contains mutually
incompatible elernents of utopia and reality, of morality and power.1024
Although this prognosis is no cause for despair, international lawyers should use the
unfortunate circurnstances as ventable materials for examining ways of d a n c i n g the
contemporary regirne of collective se~u.rity,'~~~rnost
probably beginning with refonn of
the Security ~ o u n c i l . ' Be
~ * that
~ as it may, the question is beyond the immediate scope of
'Ox UN SCOR, 47& Sess., 2974m Mtg., U . N . W . S/PV: 2974 (1991) Provisional Verbatim Record,
Statement of the Pprcsident, Mr. Bagbeni Adcito Nzcngeya. " The members of the Security Council
commend and approve of the efforts made by the ECOWAS Hcads of States to promote peace and
normalcy in Liberia."
'O" Michael Reisman, "Somc Lessons From Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics" f 64 Yale
Journal of Internationl Law at 203.
'OE H e n . , How Notions Behave, supra note 453 at 33 1
103
Supra note 977 at 260.
'O2' Reproduced in Okafor, ibid.
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There are heated arguments that the Security Ccouncil has become a "rubber stamp" for U.S foreign

this thesis. Having dispenseci with those issues, the next section explores ways and means
by which regionai arrangements may best be utilized for securing collective security
within the h e w o r k of the United Nations Charter.

policy . See Okafor, ibid. Various suggestions have been made in this regard. Ranging £tomcomplete
abolition of the veto powcr, expansion of the veto powcr to make it more rcprcsentative of the regions and
cultures of the worid, et cetera.

6.3: REGIONAL BODIES A N D COLLECTIVE SECUIUTY

In the 'world order perspective', the traditional separation of law and
politics is abolished and the legal scholar takes on the persona and the rote
of the politically+mgaged rhetoncian and activist.. .a solidarist direction.
The mode1 rests on the desire to direct international legal studies towards a
populist global condition in which every man, woman and child on earth
may live in peace and harmony, can be confident of political and social
dignity and can live in a balanced natural environment. No enlightened
person would disagree with any of these goals. Problems only arise in
attempting to know how best to pursue them. Should they be pursued
within the fiamework of the state system? Can they be pursued outside
that fia~nework?'~~'
Those who suppose that the legal system is a self suficient set of
rules existing outside of its participants and constraining lawyers and
judges to acts against their consciences will always be prevalent among
lawyers, judges and legal historians. Those who think that every human
action can be explained by the necessities of the prevailing social
environment and the requirements of nati0m.l security will always be
common among anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists. But
every so often in a human heart the ice will thaw, and a human person will
acknowled e his responsibility for other human persons he has
touched. 104'
Diverse scholarship on the desirable relationship between regional organizations and the
United ~ a t i o n s ' O ~ the
~ i n maintenance of international peace and security have identified
the salient battle for ~ u ~ r e m a c ~ ~ ~ ' 0 b e t w
these
e e n two regimes. In spite of the clear
primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of global peace, centnpetal

forces of regionalism tend to give the impression that both regimes are at par or at worst
in a giadiatorial stance. This state of affairs is reminiscent of the wars of junsdiction
fought by the English Courts of Admiralty and the Kings Bench in the 17Ih century and is
perhaps attributable to the self afflicted paralysis of the Security Council.

That the Secwity Council apparently takes action mainly when the interests of its
Robert Jackson, supra note 446.
Roger Clark, supra note 3 at 83.
1O29
Berhanykun Andemicael ed., Regionalism and the United Nations (New York: Oceana Publications,
1979) at 225.
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F-C-Okoye, International Law and the New A f ~ c a nStates (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1972) at 157.
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permanent members are involved can hardly be denied. Witness its action in Haiti and in
Iraq where the interests of a superpower were involved. Compare that with its inaction in
the Chechnya and Tibet crises where the interests of other permanent rnembers are

involved. If those are juxtaposed with its complete indifference to the chronic conflict in
Southern ~ u d a n , ' ~ ~ ' e exhortations
m~t~
on Burundi, Ethiopia, S i e m Leone, Zaire,
Guinea-Bissau and several other places, the realpolitik becomes obvious. Where it does
not clearly abdicate its role to maintain peace, it becomes a ventable avenue for
2
ineffective "conciliatory, hortatory or condemnatory~ 1 0 3rhetoric
and platitudes on peace.

This situation apparently affords fbel for the emergence of regional or ad-hoc
actions to secure global peace independent of the Security Council. This trend is
dangerous. The situation is hardly helped by the Charter of the United Nations in its
provisions on the proper role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international
peace. The Charter is not an examplar of precision and clarity in legal draftmanship as it
does not delimit with relative certainty the boundaries and terrns of association beniveen
regional organizations and the Security Council. Thus, the task of delimiting and defining
this important relationship appears to be a fùnction of uncoordinated state practice.
Towards striking a balance between the Security Council and regional initiatives a few
suggestions denved fiom the ECOWAS action in Liberia are worthy of consideration.
As an aside, the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter, which provides for a
unified military force capable of securing peace in troubled states need not be realized
literally but certain innovative arrangements are possible. Instead of the standing army
contemplated by the Charter, the United Nations Secretariat would do well to actualize its
currently proposed arrangement whereby units of the Armed Forces of some states will
be specially designated a United Nations force ready to be deployed at short notice.lo3'
1031

Wole Soyinka, n e Open Sore of A Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis (New York:
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While this arrangement is being examined, it is perhaps more fiuitful to examine how the
existing regional bodies may be harmonized and their abilities and potentials harnessed
for securing global peace within the existing fiamework of the Charter.

On how regional bodies may be incorporateci in the maintenance of international
peace by the Security Council, Tom Farer has pertinently suggested that the existing
relationship between the United Nations and the various regional bodies be urgently
redefined for

The =ope of the respective autonomy and areas of competence

and expertise of regional organizations should be clearly established. A situation like
Liberia's where ECOWAS, an organization designed for regional economic integration,
grapples with the problerns of peacekeeping and rnilitary enforcement of peace leaves
much to be desired. It lacked the experience, infiastructure, logistics and personnel for
the task and these obviously affected its performance in Liberia.
Although the Charter does not define the relationship between the United Nations
and regional ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n s , 'it~ ~would
'
be prudent to categonze and delimit them

depending on their constitutive treaties, focus and specialized competence. At the
moment no one can say with appreciable certainty which regional organizations in any
part of the globe could function under chapter 8 of the UN Charter. At the moment,

another economic body known as the Southern Afiican Development Commission
(SADC) is wrestling with the intricacies in of peace enforcement in

aire.'^^^ Regional

bodies dealing with educational, scientific, economic, environmental or o&er diverse
concerns should be so clearly recognized and their areas of special competence and
expertise delimited. This is probably the better way in which the envisaged closer
cooperation between both regimes could be e n h a n ~ e d . ' ~Peace
~ ' enforcement should not
>hnp:l/www.ngrguardiannews.com accessed on 3"' April 1999. Note that the same approach is being
pressed by the Francophone countries in West Afnca for the ECOMOG.
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be an "ail-corners" affair. The much expected regime of close cooperation between the
UN and regional organizations should be on a clearly established basis of recognition of

cornpetence.
Further, regional bodies should be encouraged to exchange information with the
Security Council. This can be achieved by inviting them to attend meetings of the
Security Council where matters of security affecting their respective regions are in issue.
The Secunty Council and regional organizations should have the mutual powers of
introducing matters to the respective agemda of each organ w h m necessary.'038Where
such efforts to cornpel the active involvement of the Security Council fails, the regional
body may ask for the Security Council's authorization to intervene in the conflict. If this
arrangement was in place, the reactionary efforts by Zaire and Ethiopia at the Security
Council which prevented a timely response by the CounciI to the Liberian crisis would
probably have been obviated. Similarly, it would obviate the inherent danger of abuse in
ex post facto

ratifications.

A syrnbiotic relationship between regional organizations and the Security Council

should be fostered.1039The
present fluid and distanced relationship between the Council
and regional organizations on security is undesirable. The former Secretary-General of

the United Nations, Boutros-Boutros Ghali in apparent rationalization of this fluid state
of affairs hailed it as affording some "usehl fiexibility conducive to a rich variety of
complementary roles.,rIû40 Arguing m e r , he posited that "just as no two regions or
situations are the sarne, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must
adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity.,*IO41 While these glonous
words for the contemporary regime of relationship between the United Nations and the

regional bodies have some element of truth, unfortunately there is no design of
1038
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cooperative work, the existence of which the Secretary General assumed. And that is the
cmx of the problem.
It is perhaps pertinent to recall that the former Secretary General of the United
Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali took an unprecedented step in 1994. On August 1, 1994
he held a meeting with the heads of al1 regional organizations committed to the

maintenance of regionai security such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
the European Union (EU), League of Arab States, NATO, OAU, ECOWAS et cetera.Io4'
At the meeting, it was reiterated that United Nations has the primary responsibility but
the need for some decentralization of that mandate under the Charter was acknowledged.
What then shall be the nature of this much heralded era of decentraiization of authonty?
From a sober examination of the relationship between the ECOWAS and the
Security Council in the management of the Liberian crisis, it can hardly be gainsaid that
some element of clear devolution and decentralization of authority is necessary. The
contemporary practice by which regional bodies like NATO, ECOWAS and the SADC
literally determine by themselves, the existence or otherwise of threats to international
peace, by-pass the Security Council by fomulating and enforcing perceived responses
thereto, is not only illegal but extremely dangerous. Indeed it strikes at the very root of
the essence of the existence of the Security ~ouncil.'"'

The question of primary

jurisdiction in maintenance of peace, globally or regionally, can hardly be resolved in
favour of regional bodies.'044Where the Security Council is unable to act, it may then
clearly and with a rather narrow margin of latitude, authonze a regional body recognized

as existing for the purposes of chapter 8 of the Charter to deal with the matter. In such a
situation, the Security Councii may still retain political and moral control over the
intervention. Such a delegation of authonty should be on very clear t e m s leaving no
--

p~
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room for an extended and tortured expansion by a regional body. For instance, the
mandate to a regional body to intervene rnay be limited in time and renewable by the
Security Council every three months.
The redefinition of the relationship between regional organizations and the
Security Council should not only be articulateci before the emergence of crisis situations
but where violent conflicts arise which threaten international peace, the role of the two
regimes should be clearly defined. A few lessons derived fiom the ECOWAS action in
Liberia may be helpfùl. Owing to the proximity of regional organizations to the
c o n f l i ~ t , it
' ~ is
~ ~not difficult to foresee a situation where blinded by the dusts of the
conflict, regional organizations bring their own agenda and perspectives to the conflict
and thus rnay compound an already grave and complex s i t ~ a t i o n .in
' ~the
~ Liberian case,
it was no secret that the Francophone States and their Anglophone counterparts brought

their mutual suspicions and prejudices to bear upon their perception of the p r ~ b l e r n . ' ~ ~ ~
However, the maintenance of international peace and security by the Security
Councit does not necessarily mean that the Security Council must be involved in every

minute aspect of crisis detection and peace enforcement. It may deiegate some of its
functions to regional bodies and yet maintain direct control of the extent of the use of
force and formulate general policies behind such actions. In the circumstances, it is
suggested that in addition to those non-permanent members of different continents sitting
as members of the Security Council, regional organizations with security interests should

be relied upon for information regarding the state of security in their respective regions.

This acknowledges that regional organizations are best situated to appreciate the

emergence of threats to international peace at their earliest stages, yet it hardly addresses
the problem of absence of standing at the Security Council of regional bodies. This is one
IM5
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way by which the m a h g of a determination by the Security Council of the emergence of
a threat to internationl peace could have appreciable objectivity.

How will the information relevant for the making by the Security Council of the
determination that there exists a threat to international peace in a porticular case be
effectively used if the regional bodies on security have no competence to table such
issues as part of the agenda of the Security Council? It is probable that the information
gathered by the regional bodies in the exercise of their advantages of proximity to the
emerging threat to peace rnay end up as a buiky and dust ridden file in an obscure office
at the United Nations. If the information is passed on to the continental representatives at
the Security Council, chances are that it may never see the light of day. The case of

Libena is in point.'048
Therefore, there is a need for a review of the procedural rules of the Security
Council to enable regional bodies, relying on their perceived higher margin of
appreciation of threats to international peace, to table such emerging crises before the
Security Council. This necessarily calls for a clearer definition of the scope of authority
of regional bodies and how best they can be utilized while remaining under the direction
of the Security Council. There is hardly any denying the reality that a concerted global

approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution is far more preferable to
regional initiatives.
The question of fùnding of operations has profound implications that have to be
resolved. The situation in Liberia is again instructive. In the ECOWAS action it has been
estimated that as at 1994, the surn of $90 million was expended. Of this sum only S18.4
was contributed by the United Nations Trust Fund. Seventy per cent of the balance was

borne by ~ i ~ e r i a .Several
" ~ ~ of the West African troops in Libena were paid their
-
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salaries directly from their respective govemments. Several West Afkican States could
hardly afford the cost of keeping their troops in Liberia This necessarily raised at least
two dangers.
First, as the salaries were in some cases unpaid for rnonths, some of the
peacekeepers began to engage in activities incompatible with their peacekeeping status.
Substantiai and senous cases of looting, expropriation and theA of Liberian assets by the

ECOMOG peacekeeping troops have been widely reprted. 'OM

Extortion of the

traumatized Liberians by the ECOMOG peacekeepm were also reported.'"'

Second,

regional enforcement actions have shown that they are more or less unilateral in character
even when masked in the toga of the regional machinery. This is more pronounced in the
aspect of funding and when the peacekeepers are paid from the respective accounts of
their different countries. Loyalty is split and those contrîbuting countries who can afford
to pay their soldiers are more likely and able to hijack the supposed regional and
collective effort.
The ECOWAS action in Liberia was largely dominated and inspired by the
military govemment in Nigeria. Of the 12 billion United States dollars spent by
ECOWAS in the cnsis, Nigeria accounted for 8 billion dollars.'052Hence, the impression
and allegation that the ECOWAS action in Liberia was in fact a Nigerian quest for

hegemonial control of West Afnca. Similar allegations are present in the ECOWAS
intervention in the Sierra Leonean crsis.'OS3The NATO intervention in Kosovo cnsis has
equally been perceived as a US attempt to impose its will and ideology in the ~ a l k a n s . ' ~ ~ '
The current SADC intervention in the Zairean crisis has equally been inspired by

Zimbabwe whose Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, is known to harbour ideas about
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To reduce and possibly avoid this

debilitating suspicion when regional enforcement actions are in place, the b d s for the
maintenance of peacekeeping troops should be in one pool regardless of the contibution
of any state and managed by the civilian administative body of the relevant regional
~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n ' ~ * ~or
a nwith
d / the UN.

In addition, a professional civilian staff to monitor and document the excesses of
the military aspect of the enforcement actions should be institutionalized and made
answerable to the office of the Secretary-General o f the United Nations. This should be
made to work in liasion with that regional organization and should also serve as a
clearing ground for regional bodies already at work in trouble spots. Unlike the UN
Special Representative or High Commisioner which are usually appointed after the
conflict has been resolved, this kind of agency would serve as information gathering and
collation centre during the edorcement of peace by a regional organization so as to
ensure that human rights abuses by peacekeepers and warring factions are not lefi
undocumented and ~ n ~ u n i s h e d .In
' ~ ~the
~ Liberian case, the ECOMOGNNOMIL
peacekeepers were alleged to have abused women and young girls, siring over 25,000
children in the process.1058A UN Special Represenative who merely visits refugees fiom
the conflict and aies back to New York to deliver "a special report" is absolutely useless
in the documentation and collation of incidents of human rights abuses perpetrated in the
field of conflict.

On the sexual abuse of Liberian women and girls, the Nigerian dominated

contingent with over 5,000 troops in the ECOMOG accounts for 50 per cent of the
number of children bom to the peacekeepers, the remaining 50 per cent is split by
IO55
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Ghanaian, Guinean, the Gambian and Sien Leonean fathers.Io5' Most of the girls were
between 13 and 16 years of age and reportedly had affairs with ECOMOG soldiers in
return for food and protection during the war.lo6' in the absence of an effective civilian

machinery to supervise the conduct of ECOMOG troops in Liberia, over 85 per cent of
the young girls sexually abused by the peacekeepers are yet to locate the soldiers nor
establish contacts between them and the "ECOMOG Children." Sadly, a combination of a
paucity of reliable documentation of the atrocities by the warring factions and the
peacekeepen, and the absence of the necessary political will has made it impossible for
criminal charges to be pressed against the perpetrators of atrocities in the conflict. 'O6'
Furthemore, the noms on intervention should be codified. Just as the United
Nations International Law Commission has researched and codified several applicable
noms, it is high time a body of experts evaluated the cases of multilateral enforcemenî
actions and came up with principles which may be adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in the form of a Dedaration. In this context, a few suggestions may be
worth trying.
First, no regional enforcement action may be countenanced without the express
authorization of the Security Council first sought and obtained. Ex postfacto ratifications
of unilateral regional enforcement actions leave ample room for abuse and arbitrariness
and does great damage to the normative order on the use of force. Second, no regional

organization purporting to enforce the peace may enter a field of conflict without an
effective cease-fire in place. The attack on ECOMOG troops by the NPFL rebels was
Iargely a function of the absence of a prior effective cease-fire before the ECOMOG
purported to enforce the "cease-fire. 331062 This factor also contributed to the protracted
nature of the conflict and actual intervention and literally made ECOMOG a party to the
'0s9
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conflict. Third, there must be clear lines demarcating the combatants themselves and the
interventionist forces. A situation in which the rebels, the vestiges of the government
troops and the ECOMOG peacekeeepers had little or no clear lines of demarcation
contributed to the high casualty rate and chaotic nature of the conflict and its resolution
by the interventionist forces. Similarly, the absence of a clearly demarcated line of

conflict and intervention obscured the apportionment of responsibility for human rights
abuses perpetrated in the conflict.
If serious abuses of human nghts are perpetrated in areas where the lines of
separation are not clear, it is very easy for the crime to go undetected, and if detected, to
' ~ ~ may
~
remain unpunished. Fourth, the interventionist force m u t be clearly n e ~ t r a l . This
best be achieved by a prior express authonzation of the Security Council and scmpulous
cornpliance with the regional organization's constitutional mechanism. The fudgy and ad
hoc manner in which ECOWAS approved and "ratified" its decision to intervene in
Liberia cast serious doubts on its neutrality and this in turn impacted negatively on its
perception by the warring factions.
Fifth, the mandate of the regional enforcers of peace must necessarily be subject
to the ovemding authority of the Secwity Council. Finally, to secure collective security,
we must first secure social distributive justice. Within the A h c a n context with a
multitude of ethnic groups split across different fiontiers of that continent's fifty-three
countries, the practice of a holistic conception of collective security and distributive
social justice secured by good govemance is the antidote to the needless civil conflicts
ravaging the continent. Collective security and social justice, in the words of Nigenan
novelist Chinua Achebe, are "two sides of the same coin.r91064

-

1063

Sup ru.
1064
Chinua Achebe, The Trouble Wirh Nigeria. (London: Heinemann, 1983) at 24.

6.4 CONCLUSION

This thesis has examuied the legdity of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia
within the standpoint of collective security in a dynamic world. The Liberian state in its
structure, polity and organization raises questions as regards the nature of statehood in
Afnca, mode of governance and raison d'ene. With this cornes the urgent need for a
redefinition of the parameters of govemance in Afnca. Further, the causes of the Liberian
conflict raise interesting issues conceming the impact of global events and phenornena on
the stability and secunty of most Afncan States. The intervention itself marked the first
active collaboration in peacekeeping by a regional organization with the United Nations.
This unprecedented development presents an interesting bu? potentially dangerous
precedent. This thesis has also explored some of the aspects relating to the Charter
regime on the use of force especiaily the relationship between chapters 7 and 8.
Some concluding observations are now pertinent. First, although heavy weather

has been made about the colonial legacy in AfEca of the Berlin demarcated boundaries,
the instability and civil crises in that continent are essentially a question of bad
governance. The Berlin boundaries may inflame and exacerbate those conflicts when as a
result of decay in the polity they arise. The direct link between legitimate govemance and
stability in the state is now deservedly well established. Second, the regime on
recognition of governments needs urgent reappraisal. Regarding the intervention, several
issues are raised. First, it raises the question of whether a regional organization can use
force to maintain peace within its area of relevance, given the paralysis of the Security
Council and the increasing marginalization and marginality of Africa in global relevance.
With notorious UN indifference or half-hearted responses to militaristic conflicts in

Sudan, Zaire, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Uganda and
Somalia, Burundi, and other flashpoints in Afnca, the temptation for relatively powerfbl
neighbouring states to seize the initiative and intervene cannot lightly be discounted.

This is moreso, when the chords of ethnic affiliations have surviveci the European
knife of division of Afnca at the 1884 Berlin Conférence. One can only refer to the
Watutsi (Tutsi) crisis in CentralEast Africa which has found expression in the infarnous
Rwandan genocide, Zairean war, and severai other ethnic motivated crises in that part of

the continent. Consequently, the dangers of abuse inherent in the ECOWAS precedent
may be worse than the Security Council's notorious indifference. The imperative

question that arises is how to improve the relationship between the Securîty Council and
regional organizations in the maintenance and enforcement of peace.
In this context one cannot fail to question the role and responsibility of members
of the UN Security CounciI, especially the permanent members. 1s their pnmary

responsibility to global concerns held hostage by their selfish and national interests? If
the permanent members of the Council look out for their respective national interests at
the expense of their responsibility to the globe, the attitude is orninous. The diversity of
the issues raised in the Liberian conflict and the consequent military intervention by
ECOWAS are almost infinite. However, in examining some of them, this thesis has

located the seeds of the conflict, not only in Liberia's (and by parity of reasoning, other
African states') histoncal foundations but in contemporary factors. It has also identified

the catalysts of such crises within the international framework.
Further, it has examined the relevant doctrines on the enforcement of peace in the
context of contemporary state practice and the prognosis is that the world is at risk of an

era when regional organizatiow assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of
global peace on theü own terms without substantive reference to the United Nations

Security Cowicil. Unilaterdism which has been veiled in multi-lateral actions is
becoming rampant and the Security Council is increasingly asniming the diminished role
of a "legitimizer", and ratifier of its hijacked legal responsibility. There is no indication
that this trend would not continue and its impact on the Charter law would be enormously
negative. If the concept and practice of collective secwity must have meaning at
international law, it must not only be by a collective effort through a iegitimate,
representative and responsible Security Council but must also perceive of security in its
holistic character, unabriged or defiled by parochial pretensions of powerfiil states.
Perhaps this thesis should be closed with the words of Polish contemporary poetess,
Wislawa ~ z ~ m b o r s k a . ' ~ ~ ~

Oh, the leaky boundaries of man-made states!
How many clouds float past them with impunity;

How much desert sand shifts fiom one land to another,
How many rnountain pebbles tumble into foreign soi1
In provocative hops!

IO65

Quoted in James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier-Exploring Gorvemance in a
Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univmity Press., 1999) at 45 1.
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